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INTRODUCTION
Promises lie at the center of persons' moral experience of one another,
and contracts lie at the center of their legal experience of one another. Many
of the most important relationships in our moral and legal culture
characteristically arise in connection with promises and contracts of some
form or other: Persons' families are connected to marriage promises, their
work is connected to employment contracts, and even their citizenship is
connected (albeit metaphorically) to the social contract. In all these cases,
and in myriad others, promises and contracts establish relations among the
persons who engage them.
But in spite of the obviously communal character of promise and
contract, the most prominent accounts of these practices remain firmly
individualistic, seeking to explain the obligations they involve in terms of
one or another service that these practices render to the several parties who
engage them. Some theories emphasize that promissory and contractual
obligations increase the freedom of promisors, by enabling them to project
their intentions into the future and rendering plans of action that require
such precommitments available to them.' Other theories emphasize
that promissory and contractual obligations reflect concern for the
reasonable expectations of promisees and the harms that promisees suffer
when these expectations are disappointed . And, most prominently, yet
other theories emphasize that promissory and contractual obligations
promote the well-being of both promisees and promisors, by increasing the
reliability of social coordination and promoting the efficient allocation of
resources. 3 These theories differ from one another in many ways, to be sure,
and they often cast themselves as competitors. But they are of a piece
insofar as they all seek the roots of the morality of promise and contract in
properties of the several individual participants in such agreements.
I do not doubt that the individualistic values from which these theories
begin can give rise to reasons for action and indeed to moral obligations. I
insist, however, that individualistic theories do not capture or reflect the
distinctive moral center of promise and contract, which cannot be found in
1. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). Relatedly, see Randy E.
Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986); and Peter Benson,
The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
2. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT (1986); P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Contracts [hereinafter
Scanlon, Promises and Contracts], in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 1, at 86;
Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199 (1990) [hereinafter Scanlon,
Promises and Practices].
3. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
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any properties of the parties taken severally but appears instead in the
relations among persons that promises and contracts create. I develop the
insight that promise and contract establish relations among the persons who
engage them into a mature theory of promise and especially of contract, in
which I describe the relations among persons that promises and especially
contracts establish, and I characterize these relations in terms of familiar
and attractive moral and political values. I claim that promises generally,
and contracts in particular, establish a relation of recognition and respect-
and indeed a kind of community-among those who participate in them,
and I explain the reasons that exist for making and for keeping promises
and contracts in terms of the value of this relation.4
Moreover, I argue that contract participates in this ideal of respectful
community even though contracts typically arise among self-interested
parties who aim to appropriate as much of the value that contracts create as
they can. Respectful community, as I understand it, is a capacious ideal,
which encompasses many forms of joint endeavor, including contract. The
centerpiece of my approach to the morality of contract is an argument that
finds the value of community directly in the form of the contract relation
rather than in any substantive ends that the parties to contracts pursue. I
present a detailed account of the characteristic relations that this form of
community, which I call collaboration, involves.
Finally, because my ultimate purpose is to develop a theory of contract
law, I show that the contract relation as I characterize it is no mere
academic conceit but is instead immanent in our legal practice. In
particular, I consider two familiar doctrinal puzzles presented by the law of
contracts-involving the consideration doctrine and the expectation
remedy-in light of the values that I claim lie beneath the contract relation.
4. My proposal that a moral analysis of promise and contract should turn to the value of the
relations that these practices involve, although out of the mainstream, is not unprecedented.
Individualistic theories of contract sometimes mention the contract relation in passing: Charles
Fried, for example, asserts that contracts can involve trust, and that persons may pursue trust for
its own sake. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 8. But Fried does not make this a substantial component
of his view. He never explains what trust is or how contracts (especially contracts among
self-interested parties whose functioning depends on state enforcement) involve trust, and his
substantive arguments about contract all return inexorably to ideas about freedom.
More auspiciously, Joseph Raz has suggested that promises create a "special bond" between
promisor and promisee and that the value of this bond might "explain[] not only why one ought to
keep promises one has made, but also why it is good to make promises." Joseph Raz, Promises
and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210,
227-28 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977). Raz's approach to promise and contract, which
I take up in some detail in Subsection I.C.2, remains purely formal, however. He is concerned
with explaining how promissory and contractual obligations might function in our practical
reasoning more generally and expressly makes no effort to identify the substantive features of
promissory and contractual relations that give them their value.
These pages, by contrast, present a sustained, substantive account of the moral value of
promise and contract relations and propose, in this way, to construct a genuine competitor to the
dominant views.
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I argue that the general theory of contractual obligation I am proposing
underwrites a more satisfactory account of these doctrines than has so far
been possible.
I seek, then, to reclaim for practical philosophy the communal character
that is the essence of both the obligations and the lived experience of
promise and contract, and that the dominant, individualistic accounts
obscure. Furthermore, instead of deriving the morality of promise and
contract from more general and more fundamental moral principles (of
freedom, harm, or welfare), I understand promise and contract as presenting
distinctive and freestanding moral ideals. These ideals, moreover, radiate
outwards from promise and contract, to illuminate aspects of practical life
that lie beyond the narrow confines of these practices. I propose, at the end
of the argument, that the collaborative ideal I find in the contract relation
represents a crucial foundation stone for the authority of modem, pluralist
economic and political institutions. In addition to developing a legal theory
of contract, these pages therefore also contribute to the political theory of
the market, and indeed of liberalism.
At the same time, the theory that I develop remains humble in other
important ways, and it pays to identify these before commencing with the
argument, in order to avoid appearing to claim more than I do. I do not
deny that a wide array of moral obligations arise in and around promise and
contract or that many of these obligations may be illuminated by reference
to the ideas of freedom, harm, and welfare that figure so prominently in the
familiar theories of contract that I seek to supplant.5 I deny only that these
obligations are of a piece with promise and contract, and that these familiar
explanations capture the characteristic moral and legal core of promise and
contract. Moreover, I focus my attention on contracts among individual,
natural persons. I take these cases to represent the core of contract and
content myself to address contracts that involve organizations in a
derivative fashion only.6 Each of these restrictions is intimately connected
to my broader ambitions. A theory that understands contract as a distinctive
and freestanding fount of moral obligation will naturally distinguish
between contract proper and various associated forms of obligation; and a
theory that seeks to connect contract to the basic structure of liberal
political authority will naturally emphasize the individual persons to whom
political justifications must be addressed.
5. Fried has similarly observed that many obligations that are not strictly speaking contractual
can arise in and especially around circumstances that generate contractual obligations, and he has
suggested that it was one of the weaknesses of the classical account of contract law dogmatically
to deny this. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 6.
6. See infra Section I.B.
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I. INTRODUCING THE PROMISE RELATION
I have proposed to develop the morality of promises and contracts-
including both the reasons for making and for keeping promises and
contracts-in terms of the relations that promises and contracts engender.
In this Part, I develop the basic ideas that figure in the morality of promises
quite generally. I delay any more specific discussion of special cases of
promise-including, in particular, contract-until later Parts. The larger
argument therefore proceeds through several increasingly specific stages. In
this first stage, I introduce the promise relation, and the values that it
involves, in generic terms. In the next stage, I develop a more precise
account of the particular form that the promise relation takes on through the
legal institution of contract. (One of the main challenges of the argument,
once again, is to show that even a form of promise so impersonal and
instrumental as contract-a practice in which the parties each try to take
advantage of the other-produces a relation of community that can sustain
substantial reasons for making and keeping contracts.) Then, in the
argument's final stage, I connect this philosophical characterization of the
contract relation to certain central components of that relation's legal, and
indeed doctrinal, expression.
A. Truth-Telling and Community
I begin at some distance from contract and indeed even from promise
by considering the reasons that support truth-telling and oppose lying. I
explain these reasons by reference to the relation of community that truth-
telling creates between a speaker and her listeners, and that lying destroys.
The account of truthfulness that I develop provides the material out of
which I construct the theories of promise and eventually of contract that
remain my ultimate goal.7
When a person tells the truth, she promotes a kind of community
between herself and her listeners. By telling the truth, a person gives
her listeners access to what she knows, to her point of view of the world, or
at least of her subject, and in this way she enables them to share it:
The truth-teller and her listeners can approach the subject matter of her
truth-telling together, and on equal terms. Lying, by contrast, places a
speaker actively out of community with her listeners. At least insofar as a
lie succeeds-insofar as the listeners are deceived-the liar and the
listeners cannot share a point of view with respect to the lie's subject
7. This account of truth-telling has grown out of a conversation that I had with Kevin Stack
while walking through the Covered Market in Oxford, where we were both graduate students, in
the early 1990s. I can no longer remember who said what, but I am certain that Kevin's
contributions were substantial.
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matter: The liar knows something that the listeners do not-this is precisely
the nature of a lie-and this combination of knowledge and ignorance
opens up a gulf between them.8 And even when a lie fails, so that the
listener discovers the truth, the liar and the listener approach their
knowledge separately rather than together. One might say that prior to
communication persons are strangers with distinct points of view. Truth-
telling brings persons together, engendering a community by creating a
shared point of view. And lying forces persons apart, estranging them from
each other by making their points of view incompatible.
Truth-telling and lying, on this account and also in most people's naive
imaginings, involve questions of what to believe-that is, questions of
theoretical reason. But truth-telling and lying are not exclusively theoretical
activities, and a person might tell the truth or might lie not only in order to
get another to believe something, but also in order to get another to do
something. And these practical cases of truth-telling and lying produce
effects that display close analogies to the forms of community and
estrangement described in the discussion of purely theoretical lies. A
doctor, for example, might truthfully report her diagnosis in order to
encourage a person to choose an appropriate treatment; and a propagandist
might lie about a political matter in order to encourage a person to support a
political adventure that he would oppose if he understood the truth. It seems
natural, in the first case, to say that the truthful doctor respects her patient
and supports his effort to return to good health, and indeed that the two
pursue this effort together; just as it seems natural, in the second case, to
say that the propagandist disrespects her victim and frustrates his effort at
political participation, and indeed that she undertakes the adventure without
him, or at least that his participation in the adventure is in some way
alienated. Accordingly, one might say, in these practical cases also, that
prior to communication persons are strangers who act separately; that truth-
telling enables them to act together; and that lying sets them apart from
each other.
These remarks about truth-telling and lying render intuitive that such
behaviors may be understood not just in terms of the benefits and harms
that they confer on the persons involved in them taken severally, but also in
terms of the relations that they establish among these persons taken
together. Of course, these are rough characterizations only, and an adequate
explanation of the morality of truthfulness must replace the intuitive
suggestion that truth-telling engenders community and that lying causes
8. The liar will of course be aware of this gulf, at least insofar as knowing misrepresentation
is an element of lying. (This certainly seems a natural suggestion, although nothing will turn on
the point here.) Moreover, because a listener may know that he has been lied to even as he
remains ignorant of the truth that the lie conceals, the listener may also be aware of the gulf
opened up by the lie.
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estrangement with a more precise and more articulate account of the forms
of community and estrangement at play.
I begin this project of elaboration by taking up certain of Kant's ideas
about lying. This is a natural starting point because the intuitive ideals
of respect and community that I have invoked are themselves Kantian in
their inspiration. Returning to Kant enables me to develop these ideals in
greater detail and in this way to describe the precise moral relations that
truth-telling and lying create. At the same time, my interest in Kant is
shamelessly instrumental rather than exegetical: I seek to borrow some of
Kant's ideas in the service of developing my own account of the moral
relations involved in truth-telling and lying, and I do not worry or indeed
explain when my views depart from Kant, or from more orthodox
interpretations of Kant, as they certainly do. Moreover, because this
exercise in the morality of truthfulness comprises only the first step toward
the theories of promise and contract that remain my ultimate goal, its
purpose departs from its nominal subject, and I do not worry or explain
when the account falls short of presenting a complete view of the subject.
Kant develops his moral ideas, including even the basic moral principle
he calls the Categorical Imperative, in several ways, by means of several
formulations. 9 Kant considers truth-telling and lying several times, under
more than one of these formulations, but his views receive their most
persuasive development through one approach in particular, under the
version of the Categorical Imperative that Kant calls the Formula of the End
in Itself. l0 This principle, which is also sometimes called the Formula of
Humanity," instructs: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a
means, but always at the same time as an end."' 12 The Formula of the End in
Itself expresses ideals of respect and community closely allied to those that
I have been invoking. It contains, as is often observed, two distinct
commands concerning how to treat humanity, in the form of the persons
with whom one interacts: 13 first, that one should never use persons merely
as means; and second, that one should always treat them as ends in
themselves.14 Moreover, these two commands describe, on Kant's view,
9. Kant suggests that the several formulations of the Categorical Imperative that he presents
are equivalent. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 437-38 (H.J.
Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785). I believe that he was mistaken to think so.
10. Id. at 427-30.
11. See, e.g., CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 137 (1996).
12. KANT, supra note 9, at 429 (emphasis omitted).
13. "Humanity," as Christine Korsgaard points out, is used by Kant to refer to the "capacity
to determine ends through rational choice." KORSGAARD, supra note 11, at 137; see also id. at
346. Kant observes that although this capacity may arise in any rational being, we experience it
only in human persons. KANT, supra note 9, at 428-29.
14. This distinction is emphasized, for example, in ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF
REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 112-13 (1989).
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distinct rules of conduct governing participation in the respectful
community of free and rational persons. The principle that one should never
use persons merely as means prohibits actions that follow principles or
rules (Kant calls them maxims) that could not possibly be accepted by the
persons whom the actions affect. The principle that one should always treat
other persons as ends in themselves prohibits actions in pursuit of ends that
the persons whom they affect cannot share.
15
These two distinct although sometimes overlapping commands express
two parts of an intuitively powerful conception of moral life-two rules of
conduct that persons must adopt in order for a moral community to arise
among them. The first command-about not using persons merely
as means-captures the idea that persons are not simply available
to one another. Unlike things, persons have independent intellects and
wills-independent points of view-concerning the world and their places
in it. A person who acts against others based on a maxim that they cannot
accept in effect denies this: She bypasses their points of view (their
intellects and their wills) altogether and so treats them not as persons but
merely as things.
The second command-about treating persons as ends in themselves-
captures the idea that even though persons are not simply available to one
another, they must nevertheless be open to one another. Persons must be
open to one another both for the instrumental reason that there are some
ends that they can achieve only by acting together and for the intrinsic
reason that they have an inner need to act together or, to put it the other way
around, because they can be lonely and generally dislike it.' 6 A person who
acts against others in pursuit of ends that they cannot share, even if she
responds to their wills in one way, does so on terms that necessarily set her
15. This development of the two components of the Formula of the End in Itself follows the
work of Korsgaard and Onora O'Neill. See KORSGAARD, supra note 11, at 137-38; O'NEILL,
supra note 14, at 112-13. O'Neill's discussion emphasizes more clearly than Korsgaard's that the
two components of the formula are distinct and complementary-that they identify "two separate
aspects to treating others as persons." O'NEILL, supra note 14, at 113.
My development of these ideas lies somewhat beyond the mainstream, both in the emphasis
that I give the distinction between the two components of the Formula of the End in Itself and,
relatedly, in the construction that I give the second component, in particular in my focus on the
idea of sharing ends with others and thereby entering into community with them. The more
common approach to these matters is perhaps represented by Paul Guyer, who dispenses with my
particular emphasis on sharing and community and instead views the imperative to treat other
persons as ends in themselves as a command generically "to enhance their prospects for the
successful exercise of their agency," including "by directly assisting [them] in their pursuit of
[their] ends." PAUL GUYER, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW, AND HAPPINESS 148 (2000). Although I
insist that my approach captures something essential to our moral experience of other persons, I
do not (as I have said) vouch for it as an account specifically of Kant's ideas.
16. These two reasons come together in the human attraction to games, whose charm lies not
just in the individual tasks that they involve but also (as the unsatisfactory character of the many
forms of solitaire attests) in the fact that they constitute forms of interpersonal solidarity.
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apart from them and therefore that rule out joint participation in the acts in
question.
Someone who violates these two commands refuses to engage others as
persons, in the first case by declining to address them at all and in the
second case by addressing them on terms that they cannot accept. And in
refusing to engage them, she estranges herself from them and renders
shared participation in a respectful relation-at least in connection with the
actions in question--quite literally impossible.
This elaboration of the forms of estrangement may be applied to the
case of lying in order to develop a more complete and precise
characterization of my earlier intuitive suggestion that a lie separates liar
from listener. Indeed, Kant himself pursues this possibility and illustrates
the Formula of the End in Itself by discussing, among other examples, the
wrongness of lying.17 As it happens, the particular lie by reference to which
Kant illustrates his views involves a lying promise: Kant imagines that a
person borrows money that he knows he will be unable to repay, and that he
intends not to repay, but nevertheless (in order to procure the loan) gives a
firm promise to repay the money within a fixed time. 18 In what, Kant asks,
does the wrong committed by the lying promisor consist-how does he fail
to treat the victim of his lie with the respect that morality demands? The
Formula of the End in Itself generates the answer-really the two
answers-to Kant's question. As Kant says, "[T]he man whom I seek to use
for my own purpose by such a [false] promise cannot possibly agree with
my way of behaving to him, and so cannot himself share the end of the
action."'
9
17. As Korsgaard observes, lying is, for Kant, one of the two "most fundamental forms of
wrongdoing to others." KORSGAARD, supra note 11, at 140. The other form is coercion. Id. The
reason for this, according to Korsgaard, is that lying and coercion quintessentially undermine the
assent of their victims-lying by manipulating the victim's will and coercion by bypassing the
victim's will altogether. Id.
I cast the wrong of lying slightly differently from Korsgaard, not only as assaulting the will
of the listener but also, through this assault, as estranging the liar from the listener and rendering a
community between them impossible. I do not have anything explicit to say about coercion,
although I believe that an account analogous to the argument that I make about lying is possible in
that case also.
18. KANT, supra note 9, at 422. Kant does not expressly say why this lying promise is a lie in
the ordinary sense at all. He presumably treats it as a lie about the promisor's capacityor intention
to repay the loan. This view of the lying promise is persuasively defended by Pill Ardal. Ardal
begins by observing that "[p]romises are statements, whatever else they may involve," and
specifically, that "[o]rdinary promises ... both state an intention of the speaker, and make an
assertion about his future action." Pill S. Ardal, And That's a Promise, 18 PHIL. Q. 225, 225-26
(1968). This enables Ardal to say (as I have done) that "a false promise is deceitful, because it
states something which is not the case, i.e., the promisor's intention to do what he promises to do.
On my view, a lying promise is a lie." Id. at 228. For a detailed account of the propositional
content specifically of contractual promises that includes economic and doctrinal illustrations, see
IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT
(forthcoming 2005).
19. KANT, supra note 9, at 429.
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The two parts of this compact indictment of the lying promise should
be distinguished and separately emphasized, because they recapitulate the
two distinct principles contained in the Formula of the End in Itself. First,
the victim of the false promise cannot possibly agree to the plan in which
the promisor involves her. Insofar as the lie at the heart of the false promise
succeeds, the false promisor's victim lacks the information necessary to
agree to the plan, so that rather than being a participant in the plan, she
becomes its object. This remains true even if the false promisor's victim
would be willing to give him the money outright. She cannot agree to give a
gift as long as she believes that she is making a loan. 20 The false promisor
uses his victim, as Kant would say, merely as a means.2'
And second, the victim of the false promise cannot share in the lying
promisor's ends. In the case of the successful lying promise (the case in
which the victim is in fact deceived), she cannot share in the promisor's
ends because he has not invited her to but has, instead, kept her in the dark
about them. And even when the lie in a lying promise fails, so that the
victim knows (in the case at hand) that the promisor has no intent to repay
the money and therefore resists being used as a mere means, she still cannot
share in his ends. Moreover, she cannot share in his ends even if, for some
reason or other, she does not object to giving him the money outright and
even if she does not object to being deceived into doing so. Even if the
lying promisor's victim does not object to his plans, she cannot join in
them: Her ends and his might coincide, but they cannot be shared. This is
what Kant must mean when he says, separately from his claims about
treating persons merely as means, that the liar fails to treat his victim as an
end.22 Even when the victim of a lying promise is not as it happens
manipulated, even when she is not treated merely as a means, she is
20. For further discussion of this point, see KORSGAARD, supra note 11, at 138-39, 346-47.
21. This explains, incidentally, why lying is such a dangerous practice for Kant, and why it is
so difficult to justify even well-motivated lies (for example, white lies or lies told to thwart evil
intentions in those whom they deceive). It is dangerous to make a means of a person, for her
freedom makes her an unpredictable means. As Arthur Ripstein observes, Kant suggests that to lie
to persons is to "convert them into a mere thing, through which responsibility flows back to you."
Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Luck, and Responsibility, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 9 n.12 (1994).
Ripstein concludes that to lie, for Kant, is "to play a game of chance with another's agency." Id.
(discussing IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right To Lie from Altruistic Motives, in CRITIQUE
OF PRACTICAL REASON 346 (Lewis White Beck trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1949) (1788)).
22. This important but tricky point is easily missed. Korsgaard, for example, devotes several
pages to explaining why the lying promisor treats his listener merely as a means, but only one
paragraph to discussing why he fails to treat her as an end. And even in this paragraph, Korsgaard
merely repeats the argument concerning the impossibility of assenting to lying promises that
drove the former analysis, saying that "[w]hat matters" under the "failure to treat as an end" prong
of the Formula of the End in Itself is that the victim of a lying promise "never gets a chance to
choose the [promisor's] end, not knowing that it is to be the consequence of her action."
KORSGAARD, supra note 11, at 140. This formulation obscures the fact that the second prong of
the Formula of the End in Itself is distinct from the first and envisions an ideal of community that
involves not just the absence of manipulation but also a respectful sharing of ends. This feature of
community is essential to my eventual analysis of promise and contract.
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nevertheless not invited to share in the liar's ends as part of a respectful
community; and even if her ends and his coincide, the lie renders
23
impossible the shared ends that such a community involves.
This application of the second element of the Formula of the End in
Itself may seem odd-it may seem an unnatural understatement to express
the wrongness of lying by saying that the liar pursues ends that her victim
cannot share. But it illustrates something extremely important, namely that
the two commands of the Formula of the End in Itself pick out distinct
moral ideas, each of which contributes to the conception of respectful
community that stands behind the larger argument. The possibility of
community is undermined both when a person uses another as a means to
her ends, by manipulating him in ways that he cannot accept, and when a
person excludes another from the ends of actions that apply to him, by
pursuing (in such contexts) ends in which he cannot possibly share. The
Formula of the End in Itself therefore identifies two distinct ways in which
persons may become estranged from each other in connection with lying.
Successful lies, including Kant's example of the successful lying promise,
illustrate the first but obscure the second of these failures of community.
But unsuccessful lies emphasize the separate importance of the second form
of estrangement. This form, in which a person estranges herself from
another by adopting ends that he cannot possibly share, will be essential to
the account of honest promises that follows.
B. From Truth-Telling to Promising
Kant's account of the lying promise treats the lie that this case involves
as more fundamental morally than the broken promise. As the analysis in
the preceding pages reveals, the wrongness of the lying promise turns, for
Kant, on the fact that the listener is deceived and not on the fact that she is
in any separate sense disappointed. (The same argument would apply,
mutatis mutandis, to the case of an ordinary lie not couched in promissory
form-say, a lie committed by a wrongdoer who denies responsibility for a
harm in order to avoid her victim's claim to compensation.) Kant's analysis
of the obligation of truthfulness and the wrongness of lying therefore does
not extend in any mechanical way to the core cases of the morality of
23. The earlier discussion of purely theoretical lies did not consider the case in which a
purely theoretical lie fails-in which the listener remains undeceived. Accordingly, that
discussion did not inquire into whether the breakdown of community into separate points of view
that the successful theoretical lie causes also follows from the unsuccessful lie. In the practical
case, a respectful community requires not just a coincidence but also a sharing of ends-that is, a
certain intentional stance toward the ends of others. This is why even an unsuccessful practical lie
violates community. I do not speculate about whether a mere coincidence of points of view is
sufficient for a respectful theoretical community or whether some analogous intentional stance is
also required there.
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promises, including most familiarly the case of the subsequent breach of a
promise that was honestly made.24 A lying promise may indeed be wrong in
the same way in which a lie is wrong (one would be surprised if it were
not), but the breach of an honest promise need not involve a lie. A promise,
after all, may be made in good faith and broken only afterwards, so that any
statements of fact that it involves, for example about the intentions of the
promisor, are truthful and support (at least at the time of the promise and at
least with respect to the parties' beliefs) a point of view that the promisor
and her promisee can share. An argument that is based upon the wrongness
of lying would therefore seem to cast little light upon the morality of more
honest, and more ordinary, promises.
This appearance, although commonly observed, is deceptive. The view
that Kant's account of the wrongness of a lying promise has little to say
about the morality of the honest promise crucially mischaracterizes the
center of gravity of the moral objection to the lying promise. Kant
approaches the lying promise as a species of lie rather than as a species of
promise, to be sure, and no account of the morality of honest promises can
ignore this feature of the argument. But the foundations of the morality of
lying are themselves much broader than the application Kant gives them
through the case of the lying promise and are in fact quite broad enough to
explain the morality not just of lying but also of promising. The lying
promise may be a special kind of lie rather than a special kind of promise,
but lies in general and broken promises in general are both themselves a
special kind of breach of community, and they therefore share much more
in common than is usually emphasized.
One can see this by attending carefully to the two distinct components
of the conception of respectful community that I have developed by
reference to Kant's Formula of the End in Itself. First, the basis of
respectful community must be free: Persons must join the community
willingly, and one of the basic forms of estrangement arises when one
person manipulates another through deception (or coercion). Second, the
basis of respectful community must be shared: Persons must enter into
community with each other through the pursuit of ends that they adopt
together (in a sense to be refined in a moment), and a second form of
estrangement arises when one person adopts pursuits in which another, who
is implicated in them, cannot participate.
Now a violation of the first command entails a violation of the second:
A person who is deceived (or coerced) and therefore treated merely as a
24. Kant is sometimes taken to task for this, but such criticisms are not entirely fair. For one
thing, they chastise Kant for failing at a task-the task of explaining promissory obligation-that
he did not, at least in this discussion, set for himself. And for another, as my arguments reveal,
Kant's account of lying in fact contains the resources needed for constructing a successful account
of promising.
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means cannot possibly share in the ends in pursuit of which she has been so
used, and in light of this relation, the moral analysis of the successful lie
(which violates the first command) did not need to distinguish between
them. But the two commands are nevertheless extentionally distinct, and it
is possible for an action to violate the second command without violating
the first-to fail to treat a person as an end in himself by pursuing an end
that he cannot share without treating him as a means by deceiving or
coercing him. This is precisely what occurs, I have suggested, when a
person disbelieves a lie but nevertheless freely goes along with it (for
whatever reason). A liar in such a case does not successfully bypass her
victim's will and therefore does not use him merely as a means. But she
nevertheless fails to treat him as an end in himself, and therefore estranges
herself from him, by insistently pursuing an end that her lie renders him
unable to share.
Moreover, a person may fail to treat another as an end in himself even
though she never even attempts to use him merely as a means, and the
second element of the conception of respectful community is therefore no
mere afterthought that follows ineffective efforts to violate the first but
instead presents an independent, freestanding moral ideal. Cases in which
the second element of the conception of respectful community figures
independently of the first arise when a person accepts that she must not
simply bypass the will of another but nevertheless pursues ends in which
the other cannot share. Persons who forswear using force or fraud against
each other may nevertheless pursue irreconcilable and fundamentally
opposed purposes, and even as they accept Kant's first command, they
remain, intractably, enemies. And although (having forsworn force and
fraud) they do not render respectful community impossible by undermining
each other's wills, they do (at least within the sphere of their enmity) render
respectful community impossible by each pursuing ends in which the other
cannot join. The rejection of force and fraud only constrains the expression
of their opposition; it does not eliminate the opposition.
"Means" and "ends," as these observations reveal, are not exhaustive
ways of treating persons: It is possible for someone to treat another person
neither merely as a means nor yet as an end in himself, and not just in the
trivial sense that the two persons may simply remain strangers, who do not
treat each other in any way at all. Accordingly, someone who forswears
using others merely as means does not thereby secure a respectful
community with them. The forms of estrangement are not exhausted by the
disruption of the will that occurs when one person, employing force or
fraud, treats another merely as a means. Instead, persons may abjure force
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and fraud and yet still estrange themselves from others by pursuing ends
that engender separation rather than community.25
It is now possible, against this backdrop, to approach the morality of
the ordinary breach of an honest promise-the breach of a promise made by
a promisor who intended to keep it. The lying promisor drafts her promisee
into her service through deception, and in this way undermines his will.
This is the root both of Kant's suggestion that the lying promisor uses her
promisee merely as a means and of my claim that the lying promisor
estranges herself from her promisee by refusing to engage him as a person.
The ordinary promise-breaker, by contrast, does no such thing. She does not
convert her promisee into her instrument or draft him into her service, and,
accordingly, she does not use him as a means at all.26 This difference
underwrites the familiar skepticism of efforts to connect the morality of
promising to the morality of truth-telling. But, as the two-pronged
development of Kant's Formula of the End in Itself reveals, the ideal of
community to which the morality of promising must answer involves more
than the principle that persons ought not to use one another merely as
means; it also incorporates the separate and distinct principle that persons
should treat one another as ends in themselves. And a promisor who
breaches an honest promise, even though she does not violate the first of
these principles, may yet (just as did the unsuccessful liar) violate the
second. The promisor who breaches an honest promise does not use her
promisee merely as a means, to be sure. But she nevertheless estranges
herself from him, and violates the command that she treat him as an end,
because she pursues (through her breach) an end in which he cannot
possibly share.
When a person makes a promise, she adopts certain ends-the ends
associated with the promised performance-that are also available to her
promisee and indeed, in the ordinary case, that are in fact also adopted by
her promisee.27 The ends of a promisor therefore coincide with those of her
25. The first form of estrangement, involving force or fraud, undermines community by
depriving persons of the capacity freely to act at all; the second form of estrangement, involving
incompatible ends, undermines community by depriving persons of the capacity freely to act
together.
26. This claim must be approached cautiously, because the distinction between making a
lying promise and breaking an honest promise cannot be drawn formally. A promise that was
honestly made may become a lying promise when a promisor develops a secret intent to breach
that she does not disclose in order that the promise might continue to encourage her promisee to
complete his own agreed-upon performance. (An installment buyer, for example, might form an
intention not to pay for goods that she had intended to pay for when she bought them but keep this
intention secret from her sellers in order that they deliver the goods.) A once-honest promisor who
forms such a secret intention to deceive her promisee becomes a lying promisor, and uses him
merely as a means, just as surely as a promisor who lies from the start.
27. I say "in the ordinary case" because I do not want to rule out that a promisee might hope
that the promised performance never occurs-that the promise is broken-and therefore might not
adopt the ends associated with the performance. Raz imagines the case of "a man who solicits a
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promisee, at least in respect of the promised performance. Moreover, the
connection between the promisor's and promisee's ends is no mere
coincidence, and the overlap in their ends is not just incidental. Instead, the
promisor, through her promise, intends to entrench her pursuit of the ends
announced by the promise and to refuse to defect from these ends unless the
promisee releases her. She intends, in effect, to give the promisee authority
over her ends-to pursue, within the sphere of the promise, only ends that
the promisee also affirms. She intends, one might even say, to become
obligated to the promisee to render the promised performance. 28 And
finally, insofar as the promisor performs the promise-insofar as she
refuses to deviate from the promised performance without obtaining a
release from the promisee-she carries out the intention not to defect and
actually confers this authority over her ends to the promisee.
A promisor therefore intends, within the sphere of the promise, to defer
to her promisee and indeed to subordinate her ends to her promisee's will.
And through this subordination-through placing her ends in his hands-
the promisor comes to take the promisee's ends as her own and, moreover,
to treat him-his will-as an end.29 In this way, the promise underwrites a
respectful community between the promisor and the promisee.
Moreover, the community that a promise establishes is not empty or
formless, and a promisor does not engage with her promisee on just any
terms, or treat him as an end in himself in a contentless or generic fashion.
A promise, through the performance that it describes, specifies the precise
ends that the promisor shares with her promisee and in this way fixes the
terms upon which she engages him and treats him as an end in himself. A
promise, hoping and believing that it will be broken, in order to prove to a certain lady how
unreliable the promisor is." Raz, supra note 4, at 213. It is not clear to me that the promisor and
promisee in this unusual case in fact do treat each other as ends in themselves in the manner
described in the main text, although I see no need to decide the question here.
One further related point is also worth making. I refer in the main text to "ends that are also
available to the promisee." I mean, by this, to eliminate cases in which the promised performance
could not be assented to by the promisee, for example because it involves the use of force against
the promisee (as in, "If you don't hand over that jewel, I promise I'll kill you"). Such cases
involve, as is commonly said, threats rather than promises. One possible implication of my
account of promising is that the familiarly tricky distinction between the two turns on whether
promisees might possibly share in the ends associated with the promised performance (in which
case there is a promise) or instead cannot adopt these ends (in which case there is a threat). This is
a suggestion only, and I do not defend it or even elaborate upon it.
28. The last two ways of characterizing promissory intentions, which build the idea of
obligation (or its cognates) into these intentions, turn out significantly to complicate the theory of
promising. I take up the complications below. See infra Subsection I.C.3.
29. It is worth pointing out, in light of the complication mentioned in the previous footnote,
that this account of the promissory relation does not depend upon characterizing the promisor's
intentions in terms of obligation or any of its cognates. All the elements of the promissory relation
appear even if promising is characterized, as I have also done, simply in terms of a promisor's
intentions not to defect from the promised performance unless she is released from the promise.
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subsequent breach of the promise (when it is truly a breach 30 ) abandons
these shared ends in favor of others that cannot be shared with the promisee
because they are inconsistent with the ends that the promisee has in fact
adopted in conjunction with the promise.
The breach therefore does more than merely return the promisor and
promisee to the status quo ante, in which they were strangers. Strangers do
not share ends and do not treat each other as ends in themselves, but they
may at any moment come to do so. The breach of the promise, however,
presents an obstacle to such sharing between the promisor and promisee.
The breach entails that, at least in respect of the promised performance, the
two adopt inconsistent ends. The breaching promisor in such a case does
not treat her promisee merely as a means, to be sure.31 But this does not
exhaust the moral significance of the breach, because the forms of
estrangement are not exhausted by the disruption of the will that occurs
when one person, employing force or fraud, treats another merely as a
means.
Although a promisor who breaches an honest promise need not employ
force or fraud, and may even abjure using her promisee merely as a means,
she will nevertheless forfeit the possibility of treating him as an end and in
this respect become estranged from him. The breaching promisor does not
just unmake but instead actively betrays the community established by the
promise. She pursues ends, through her breach, that do not just depart from
but instead contradict her promisee's ends. The breaching promisor
therefore becomes, within the sphere of the promise, an enemy of her
promisee: Her breach forecloses possibilities for sharing ends that
previously existed and imposes conflict in their place. The parties to a
broken promise, even one with an honest beginning, therefore become more
distant than strangers-they become, as I have been saying, actively
estranged.32 And this estrangement explains why not only making lying
promises but also breaking honest promises is morally wrong.
30. That is, when the circumstances do not excuse the promisor from performance under
either the express or implied terms of the promise.
31. But recall the cautionary note struck above. See supra note 26.
32. Here it is instructive to notice the difference between the moral character of
nonperformance that constitutes a breach of promise on the one hand, and nonperformance
connected to a promisee's waiver of her promissory rights on the other. In this alternative case-
in which the promisee releases the promisor from any duties that arose under the promise-the
relation that was invited by the promise is not so much betrayed as abandoned and the status quo
ante in which promisor and promisee were strangers is simply restored. This observation suggests
that the reasons persons have for maintaining promissory relations rather than mutually
abandoning them closely resemble the reasons persons have for making promises in the first
place. Some promises-for example, marriage promises on a certain (no longer popular)
understanding-may present an exception to this rule. In these promises, every abandonment
would indeed involve a betrayal and render future sharing of ends among the parties difficult or
impossible. I say more about the general relationship between the reasons for making and keeping
promises in a moment.
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The analogy that I have asserted between the naive case of truth-telling
from which I began and the more difficult case of promising that has
occupied most of my attention is now complete, and a brief summary of the
argument is in order. Truth-telling in the very simplest case gives persons
access to one another's minds and in this way allows them, where they
would otherwise remain strangers, to construct and join in a shared
theoretical perspective. Similarly, promising (and also the more
complicated case of truth-telling connected to action) gives persons access
to one another's wills and allows them, where they would otherwise remain
strangers, to construct and join in a shared practical posture. The morality
of this practical relation contains two principles, both captured by Kant's
Formula of the End in Itself, which specify the conditions under which the
relation is respectful and desirable. First, persons may never use one
another merely as means, for to use a person in this way is to deny his
personality and impose the isolation that practical life seeks to overcome.
And second, persons should treat one another also as ends in themselves,
for this treatment renders a shared practical posture possible.
The first principle explains why it is wrong to manipulate a person's
will by lying, including by making lying promises, because lies undermine
every practical sharing. The second principle, by contrast, establishes the
morality of honest promises. This principle explains why persons have
reasons to make promises, because a person who makes and performs an
honest promise engages her promisee's practical life, by committing herself
to share in his ends. The second principle also explains why persons have
reasons to keep promises. A person who breaches a promise, even if it was
honestly made, does not merely fail to share in her promisee's ends but
renders such sharing, at least in respect of the promised performance,
impossible. She does not merely return to being a stranger but instead
becomes estranged.
Promises therefore render persons practically open to one another.
Without promises, their wills would remain isolated (just as their minds
would remain isolated without truthful communication). Moreover, when
promises are broken, persons' wills become isolated (just as their minds
become isolated when they lie). But when persons make and keep promises,
they may overcome their isolation and enter into respectful relations with
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each other.33 Promise-making and promise-keeping arise, as Hannah Arendt
observes, "directly out of the will to live together with others in the mode of
acting and speaking. 34
C. Making and Keeping Promises
In a moment, I move on to fill out this general theory of promises for
the special case of contract by developing a detailed account of the specific
relations among persons that contracts create-the specific way in which
the parties to contracts treat each other as ends. But it is helpful, before
commencing with that narrower enterprise, to connect the more general
reconstruction of the morality of promises that I have just presented to our
practical and theoretical preoccupations concerning promising, in order to
show that it can accommodate familiar elements of our promissory
practices and illuminate familiar problems in the philosophy of promising.
The connections that I draw all emphasize, although in very different ways,
the general theory's capacity to connect the morality of making and of
keeping promises.
1. Promises and Discretion
Our ordinary attitudes toward promise-making and promise-keeping
attribute different degrees of precision, or, to use a more accurate but
less elegant word, definiteness to the reasons for promise-keeping and
promise-making respectively. We conventionally believe that the morality
of promise-keeping gives a person a reason for keeping each and
every promise that she has made. But we understand the morality of
promise-making to display a much less definite character: We believe that
the morality of promising rarely (if ever) requires a person to make any
particular promise, 35 although we also recognize that a person who makes
no promises whatsoever is impoverished because of this-that she fails to
33. By uniting the wills of the parties in pursuit of shared ends, promising may even be said
to serve as a private analogue to the public practice of lawmaking-as a private act of collective
self-governance. The analysis that I am conducting of the respectful private community of
promising may be said, therefore, to parallel the republican analysis of the respectful community
of citizenship.
34. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 246 (1958).
35. Of course, a person may have other strong reasons, including other moral reasons, to
make particular promises, as when a promise presents the best available means of discharging
some independent obligation. (Imagine, for example, that a person who tortiously damages
another's property promises to pay compensation.) However, the reasons for making such
promises do not sound specifically in the morality of promising, but rather in features of the
overall circumstance that are independent of promising, and these reasons might be satisfied by
alternatives to the promise were they available. (If the tortfeasor could pay the compensation at
once, then there would be no need for her to promise to do so.)
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recognize or participate in values that find an important place in a life
well-lived. One might say, once again using language made familiar by
Kant, that the reasons for promise-keeping underwrite perfect duties
whereas the reasons for promise-making underwrite imperfect duties.36
Perfect duties require definite actions, whereas imperfect duties allow a
person's proclivities or "inclinations ' 37 to influence precisely how (to what
extent and in what ways) she will carry them out.
The return to Kant is useful here because Kant's general understanding
of imperfect and perfect duties illuminates our everyday attitudes toward
promise-making and promise-keeping. Imperfect duties arise in connection
with ends that persons have a duty to promote but that may be promoted in
a variety of ways and by a variety of actions, and imperfect duties apply to
the range of actions that promote such ends, among which it is up to a
person to choose. 38 Promise-making presents precisely this circumstance:
By making promises, a person can come to share ends with others and
therefore to treat them as ends in themselves, something that she has a duty
to do;39 but many particular promises (and perhaps even some actions that
are not promises) enable persons to join in a community in this way, and
each person may choose from among the many alternatives according to her
own inclinations. This underwrites the commonplace view that while a life
bereft of all promises is a bad one, the everyday morality of promising
requires no particular promises to be made.
Perfect duties, by contrast, arise in relation to actions that display some
more definite connection to obligatory ends. One form that this definite
36. See KANT, supra note 9, at 421; IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical First Principles of the
Doctrine of Virtue, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 373, 422-23 (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797). For a discussion of the distinction between perfect and
imperfect duties, see KORSGAARD, supra note 11, at 17-18, 20-21; and ALLEN W. WOOD,
KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 44 (1999). This distinction arises, in Kant, in tandem with the related
distinction between "strict" and "broad" obligations. Although these distinctions are different
from each other, the differences are subtle and Kant himself "does not use the four terms in a
perspicuous way." KORSGAARD, supra note 11, at 20. One difference between the two
distinctions is that the focus of the perfect/imperfect distinction is on the definiteness of a duty
and the role open to personal inclination in its fulfillment, whereas the focus of the strict/broad
distinction is on whether a duty may be fully discharged (strict) or instead imposes open-ended
and ongoing obligations (broad). See generally ONORA NELL, ACTING ON PRINCIPLE 43-58
(1975) (discussing the different criteria by which Kant analyzes a duty). The main argument does
not turn on these intricacies, and so I set them to one side.
37. KANT, supra note 9, at 421 n.*.
38. See KORSGAARD, supra note 11, at 20-21; WOOD, supra note 36, at 325.
39. I reject, on the basis of this observation, the surprisingly common view that where an end
may be achieved with or without a promise, there is never any reason to employ a promise as a
means for achieving it and, relatedly, the view that it cannot be "a reason for someone to make a
promise that she would be able to fulfill it later on." Holly M. Smith, A Paradox of Promising,
106 PHIL. REV. 153, 183-84 (1997). In fact, the choice whether to pursue an end by a promise or
by some other means at least sometimes involves the choice whether to pursue it communally or
at most coincidentally. This means that there can be reasons-indeed, as will become plain, very
strong reasons-for pursuing ends by promises, and it can be a reason to make promises that they
can be kept.
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connection can take appears when an act necessarily sets an end that is
directly contrary to another end that persons have a duty to pursue. The
perfect duty not to lie, for example, arises because lies, including lying
promises, treat their victims merely as means, which is contrary to the
obligatory end of never treating others as mere means. Moreover, the
connection between certain actions and obligatory ends may give rise to
perfect duties in a second way also, as when an act (even though it does not
involve setting a prohibited end) involves a failure to set an obligatory end
at all.40 The breach of an honest promise violates a perfect duty under this
alternative construction. Although a promisor who breaches an honest
promise does not use her promisee merely as a means, she does foreclose
the possibility of treating her promisee as an end in himself by adopting
ends, at least in connection with the promised performance, in which he
cannot possibly share. A person may remain a stranger to many, which is
why the duty to make promises is imperfect only; but she should estrange
herself from none, which is why the duty to keep promises is perfect.
Finally, the reasons for making promises become increasingly definite,
and the duty to make promises becomes increasingly perfect, as other
circumstances render it increasingly unacceptable for persons to remain
strangers. This is most starkly illustrated by moral cultures that connect
promising to other forms of intimacy, and in particular to intimacy within
the family. Thus it is a familiar fact that some cultures insist that sexual
relations may occur only within the confines of the marriage promise, so
that a perfect duty of promise-making arises among sexual intimates. And
even our own more sexually liberated culture recognizes that certain
intimate relationships that grow out of sex and reproduction demand
promises from persons who inhabit them, so that a parent, for example, will
often come under a duty not just to offer his frightened children comfort
and protection but to promise to do so. In each of these cases, and no doubt
in many other cases besides these, a person's discretion concerning which
promises to make diminishes and the duty of promise-making becomes
commensurately more perfect. And just as it explained the general rule that
the duty to make promises is imperfect whereas the duty to keep promises
is perfect, so the theory of promising that I have developed can explain this
exception to the rule also. The duty to make promises becomes perfect
insofar as a potential promisor is already embedded in a relationship (in the
examples, involving sex and family) that insists upon the respectful
community-the recognition of others as ends in themselves-that
promises engender. The ordinarily imperfect duty to make promises
40. For a similar discussion, see WOOD, supra note 36, at 325.
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becomes perfect insofar as other moral ideals insist upon particular
instantiations of the promissory relation that the theory describes.4'
2. Promises and Obligations
The account of promising that I have proposed also illuminates a
second difference in our conventional attitudes towards promise-making
and promise-keeping, which involves not the substance of the reasons
conventionally thought to govern making and keeping promises, but rather
the relationship between these reasons and other reasons-that is, the form
in which reasons for making and keeping promises conventionally
intervene in our all-things-considered practical deliberations. This
difference involves not so much what the reasons for making and keeping
promises require as how these reasons operate.
It may seem that the differences between the reasons for making
promises and those for keeping them are straightforward and, moreover,
that they count against the theory of promising that I have proposed. Thus it
is tempting to suppose that the reasons for promise-keeping are simply
stronger or more powerful than the reasons for promise-making, so that
the difference between the two kinds of reasons is just that reasons for
promise-keeping are more likely than reasons for promise-making to hold
sway in all-things-considered practical deliberations. It is common to
observe that although there exist only weak reasons for making a promise,
there are strong reasons for keeping the promise once it has been made: A
person has only a weak reason to assure her friend that she will collect him
at the airport, for example; but once the assurance has been given, she has a
much stronger reason to follow it through. The account of promising that I
have proposed is difficult to square with, and certainly cannot explain, this
view. Its insistence that the reasons for making and keeping promises both
arise out of the same basic vision of a moral community grounded in
mutual respect renders any suggestion that one set of reasons is more
substantial than the other unnatural, or at least itself in need of explanation.
But although the common suggestion that the reasons for keeping
promises are stronger than the reasons for making promises responds to
something real in the morality of promising, it expresses the underlying
truth about promising (and the features of our conventional moral practices
that reflect this truth) only poorly, and at too low a level of abstraction.
Indeed, the morality of promising (even as it is conventionally understood)
does not in fact systematically regard the reasons for keeping promises as
41. Note, in this regard, that when persons breach such perfect duties of promise-making-
when they refuse to make the promises to sexual partners or children that these examples
identify-then they are commonly thought to violate the morality of these relations
(as libertines or child neglectors), rather than the morality of promising.
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weightier than the reasons for making them. It is not hard to imagine cases
in which the reasons for making a promise are powerfu! indeed, and quite
as powerful as the reasons for keeping it: Think of the promises involved in
marriages.42 (Nor is it difficult to think of cases in which the reasons for
keeping a promise are trivial: Consider someone's promise to join a group
of friends who have arranged an informal dinner out.) Moreover, the
suggestion that the reasons for promise-keeping are stronger than the
reasons for promise-making bears the hallmarks of a by-now-familiar error:
In many cases, as in the case involving assurances presented a moment ago,
promises will induce reasonable reliance once they are made, and this
reliance may underwrite nonpromissory, harm-based reasons for following
through. But these reasons do not belong to the morality of promising, and
while they may be reasons for doing what has been promised, they are not
reasons for keeping the promise.
The reasons for keeping promises do figure differently in practical
deliberations from the reasons for making promises, but the difference is
not simply one of weightiness or strength. Instead of being quantitative in
this way, the difference is qualitative and structural. The reasons for
keeping a promise bear on the question whether to do the promised acts, to
be sure, but they do not do so only directly (as, for example, harm-based
reasons involving a promisee's reliance might do). Instead, the reasons for
promise-keeping also operate indirectly, by emphasizing the promisor's
intention to give her promisee authority over her ends and the community
that this intention engenders. This authority entails that the promisor must
prefer such shared ends over other ends, specifically by constraining the
promisor from acting on certain reasons not to perform, including most
notably the reason that the consequences of not performing the promise (of
doing some other act instead of the one promised) are better overall than the
consequences of performing. 4  The justification for the constraint that
principles of promise-keeping impose on the promisor's responsiveness to
overall consequences may be found in the value of the promisor's intention
to give the promisee power over her ends. Without this intention, the
promise could not enable the promisor and promisee to share in the ends of
the promise (as opposed to merely having their ends coincide), and it
therefore could not enable the promise to underwrite the community in
which the promisor treats the promisee as an end in himself. Promises
42. It is important to note that these examples do not undermine the earlier discussion of
perfect and imperfect duties. Even for those who believe that marriage is an essential part of a
good life, so that the reasons persons have for marrying are overwhelmingly strong, the duty to
marry remains imperfect. It does not say whom a person must marry, but leaves this matter to
personal inclination.
43. That reasons for promise-keeping serve in this way to give separate or additional support
to performing promises is perhaps the source of the mistaken view that they are stronger than the
reasons for making promises.
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enable persons to cease to be strangers, but only by giving them reasons
that constrain them from acting on the balance of reasons that are available
to strangers.
This formal account of the way in which principles of promise-keeping
feature in practical reasoning evokes Joseph Raz's well-known view of the
role that obligations play in our practice of promising.4 Raz observes that
the reasons for promise-keeping do not just include first-order reasons
directly in favor of keeping promises, but also include second-order
reasons, which Raz calls exclusionary reasons, for not acting on certain
first-order reasons for breaking promises (say, that breaking a promise
would produce the best consequences overall).45 Raz believes that this is a
genetic feature of our practice of promising, which receives expression in
much of the practice's phenomenology. Principles of promise-keeping, for
example, themselves constitute independent reasons (rather than just
reporting on the balance of other more fundamental reasons),46 and
promisors may experience principles of promise-keeping as restraints on
their practical activities and feel themselves bound by such restraints to act
47
against the balance of their first-order reasons.
Raz argues that principles of promise-keeping that operate in this way
cannot be explained by conceptions of promising (including most familiarly
the utilitarian conceptions) that explain promise-keeping by reference to the
costs that breaking a promise imposes. Such considerations-including,
most commonly, the harms suffered by promisees who rely and the costs
associated with the reduced credibility of breaching promisors-can
underwrite first-order reasons for keeping promises, to be sure. But they
cannot possibly explain the second-order, exclusionary effect that we
commonly accord to principles of promise-keeping in the broader scheme
of our practical deliberations: The legitimate influence of considerations
involving harm or future credibility is exhausted once these values are
taken into account in first-order reasoning; to accord them further,
exclusionary effect would be to give them improper influence (to count
them twice over, as it were). Instead, the morality of promising must take
the decision whether to keep a promise out of the ordinary balancing of
first-order reasons. It can do this, Raz proposes, only by understanding that
promises, instead of invoking ordinary values that might come into play
44. See Raz, supra note 4. My views do not precisely match Raz's, however. I discuss one
difference between us below. See infra note 52.
45. See id. at 226. For more on Raz's idea of second-order reasons, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 3-33 (1979) (reprinting Joseph Raz, On
Legitimate Authority, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW: AUTHORITY, EQUALITY, ADJUDICATION,
PRIVACY 6 (Richard Bronaugh ed., 1978)); and JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS
49-106 (1975).
46. See Raz, supra note 4, at 219-20.
47. See id. at 223-24.
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among persons generally, constitute a special relationship, or bond, between
promisors and their promisees. This special bond is the expression, in terms
of our everyday moral experience, of the exclusionary effect of the
obligation of promise-keeping.48
Raz recognizes that the theory of promising cannot, finally, stop at this
purely formal insight; the formal conception of promises he proposes "can
only be justified if the creation of [the] special relationships between people
[that this conception entails] is held to be valuable., 49 But he expressly
makes it no part of his purpose "to defend [or] to criticize any particular
view of the grounds for keeping promises, 5 ° or even "to argue that the
special relationships the desirability of which would validate [such a formal
account of promising] are indeed desirable., 51 My own theory of promise,
by contrast, begins with precisely this purpose and leads with a substantive
effort to say what the special relationship between a promisor and her
promisee is like and why this relationship is desirable. This effort produces
an account of overcoming isolation through an intentional pursuit of shared
ends whose structure closely tracks the form of obligation that Raz
concludes must underlie the phenomenology of our promissory practice.
The authority over her ends that a promisor gives the promisee on my
account serves as an analogue to the obligation that the promisor assumes
on Raz's. Moreover, when the reasons for making and especially for
keeping promises are developed by reference to my account of the
promissory relationship, they display the formal structure that Raz observed
and so skillfully set out to explain. My argument and Raz's therefore
approach promising from opposite directions but in the end join up, so that
my substantive account of promising and Raz's formal account complement
each other, and my account may be read to address some of the questions
that Raz identifies but declines to answer.52
48. See id. at 227-28.
49. Id. at 228.
50. Id. at 211.
51. Id. at 228.
52. One difference between Raz's view and mine deserves mention. Raz believes that the
special relationship upon which the exclusionary effect of principles of promise-keeping depends
can be established only if promises function, phenomenologically, not as expressions of simple
intentions to perform an action unless released but rather as expressions of reflexive intentions to
assume, by their very expression, obligations to perform an action. Raz rejects, as he puts it,
intention conceptions of promise in favor of obligation conceptions. Id. at 211. I worry, as have I
said in passing, see supra notes 28-29, and will explain in detail in the next Subsection, that
insisting that promissory intentions must make reflexive reference to the obligations the promises
engender introduces a vicious circle into the theory of promising, and my account of promising is
expressly designed to make do without including obligation, or any of its cognates, in promissory
intentions. In place of Raz's intention to assume an obligation I include a simple intention not to
abandon performance without the permission of the promisee.
I take this difference to stand in a friendly, rather than a hostile, relationship to Raz's general
approach. I retain Raz's basic account of the formal structure of the morality of promising and
adopt his suggestion that this structure might arise out of the value of the special relationship that
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3. The Grounds of Promise-Keeping
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the account of promissory
obligation that I have developed can resolve a puzzle concerning the
grounds of the obligation to keep promises that has long troubled
moral philosophers. The central task for a philosophical explanation of
promise-keeping is to connect the obligation to keep promises to the act of
will (the act of making the promise) that presents the distinctive feature of
our promissory practice. It turns out to be extremely difficult to give a
satisfactory account of the place that the act of will involved in making a
promise occupies among the grounds of the obligation to keep the
promise.53
Thus it seems incredible that the bare act of will that promise-making
involves might by itself conjure the obligation of promise-keeping into
existence. This sensibility led Hume to compare the idea that the act of will
involved in promise-making in itself begets a duty of promise-keeping to
the mystery of transubstantiation.54 For although persons may incur
obligations in conjunction with willful actions in any number of ways
(most commonly in connection with intentional actions, including perhaps
representations of what they will do in the future, that harm others),
all these obligations are grounded in the effects of the persons' wills-in
the harm that they have done-and not in the bare willing in itself. Persons
do not simply will these obligations into existence, and it is difficult
to conceive of how they possibly could do so, because it is difficult to
promises engender. Insofar as I succeed in showing that this relationship can arise without
building obligation into promissory intentions, my argument broadens the substantive foundation
of Raz's formal account and in this way protects it against the charges of circularity that I
mentioned a moment ago and take up in earnest in the next Subsection.
53. The discussion that follows is indebted to Liam Murphy, Promise, Practice, Contract
(Nov. 6, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
54. DAVID HUME, Of Morals, in A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 455, 524 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739-1740). For Hume, the mystery in the origins of the obligation of
promise-keeping was compounded by his sentimentalist belief that "[n]o action can be requir'd of
us as our duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive,
capable of producing the action," and his skepticism about whether the act of will involved in
promising could ever give rise to any such motivation. 1d. at 518. Without taking a position on the
connection, if any, that exists between obligation and motivation, I observe that the view of
promising that I am developing meets Hume's condition through its reference to the inner human
need to act together. This need underwrites, in the ways I have described, the required motivations
both to make and to keep promises.
Hume worried about promising in another way, which I identify only to set aside. He
worried how promising, as an act of language, might be intelligible at all. In Elizabeth
Anscombe's words, "[Hlow on earth can it be the meaning of a sign that by giving it one purports
to create a necessity of doing something-a necessity whose source is the sign itself, and whose
nature depends on the sign." G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, Rights, Rules, and Promises, in ETHICS,
RELIGION, AND POLITICS 97, 100 (1981). I take my view of promising to answer this objection
also, because there is no special mystery in how a sign might enable persons to share ends, and
my theory explains how certain ways of sharing ends might give rise to obligations.
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conceive of how they could simply will anything so external as an
obligation into existence. Moreover, this difficulty does not disappear just
because willing a promissory obligation, through making a promise, is often
in practice associated with an obligation's actually arising. As Elizabeth
Anscombe observed, "[I]f a door opens when I say to it: 'I hereby open
you,' that doesn't mean that my saying those words itself, in suitable
circumstances, is enough to prove that the door is open." 55 We still wish to
know, in the case of the door, on what ground it might be open; and we still
wish to know, in the case of the obligation of promise-keeping, on what
ground it might arise. And it seems implausible, in each case, that this
ground is just the willing in itself.
Thoughts like these have led many philosophers to find the grounds of
the obligation of promise-keeping in something besides the act of will that
constitutes promise-making, so that even though promise-making triggers
the obligation of promise-keeping, it does not underwrite it. The most
prominent efforts in this direction look either to the harm promise-breaking
imposes on promisees who have relied on a promise, or to the existence of a
social practice of promising to fill the gap in obligation that is opened by
the will's impotence.5 6
But these views, even as they explain an array of duties that arise
around promises, fail to capture the immediate moral experience of
promising. Harm-based views fit uncomfortably with the experience that
promissory obligation extends to encompass promisees' forward-looking
expectations in the promised performance and not just their backward-
looking reliance. They cannot easily explain the fact that promises seem to
obligate even where promisees have not relied and that a promisor cannot
discharge her promissory obligations simply by compensating her
promisee's reliance losses.57 And practice-based views fit uncomfortably
with the experience that promissory obligation extends directly from a
promisor to her promisee, rather than being mediated by a social practice of
promising.58 The experience of promising does not deny that additional,
nonpromissory duties might arise in conjunction with promises, but it
55. ANSCOMBE, supra note 54, at 99.
56. The harm-based views appear, for example, in Lon Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937), and in
P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981). Practice-based views appear, for example,
in HUME, supra note 54, at 516-25; and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 344-48 (1971).
57. Of course, some harm-based views-for example Fuller and Perdue's, see Fuller &
Perdue, supra note 56-seek expressly to shake these intuitions about promising.
58. This shortcoming of practice-based theories is most vivid in Rawls's approach, which
explains the obligation of promise-keeping in terms of a promisor's obligation to do her fair share
to support the practice of promising, which she has invoked to her benefit. See RAWLS, supra note
56, at 346. Rawls's view suggests, against all experience, that the obligation of promise-keeping
finds its grounds not between the promisor and promisee but rather among all participants in the
social practice of promising.
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nevertheless focuses insistently on promise-making itself, which it
recognizes as a distinctive, freestanding fount of moral obligation.
Moreover, this experience suggests that the will of the promisor lies at the
center of promissory morality-indeed that there is nothing, fundamentally,
to promise-making other than an act of will.59 The moral experience of
promising therefore insists on a distinctive form of moral obligation that the
philosophy of promising has so far been unable to explain. The
philosophical tendency to account for the moral obligation of promise-
keeping on other, more generic grounds is not so much an effort to explain
the moral experience of promising as to explain away an experience that
has remained philosophically intractable.
The account of promising that I have developed can provide the
necessary explanation of promissory experience without indulging in any
mysticism about the generative powers of the will. It can do this because it
presents a fundamentally new approach to the relationship between
promise-making and promise-keeping, under which the act of will involved
in promising can occupy an essential place in an account of the distinctive
grounds of the obligation of promise-keeping without having to beget the
obligation on its own. In particular, the traditional view so starkly confronts
the task of explaining how willing can create an obligation out of nothing
only because it understands the act of willing involved-promise-making-
as essentially morally indifferent. On the view that I have developed, by
contrast, promise-making occurs against a backdrop of ideals concerning
respectful community and, relatedly, treating persons as ends in themselves.
And when it is viewed in this light, promise-making no longer appears
morally indifferent but is revealed, instead, to be morally required, even if
this requirement does not extend to the making of any particular promise.
And once this is understood, it becomes clear that when the act of will
involved in making a promise gives rise to an obligation to keep the
promise, it does not do so out of nothing but instead merely perfects an
already present but previously imperfect duty. 60 Nor is it at all surprising
that a bare act of will should have this power; indeed, one of the central
functions of the will is precisely to choose which among several possible
ways of fulfilling an imperfect obligation to adopt.
59. It is tempting to deny this by observing that promise-making involves not just an act of
will but also the communication of this will to the promisee, but this addition does not help the
argument, at least not at the moment. It remains mysterious how the bare expression of an act of
will might bring an obligation into existence-recall that Anscombe's example involved saying
"I hereby open you." Of course, the expression of will involved in promising may trigger
consequences-most notably, reasonable reliance in the promisee-and these consequences may
generate obligations associated with promise-keeping. But as the main text argues, these
associated obligations do not match the immediate moral experience of promising.
60. I owe this way of putting the point to Scott Shapiro.
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Moreover, the will can play this part in accounting for the obligation of
promise-keeping without bootstrapping or circularity. I have, to be sure,
sometimes characterized promise-making in terms of the promisor's
intention to give the promisee authority over her ends and even in terms of
the promisor's intention to obligate herself to her promisee. And each of
these formulations raises a specter of circularity, because it appears to
assume precisely the conclusion that the moral theory of promising is trying
to establish: If the forms of authority and obligation to which these
formulations refer must themselves obtain in order to establish the
respectful community that I have said promises create, then the value of this
community cannot underwrite promissory obligation, and the theory lacks a
bottom. (This difficulty would not arise, of course, if the will could conjure
promissory obligation on its own bottom. But this is highly dubious, as I
have observed, and would anyway do away with the need for the very
ideals of respectful community that make the theory distinctive.)
These worries about circularity are misplaced, however, because the
intentions that generate the respectful community upon which promissory
morality depends may arise, and may be described, without making any
reference to obligation or any cognate ideas. It is sufficient for respectful
community that the promisor intends, as I have also said, simply to pursue
the ends announced by the promise unless the promisee releases her from
pursuing these ends. 61 The theory of promising can therefore do without the
61. The concern to avoid circularity has also influenced Thomas Scanlon's views about
promising, including his construction of the principle of Fidelity from which he argues obligations
of promise-keeping arise. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 295-327 (1998);
Scanlon, Promises and Practices, supra note 2. Scanlon develops his theory of promissory
obligation around the idea that promisees may reasonably trust promisors to vindicate their
promissory assurances, and he recognizes that his theory can avoid circularity only if the reasons
behind the promisees' trust sound in something besides promissory obligation. See SCANLON,
supra, at 307-08; Scanlon, Promises and Practices, supra note 2, at 212. He therefore seeks to
ground promisees' faith in promissory assurances in prepromissory principles that forbid certain
forms of manipulating others and require that persons exercise due care in leading others to form
certain expectations. This argumentative strategy seeks to ground the wrong of making lying
promises in these prepromissory values and then to ground the reasonableness of trusting
promissory assurances in the fact that promisors may reasonably be expected to avoid this and
related wrongs. See SCANLON, supra, at 308; Scanlon, Promises and Practices, supra note 2, at
213. And Scanlon's account of promissory intentions, like mine, therefore dispenses with any
reference to promissory obligation and makes do with the simple intention to perform unless
released. See SCANLON, supra, at 304; Scanlon, Promises and Practices, supra note 2, at 208-09.
Despite these structural similarities, my account and Scanlon's base promissory obligations
on very different substantive values. Where Scanlon appeals to principles concerning a person's
responsibility for disappointments that others suffer in connection with expectations that she has
led them to form, I appeal to principles concerning the duty to share ends with others; and where
Scanlon grounds his arguments in the value of the general relationship involved in seeking to live
according to principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated,
could not reasonably reject, I ground my argument in the value of the special relationship of
sharing ends that promises engender. I believe, moreover, although I do not develop the point
here, that the general considerations to which Scanlon appeals are inadequate to underwrite the
distinctive departures of promissory and contractual obligation from the broader obligation not to
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intentions that give rise to the concern about circularity. And although the
theory of promising is not entitled to express promisors' intentions in terms
involving authority or obligation until it can establish itself without
referring to these ideas, such references become harmless once it is clear
that the theory can indeed do without them.
62
Finally, although the act of will involved in promise-making, on this
account, no longer stands alone among the grounds of the obligation of
promise-keeping, it remains an essential part of these grounds and is not
just their cause, or trigger. The form of respectful relation to which the
morality of promising ultimately answers-the ideal of treating others as
ends in themselves-requires that persons' wills converge, in the
appropriate way, upon shared ends, and the willing of the promissory
obligation is an essential component of this convergence.63 The approach to
promising that I have developed therefore explains the connection between
the will and the obligation of promise-keeping in a way that eludes
alternative approaches and that accounts, moreover, for the distinctiveness
of the immediate moral experience of promising.
II. CONTRACT
The value of a certain communal relation underwrites a powerful and
broad-reaching moral theory of promise. In order to enter into this relation,
persons must (negatively) refrain from treating one another merely as
means by refraining from acting under principles that others could not
accept, and also (positively) treat one another as ends by pursuing ends
others share. The negative part of this theory explains the morality of lying
promises: Lying promisors act wrongly because the principle of action such
promises contain could not possibly be accepted by their promisees, who
are deceived and to this extent manipulated as mere means. The positive
harm others-in particular the forward-looking character of promissory duties and the expectation
remedy. (Scanlon attempts-to my mind, unsuccessfully-to explain these phenomena in terms of
his theory in Promises and Contracts. See Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, supra note 2, at 99-
111.) My own efforts in this direction, which make extensive reference to the special value of the
promise relation, appear in Part III.
62. One further concern bears mentioning. It may seem that expressions of promissory
intentions that forswear ideas of authority and obligation avoid circularity only at the cost of
infinite regress. For one might worry that a promisor's non-obligation-based intentions to perform
a promise unless the promisee releases her cannot establish a communal relation unless she also
intends not to abandon this intention without a release, and so on ad infinitum. But this concern
notwithstanding, the first intention in the chain-to perform unless released-is sufficient to
establish a respectful community whenever it obtains. And it can obtain at the moment of
promising even without the subsequent intentions to the chain. (I thank Michael Bratman for
helpful discussions on this point.)
63. The expression of will involved in promising-the communication to the promisee-now
reappears as important to the argument, but in itself and for the relation among wills to which it
belongs, rather than, as in my earlier discussion, see supra note 59, for any external consequences
that it might produce.
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part of the view explains the morality of honest promises: The reason for
making honest promises is that the intentions they involve enable persons to
cease to be strangers by sharing in the ends of the promises; and the reason
for keeping honest promises is that breaches betray these shared ends in
favor of others that cannot be shared, and in this way estrange the parties
from each other. Moreover, this theory of the promise relation accounts for
the most prominent features of our experience of the morality of promising:
the different definiteness of the duties to make and keep promises, the place
of the obligation of promise-keeping in our broader practical deliberations,
and the distinctive place of the will among the grounds of promissory
obligation.
But although it has achieved some substantial results, the argument has
so far proceeded at an extremely abstract and general level, leaving many
important points unaddressed. Most notably, I have said virtually nothing
specific about the community involved in the promise relation, either about
the content of the shared ends that this community invokes or about the
nature of the sharing that this community incorporates. Moreover, the gap
in the theory as developed so far corresponds to questions about the
morality of promising that arise naturally at this point in the argument, and
indeed that the theory actively encourages and invites.
For example, although I have observed that the reasons for making
some promises (for example, the promises involved in marriage) are much
stronger than the reasons for making other promises (for example, the
promises involved in ordinary buying and selling), I have said little to
explain why these differences in the strength of the reasons for promise-
making emerge.64 The explanation that naturally suggests itself is that the
community created by marriage promises somehow exercises a greater
draw on persons than the community created by promises to buy and sell-
perhaps because it involves sharing more significant ends, or even a more
significant mode of sharing-but I have so far said nothing to elaborate
upon or explain this intuition. Moreover, although I have observed that
making promises invites community, I have not explained in any detail
what promise-making consists in, and although I have observed that
breaking a promise violates community, I have not said what enforcement
mechanisms might protect against such violations.
These topics call for increasingly specific accounts of the several
peculiar varieties of promises, and I now turn to developing one such
64. Note that when I refer, in this context, to the reasons for making promises, I mean the
reasons presented by the morality of promising (based on the value of the promissory
community). Many other reasons for making promises may arise besides these, and some such
reasons may be quite powerful-for example, it may be a strong reason to make a promise in
connection with buying that a buyer very much wants the item she promises to pay for or that the
item is a bargain.
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account for one class of promises in particular, namely contract. In this
Part, I elaborate upon the character of the peculiarly contractual version of
the promissory community-upon the shared ends and the precise manner
of sharing that are immanent in our contractual practice. Then, in the final
Part of my argument, I invoke this elaboration to address still more detailed
matters, involving (for example) what making a contract consists of and
what remedies ought to be available in case of breach.
The argument going forward therefore abandons much of the generality
of what has come before, but it continues, as it were, to be illuminated from
behind. Contract presents a special case of promise, and a species always
incorporates the essential characteristics of the genus to which it belongs, so
that the reasons for making and keeping contracts must be expressed in
terms of the reasons for making and keeping the promises that contracts
involve. The focus on contract therefore represents not a new departure but
a move inward-an effort, as I have said, to elaborate the precise forms of
respectful community that arise in connection with the particular class of
promises presented by contract.
The choice to proceed in this way partially reflects taste and
inclination-my purpose in introducing the broader arguments about
agreement and promise was to equip myself to join the theoretical tradition
of contract scholarship that drew my interest to begin with. But the narrow
focus on contract also reflects necessity. The next stage in the argument
requires dispensing with general notions of respectful community and
shared ends, in favor of developing a particular version of community based
on the sharing of a particular class of ends under a particular conception of
sharing. The class of promises is too broad and too heterogeneous to be the
object of the narrower form of analysis now called for. Contract, by
contrast, is narrow and homogeneous in precisely the right way, and it will
be possible, in the pages to come, to develop fairly precise accounts of the
shared ends that contract involves and of the manner in which they are
shared.
A. The Collaborative Ideal
This move inward, from promises generally to the special class of
promises that constitute contracts at law, may appear straightforward at
first. As a formal matter, at least, contractual promisors, just as promisors
simpliciter, intend to give their promisees authority over their ends-to
pursue, within the sphere of the contract, only ends that their promisees also
affirm. Indeed, contractual promisors intend to give their promisees not just
moral authority but also the legal capacity to compel them to pursue the
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ends that the contract specifies. 65 And insofar as contractual promisors
honor their contracts-insofar as they refuse to deviate from the contractual
performance without obtaining a release from their promisees-contractual
promisors actually confer (legal) authority over their ends to their
promisees. Just as with ordinary promises, therefore, the mechanisms of
contract-making and contract-keeping enable contractual promisors to share
ends with their promisees and in this way to treat their promisees as ends.
And just as with ordinary promises, contracts enable the parties to them to
cease to be strangers and to enter into a respectful community.
But although this application of promissory morality to the special case
of contract is natural, and indeed straightforward, from the point of view of
moral theory it remains unsatisfying as an account of contractual practice.
The argument proceeds too quickly, and too mechanically, to give a
satisfactory account of the morality of contract, in particular because it
ignores the substance of the purposes with which the parties typically enter
into legal contracts. And when these purposes are taken squarely into view,
the suggestion that contracts establish a morally respectful community may
come to appear an empty formalism.
This suggestion traffics in the idea that contracts, like all promises,
invoke shared ends through which the parties to them come to treat each
other as ends. But although personal promises may commonly involve a
substantial sharing of ends, contracts appear, at first blush, to involve quite
the opposite. Even if contractual promisors do intend to assume obligations
to their promisees, and in this way to give their promisees authority over
their ends, it seems strained to say that promisors thereby respect their
promisees, or join in a community with them. The parties to contracts
generally compete, after all, and each tries to get the best deal that she can;
buyers press for low prices, for example, and sellers for high ones. This
suggests that the parties to contracts ordinarily do not finally share ends, but
rather pursue opposed ends. The parties to such contracts therefore do not
appear to treat each other as ends in themselves at all, whatever the theory
of promise might suppose. Regardless of the contractual form, the
substance of contract is that each party treats the other as a means in the
pursuit of her own, unshared ends.66 The moral theory of promising that I
65. 1 do not mean, by this remark, to prejudge the question whether the proper remedy for
breach of contract is expectation damages or specific performance. I take up this question in
Section IlI.B, where I argue that, for purposes of the collaborative view, expectation damages may
vindicate the ends of a contract and therefore underwrite contractual community.
66. None of this implies that the parties to such contracts violate the first prong of the
Formula of the End in Itself and use each other merely as means. Even as each party pursues
the best deal that she can get, she recognizes limits on how she may behave in pursuit of this
deal-for example that she may not proceed by force or fraud-that reflect the personhood of the
other party. (At the same time, as I observed in the previous Part, the fact that a person recognizes
that she may not treat another merely as a means is not sufficient for her to treat him as an end in
himself.)
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have developed appears, on this view, to be most suited to personal,
benevolent promises. Contracts seem to lie beyond its reach.
This skepticism about contractual community does not apply to every
contract, of course. Some contracts generate substantive obligations of
mutual concern that unquestionably support the substantive community that
the general theory of promise invokes: Contracts that establish partnerships
or joint ventures, for example, create fiduciary relationships among the
participants.67 And other contracts-including many employment contracts
and many contracts among regular suppliers-supervene on long-term,
ongoing relationships that may also present such substantive community.
This makes it tempting to try to rebuff skepticism about contractual
community by assimilating all contracts into these thicker and more
contextual-and therefore more substantively communal-patterns.68
I resist this temptation, however, and my account of contractual
solidarity proceeds in the opposite direction. I insist that the conceptual core
of contract remains the discrete and self-interested exchange, in which
contract stands apart from status, custom, habit, and the other thicker, more
contextual forms of community that may sometimes accompany contractual
activity. Rather than deny that the contractual version of community is thin
and formal, or that it arises against a backdrop of self-interest, I argue that
even the most self-interested, discrete, and purely transactional contracts-
even contracts in which the contractual promise stands alone and
unadorned-invoke the moral relations of respect and community that I
have articulated and that present the foundations of promissory and
contractual obligation. Indeed, I propose that the thinness and formality of
the contractual ideal of community is an asset rather than a liability for the
theory of contract, because it allows the theory to cast contract in a central
role in broader accounts of social and political organization.
69
Ideas concerning the place of contract in such broader schemes of
justification must abide later development, however. The burden of this
Section is to make good on the claim that the transactional form of the
contract relation can underwrite a freestanding community by
demonstrating that the parties to contracts share ends in the contracts, and
treat each other as ends through the contracts, even when the contracts
67. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) ("Joint
adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the
finest loyalty.").
68. The most prominent proponent of this approach to contract is Ian Macneil, who calls
contracts that arise in such cases "relational contracts" and claims that every contract is
"necessarily partially a relational contract." IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 10
(1980). Macneil's theory of contract and mine represent almost exact opposites in this respect.
Macneil claims that no contract is ever a freestanding source of obligation; I argue that every
contract, including even the most isolated contract, presents a freestanding source of obligation.
69. I elaborate on this point in the Conclusion.
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involve nothing more than self-interested exchange. I seek, with this
purpose in mind, to display the ends that even self-interested contracting
parties share and the mode of sharing to which they commit themselves. I
also seek to explain why persons who commit themselves to sharing such
ends in such a way cease to be strangers and come to treat each other,
affirmatively, as ends in themselves, by entering into what I call a
collaborative community. The hallmark of this collaborative form of
community is that it replaces a concern for other persons' interests-the
concern that underwrites the sharing of ends involved in typical personal
promises-with a concern for other persons' intentions and, ultimately, for
their points of view. The morality of contract therefore identifies and
elaborates a form of respect that does not rely on affection.
1. Joint Intention
The argument finds its starting point in ideas that Michael Bratman has
developed in analyzing certain forms of joint action that Bratman calls
shared intention.70 I seek to adapt these ideas to my purposes rather than to
approach them on their own terms, and so my engagement with Bratman's
work will proceed, once again, in the mode of borrowing rather than
exegesis. I seek to show that contracts involve the patterns of intention that
Bratman describes and that these intentions, in conjunction with contractual
promises, establish relations of respect and community among persons who
adopt them, even when these persons display no concern for each other's
well-being and engage in contracting as part of the pursuit of their narrow
self-interests.7
70. MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative Activity [hereinafter BRATMAN, Shared
Cooperative Activity], in FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY
93 (1999) (reprinting Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327
(1992)); MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Intention [hereinafter BRATMAN, Shared Intention], in
FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY, supra, at 109 (reprinting
Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS 97 (1993)).
71. The preoccupations to which I apply Bratman's ideas are therefore very different from the
preoccupations in whose service he develops them, and I occasionally pause to reflect on these
differences in the margin.
My most significant departure from Bratman's treatment arises because Bratman approaches
joint intentional activity from the point of view of the philosophy of action, whereas I am
approaching joint intentional activity from the point of view of moral philosophy. This difference
causes my presentation to depart from Bratman's, even where I follow his views in substance.
Specifically, Bratman says that a "commitment" to the joint activity is among the general
conditions for the existence of joint intentional activity, see BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative
Activity, supra note 70, at 94-95, whereas I avoid using the word "commitment" in this way. My
reason for doing so is to avoid any confusion between a "commitment" to a joint activity on the
one hand and, on the other hand, a moral "obligation" to the other participants in the activity.
Bratman is himself quite clear about these matters and proceeds without any hint of confusion:
The existence of an intention in favor of the joint activity is sufficient to give rise to a
"commitment" of the type that Bratman has in mind, id. at 96, and such a "commitment"
obviously carries no moral weight. Moreover, the backdrop of Bratman's argument-the broader
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The most general form of shared intention that Bratman considers
involves what he calls joint intentional activity. A couple taking a walk
together, two musicians singing a duet together, and two people rowing a
boat together all present examples of joint intentional activity, to which it
will be helpful to return occasionally to test conclusions or even just to fix
ideas. Bratman wishes to know the precise character of the distinctive form
of interpersonal interaction that these activities involve. There is no doubt
that these and other joint activities all involve forms of coordinated and not
merely correlated action: The actions of the participants do not merely
coincide but rather, to use Hume's phrase, "have a reference to" each
other.72 But this is a rough characterization only, and Bratman is concerned
with understanding more precisely and stating more carefully what such
coordination involves. His answer (modified somewhat to suit my
purposes) illuminates the morality of contract by providing a strikingly
precise characterization of the ends that contracting parties share, the
manner of their sharing, and therefore the sense in which contracting parties
treat each other as ends in themselves.
Bratman's account begins from the observation that joint intentional
activity can arise only when each participant in the activity forms an
appropriate intention, which Bratman characterizes, initially, as an
"intention in favor of the joint activity. ' 73 In order for two musicians to sing
a duet as a joint intentional activity, each must intend to sing the relevant
music. 74 But, as Bratman observes, this rough match of intentions is not by
itself enough for joint intentional activity: A more intricate pattern of
intentions is required.75 This is revealed by returning to the case of the two
musicians and imagining that one intends to sing in a major and the other in
tradition of the philosophy of action-is removed from morality and does not invite any confusion
along these lines. My own argument, by contrast, proceeds in the tradition of moral philosophy,
and this context does invite confusion. I therefore do without the word "commitment" and instead
speak directly in terms of underlying intentions.
72. HUME, supra note 54, at 490. As an example of correlated but not coordinated action,
consider the case of two people who independently cast votes in favor of the same candidate in an
election. These people, one might say, are in agreement without there being an agreement
between them.
73. BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 70, at 96.
74. See id. Bratman properly insists that the activity so intended must be characterized, as he
says, in a "cooperatively neutral" and not in a "cooperatively loaded" way. Id. The cooperatively
loaded characterization of the intended act, for example "trying to win the championship
together," would render the account ofjoint intentional activity circular because it "already brings
in the very idea of cooperation." Id. A cooperatively neutral characterization, for example "trying
to win the championship," by contrast, does not prejudge the matter but is instead consistent with
both cooperative and noncooperative action. (In the example, the persons trying to win may play
on the same or on different teams.)
75. Note, however, that the. entire additional structure that Bratman adds to his conception of
joint intentional activity all plays in the initial register of intention. In particular, Bratman imposes
no requirements on the reasons that the participants in joint intentional activity have for forming
their intentions. I may seek exercise and you may wish to enjoy the view, but as long as we have
the right intentions we can still take a walk together.
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a minor key. It would be misleading to call such singing joint intentional
activity because the jointness does not extend sufficiently deeply into the
singers' intentions. Using Bratman's language, one might say that the
"subplans" by means of which the singers intend to implement their
intentions to sing the duet clash, and that a joint intentional activity requires
more intricate coordination than this example provides.76 The coordination
need not, however, be complete: One singer may intend to sing in a minor
key and the other may intend to dress in black, and the duet may
nevertheless qualify as joint intentional activity. Joint intentional activity
requires only that the participants' subplans are not inconsistent with each
other, or, as Bratman says, that they "mesh.""
The fact of meshing subplans is, however, still not sufficient for joint
intentional activity, for it remains possible that the participants' subplans
mesh only accidentally, as it were, so that meshing does not figure in the
participants' attitudes toward the activity. Two singers of a song may sing
in the same key but only because their rehearsal patterns, involving
sequences of many keys, happen to overlap, in which case it would be
wrong to say that they are singing a duet together. To account for this
complication, Bratman builds the meshing condition into the content of the
participants' intentions: Joint intentional activity requires that the
participants specifically intend to perform the actions according to meshing
subplans.'
Even this is not enough for joint intentional activity. Although the
discussion so far has specified the intentions that each of the participants in
joint intentional activity must develop severally, it has not yet explained the
relationship that must arise among the participants.79 The participants in
76. BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 70, at 98-103.
77. Id. at 99.
78. Id. at 98-103. The example through which Bratman develops this point differs slightly
from my example of the practicing singers in a way that strikes me as misleading. Bratman
imagines that two people who paint a house together have subplans that happen to "agree" on red
paint and that one then changes her mind in favor of blue. Id. at 99. Insofar as the example
suggests that the initial convergence on red involved more than mere coincidence (and was
perhaps even the product of an "agreement"), the shift to blue raises questions of cooperative
stability that are not yet at issue. My example of the practicing singers is designed to avoid this
confusion by emphasizing the coincidence of the mesh.
79. My discussion remains incomplete in another way also. As Bratman emphasizes, joint
intentional activity requires not only action in accordance with the participants' intentions and
their subplans, but also action because of these intentions and subplans. Id. at 100. As Bratman
observes, when one person kidnaps another and, overpowering her, takes her to a city to which
she anyway intended to go, no joint intentional activity has taken place. Id. Joint intentional
activity remains first of all intentional activity, and the person who is overpowered in the example
hasn't intentionally traveled anywhere. At the same time, even as joint intentional activity must be
voluntary, it need not be free. It is enough, in the example, for the kidnap victim willingly to make
the journey, even if her intention to do so is formed in response to a threat. Joint intention fails
only if the person is made to travel against her intentions, or, as one might more commonly say,
against her will.
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joint intentional activity must, as Bratman says, be "mutual[ly]
responsive[]" to one another.80 That the participants' intentions are
mutually responsive to one another is a consequence of something that has
already been said, namely that the requirement of meshing subplans is built
into the content of each participant's intentions. This entails, as Bratman
observes, that each participant in joint intentional activity will construct her
own subplans with reference to the others' subplans, in order to secure a
mesh.81 But joint intentional activity requires a further display of mutual
responsiveness, not just in the participants' intentions but in their actions as
well.82 The participants in joint intentional activity do not just intend to act
together; they in fact do act together, so that not just their plans but their
actions mesh.
This distinguishes joint intentional activity from what Bratman calls
prepackaged coordination.83 In prepackaged coordination, all the jointness
occurs in advance of the activity: The participants plan together and hence
display mutual responsiveness in their intentions, but once the planning is
done, each participant executes her part of the plan (according to her
intentions) separately and without interaction with the others. In
prepackaged coordination, the planning is joint-indeed, typically itself a
joint intentional activity-but the action is separate. Prepackaged
coordination may even reflect the dissolution of a previously joint
endeavor, as when the pair of musicians, tired of their partnership, divide
their mutual possessions and plan for each to collect her share from their
old practice room, as they go their separate ways.
Here it is worth noting, because the point will come up again later on,
that prepackaged coordination, unaccompanied by any joint intentional
activity, can succeed only if the plans and intentions that it involves are
perfectly complete in the sense that they specify, in every necessary detail
and anticipating every contingency, the actions that each participant must
eventually take in order to bring the planned coordination off. This renders
the prepackaged coordination that Bratman imagines a narrow, indeed
perhaps a vanishingly narrow, phenomenon and certainly renders it
incapable of regulating coordination that displays even moderate extension
I have relegated this observation to the margin because it strikes me as implicit in the main
discussion, indeed almost as a background assumption of that discussion, rather than as a
distinctive feature of the phenomenon Bratman seeks to characterize. (Moreover, the assumption
seems to me to fit more economically into the main argument by saying that each participant's
subplans include participating intentionally in the activity, so that the kidnapping example
presents a case of nonmeshing subplans.)
80. Id. at 106.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Bratman speaks of prepackaged cooperation, but this is because he introduces the idea
while discussing a subset of joint intentional activity that he calls shared cooperative activity. I
say more about shared cooperative activity, and about cooperation in general, in a moment.
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or intensity. For, as any contract lawyer knows, the administration even of
the very simplest joint plan requires constant addition, revision, and
adjustment over the course of its performance.
Finally, joint intentional activity requires that these several elements-
each participant's intentions to join in the activity, in accordance with
meshing subplans, 84 and to act in a mutually responsive way-be common
knowledge among the participants. 85 Two people who pursue a common
intention and adjust their intentions and actions in all the ways joint
intentional activity requires nevertheless fail to act jointly unless these
features of their actions are out in the open between them: If each of two
musicians seeking to sing a duet accommodates herself to the other but this
mutual accommodation is not common knowledge between them, they are
not yet singing a duet together-although they may sound as if they are.
86
Putting all of this together, as Bratman helpfully does, one may say that
joint intentional activity characteristically involves a pattern of intentions
that are, self-consciously, interlocking, "for each agent must have intentions
in favor of the efficacy of the intentions of the other. In this way, each agent
must treat the relevant intentions of the other as end-providing for herself;
for each intends that the relevant intentions of the other be successfully
executed.,
87
And yet, in spite of involving this self-consciously interlocking web of
intentions, joint intentional activity may arise even among persons who are
indifferent, or indeed even ungenerous, toward each other. Bratman
illustrates this point through an example he calls "the case of the unhelpful
singers," in which two musicians sing a duet, coordinating their voices as
joint intentional activity requires, but neither has any disposition to help the
other should she stumble, because each prefers the other's failure over their
joint success. 88 Bratman uses the example to contrast joint intentional
activity generally with a second, richer form of shared intention he calls
shared cooperative activity.89 Cooperation, Bratman observes, adds to joint
intentional activity the requirement that each participant's intentions are
such that there exists at least one circumstance in which the other requires
help to perform the joint task but offers no new inducement to secure the
help, and the first participant is willing to help.90 As Bratman says, this
84. Recall also that each participant must act because of these meshing subplans. See supra
text accompanying note 78.
85. BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 70, at 102.
86. This fact-that the performance sounds like a duet-may of course be evidence that each
is proceeding as joint intentional activity requires, and the participants may infer the common
knowledge needed to complete joint intentional activity from such evidence.
87. BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 70, at 102.
88. Id. at 103.
89. Id. at 93-94.
90. See id. at 104. Bratman adds, as a further condition, that whereas joint intentional activity
need only be voluntary, shared cooperative activity must also be free. See id. at 101-02. I find this
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intention in favor of "mutual support" ensures that the joint activity is in
such circumstances "minimally cooperatively stable."9' At the very least,
the participants in shared cooperative activity cannot have interests in the
activity that are opposed to each other, because this opposition would




This analysis is interesting, in the present context, because describing
contract in the terms developed by the theory of joint intentional activity
makes it possible to identify the ends that contracting parties share and the
manner of their sharing, and in this way to specify the precise form of
respectful community that contracting engenders and whose value underlies
the morality of making and keeping contracts. Critically, the sharing of
ends that contract invokes can be explained, by this means, in a manner that
is not undermined by the recognition that contracts can involve no more
than discrete transactions and that the parties to these transactions can
engage each other, ultimately, in pursuit of their separate self-interests.
To begin with, contracts plainly present cases of joint intentional
activity. The parties to contracts--even to very simple contracts, say, in
which one person hires another to cultivate her garden at a fixed hourly
wage-participate in the joint intentional activity of performing the
contract. Each party intends to join in the performance (the cultivation of
the garden in exchange for the payment of the wage); each party intends to
do so in accordance with meshing subplans (in which the gardener
composes a garden to suit the plants and tools that the homeowner provides
addition somewhat obscure. It seems to me that two singers who sing a duet under threat of
violence should they fail-who give a command performance, as it were-are properly described
as cooperating with each other even though they do not sing freely. They certainly have the
intentions in favor of mutual support that distinguish cooperation from joint intention simpliciter.
Finally, Bratman adds, in effect as background conditions, that the help does not undermine the
first participant's own participation in the joint activity, and that the intentions to help are
common knowledge.
91. Id. at 103, 105. Bratman in fact speaks of a "commitment" to mutual support, see id. at
103, and this is therefore a point at which Bratman's usage and mine diverge. This is also a point
at which it is important to avoid the confusion of which I have warned. The "commitment"
Bratman identifies is a practical commitment to the joint activity; it is not a moral obligation to the
other participants in the activity. The importance of this difference will become plain in the pages
that follow.
92. The participants in shared cooperative activity need not, however, be independently
concerned for each others' interests. Although such generosity is one natural source of the
intentions in favor of mutual support that cooperation involves, these intentions may arise in other
ways also. It is possible, for example, for purely self-interested participants in an activity to enjoy
benefits from the activity that so far exceed the costs (including opportunity costs) of their
participation that they are willing to assume additional costs in order to sustain the activity in case
other participants stumble and place the success of the activity at risk.
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and the homeowner secures plants and tools to suit the gardener's
composition); and, because even the simplest contract cannot be
administered as prepackaged cooperation, each party adjusts her subplans to
the other's as mutual responsiveness in action requires (so that the
gardener's composition and the homeowner's provision adjust to each other
as the garden develops).93
Moreover, even discrete, purely transactional contracts-including
most prominently contracts for the sale of goods-involve joint intentional
activity, even if (in contrast to the gardening contract described a moment
ago) they do not invoke any rich culturally familiar relations among the
parties, who become nothing more than buyers and sellers. Even parties to
discrete, transactional contracts intend to join in the promised performance
(to secure the exchange of goods for money); even parties to discrete,
transactional contracts intend to perform in accordance with meshing
subplans (involving, for example, the method of shipment, place of
delivery, and the means of payment); and even the most discrete,
transactional contract cannot fully specify in advance every component of
the performance that it contemplates or every contingency that might affect
the parties' intentions in this performance, and it therefore cannot be
administered as prepackaged cooperation, but instead depends on some
degree of mutual responsiveness in action.94
Contracts generally do not, however, involve shared cooperative
activity. Some forms of promise, especially among intimates, may well
invoke the intentions in favor of mutual support that constitute the core of
cooperation (think of the traditional marriage vow's language "in sickness
and in health" or indeed of contractual promises to establish partnerships or
joint ventures 95). But contracts can arise, as I have been saying, among
parties who retain opposed interests in the joint activity that the contracts
contemplate and who are each unwilling, when the other stumbles and
places the success of the joint activity in jeopardy, to shoulder any
uncompensated increases in their shares of the burden of the joint activity.
And although even discrete contracts do not necessarily involve parties who
are in this sense uncooperative-although even discrete contracts may be
sufficiently profitable, and the costs associated with their breakdown
93. Contracts of course also satisfy the common knowledge condition that Bratman imposes
on joint intentional activity. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
94. The law of sales recognizes this and requires the parties to fill in the unspecified aspects
of their performance in a reasonable fashion. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-503 (1997) (providing that a
seller must give a buyer reasonable notification of tender); id. § 2-504 (providing that, except as
otherwise agreed, a seller who is required to ship goods to a buyer must choose a means of
shipment "as may be reasonable having regard to the nature of the goods and other circumstances
of the case"); id. § 2-513 (providing that, except as otherwise agreed, a buyer may make a
reasonable inspection of the goods). These requirements of reasonableness all serve, among other
things, to ensure that the parties to contracts display mutual responsiveness to each other in action.
95. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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sufficiently large, so that the parties are willing to shoulder additional
uncompensated burdens in order to keep their contracts afloat-the legal
structure of the discrete contract relation characteristically accepts such
uncooperative participants. As a general matter, a material breach by one
party to a contract (even if it is innocent 96) relieves the other of its
obligation of return performance. 97 Moreover, the law never requires a
disappointed promisee to catch a stumbling promisor and (shouldering the
burden herself) ensure that the contemplated performance occurs. In place
of mutual support, contract imposes only a much thinner nondefection
condition on joint intentional activity. The parties to a contract need not be
willing to compensate for each other's shortcomings; they need only be
committed to not stumbling first. Indeed, Bratman's case of the unhelpful
singers could easily be brought within the legal form of contract, and a
moral theory of contractual obligation must therefore, as I have been
saying, apply even to such a case.
98
Bratman's ideas therefore make it possible to begin to give a precise
account of the shared intentions that contracts do and do not involve. But
this account seems to undermine rather than support my larger theoretical
claims concerning the morality of contract. As the connection between
contract and the case of the unhelpful singers brings home, Bratman's ideas
on their own appear not so much to reveal the respectful and communal
character of the contract relation as to pinpoint the precise failures of
respect and community that the contract relation involves.
This suggestion is mistaken, however, because references to shared
intention present only an incomplete account of the contract relation.
Contract also involves the intention that figured so prominently in the more
general theory of promising-the intention to perform unless released (or,
speaking with the theory of promising already in place, to assume an
obligation). Neither joint intentional nor shared cooperative activity
characteristically involves this intention, so that describing the contract
relation exclusively in terms of shared intention leaves a key element of
contract to one side. The truly respectful and communal character of the
96. Contractual liability, after all, is strict liability.
97. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §237 (1981) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
98. It is important to differentiate this discussion of contract from remarks Bratman makes
under the heading "competition and levels of mesh." See BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative Activity,
supra note 70, at 107. Bratman observes that some activities, most characteristically play at
games, can involve shared cooperative activity (including intentions in favor of mutual support) at
one level-involving recognizing the rules of the game, choosing a venue for play, and so on-
but be noncooperative (and indeed competitive) at lower levels involving strategic action within
the game. See id. The difference between contract and shared cooperative activity does not just
involve the level of mesh at which the cooperation stops. (Although the depth of the mesh in
contract may indeed be quite limited, as when two competitors do a deal.) Contract need not
involve shared cooperative activity at any level of mesh.
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contract relation appears only when contractual obligation is returned to the
center of the argument and the joint intentions that Bratman emphasizes are
viewed against the backdrop of this obligation.
In spite of their complexity and richness, joint intentional and even
shared cooperative activity standing alone do not yet establish the relations
among persons that promises, including contracts, characteristically
involve. As Hume surmised, "Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it
by agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each
other."99 And Bratman himself imagines that two musicians might sing a
duet together even though they "have a clear understanding that neither is
making a binding promise to or agreement with the other concerning their
singing" so that each expressly "reserves the right to change her mind." 100
Moreover, these reservations apply equally to shared cooperative as to joint
intentional activity. Cooperation requires only a present intention in favor
of mutual support; it does not require any intention to assume an obligation
of mutual support or indeed even to maintain present cooperative intentions
in the future. A person may join a cooperative venture, and intend to
support her co-venturer's cooperative activities, and yet reserve, expressly
or even just implicitly, the right to change her intentions and abandon the
cooperation at any time.
If the intentions of a participant in joint intentional or even shared
cooperative activity (responding, say, to changes in external circumstances)
waver or change, causing her to abandon the activity, the other participants
can raise no claim against her. If one of the musicians in the duet shifts
from being a cooperative to being an unhelpful singer, or even stops singing
the duet entirely, the other does not, without more, have any moral
complaint.' 0' This reveals that the intentions involved in joint intentional
99. HUME, supra note 54, at 490.
100. BRATMAN, Shared Intention, supra note 70, at 126-27; see also MICHAEL E. BRATMAN,
Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation, in FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON
INTENTION AND AGENCY, supra note 70, at 130, 133 (observing that in such a case, neither is
obligated to the other to continue with the duet).
101. Bratman is perfectly aware that his account of joint intentional and even shared
cooperative activity does not directly underwrite moral obligation, and he devotes a subsequent
essay to discussing the relationship between shared intention and obligation. See BRATMAN, supra
note 100. Bratman approaches these questions by separating the problem of "describ[ing] a social-
psychological web of interlocking attitudes that plays the roles definitive of shared intention"
from the problem of identifying the "normative consequences of that web." Id. at 140. These
normative consequences arise, for Bratman, from the application of freestanding moral principles
to the particular patterns of attitudes that shared intention describes, so that even though shared
intention may be associated with obligations, "we need not see the associated normative
consequences as themselves constitutive of shared intention." Id. at 141. Bratman's approach to
shared intention and mutual obligation may be contrasted, in this respect, to the approach taken by
Margaret Gilbert, who claims that shared intention, or (as she more commonly calls it) joint
commitment, "in and of itself' involves mutual obligation, so that the relationship between the
two is, as Gilbert says, "conceptual." MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 8,
17 (2000). Gilbert also presents this view in two earlier books. MARGARET GILBERT, LIVING
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and even shared cooperative activity are ultimately intentions in favor of
the activity only and not in favor of the other participants. Although the
jointness of these forms of activity necessitates the interlocking structure of
intention that Bratman describes-in which each participant's intentions are
in favor of the success of certain of the others' intentions-this entire
interlocking structure depends, in the cases Bratman addresses, wholly
upon each participant's individual interest in the activity. Even though the
participants in joint intentional and even shared cooperative activity intend
to adjust to each others' intentions, each participant's adjustments answer
exclusively to her own engagement with the activity. The participants do
not intend to subordinate themselves to each other's wills. And joint
intentional and even shared cooperative activity therefore do not establish a
moral relationship among the persons who engage them.
Contract stands in stark contrast to joint intentional and shared
cooperative activity simpliciter in this respect. Whereas joint intentional
and shared cooperative activity involve intentions in favor of the activity
that invoke the other participant only through the activity, contract, being a
species of promise, adds to these an intention in favor of the other
participant, which has as its subject the performance of the joint activity.
After all, a contractual promisor, including even a promisor in a discrete,
transactional contract, intends not to abandon the promised performance
unless released from the contract. Rather than intending, as in both joint
intentional and shared cooperative activity, just that the intentions of her
promisee succeed, a contractual promisor intends, in effect, to give her
promisee authority to require her to promote the success of his intentions.
She intends, within the sphere of the contract, to subordinate her will to her
promisee's, and she comes, in this way, to treat her promisee, and not just
the joint activity of the contract, as an end in himself. Although contract
involves less extensive sharing than shared cooperative activity-it
TOGETHER: RATIONALITY, SOCIALITY, AND OBLIGATION (1996); MARGARET GILBERT, ON
SOCIAL FACTS (1989).
My account of contractual obligation has Bratman's structure rather than Gilbert's (although,
as I discuss in a moment, see infra note 104, the substantive moral principles to which Bratman
appeals are very different from the ones that figure in my argument). I describe a pattern of
intentions-involving joint intentional activity coupled with intentions not to defect from this
activity unless the other participants consent-and then argue that this pattern gives rise to moral
obligation by reference to freestanding moral principles concerning the value of respectful
community. It seems to me that this is the only plausible approach to take to the relationship
between shared intention and obligation. To begin with, cases clearly exist in which shared
intention appears without obligation (as in Bratman's case of the singers who each expressly
reserve the right to abandon their duet, see supra text accompanying note 100). Furthermore, and
more fundamentally (because the first objection may perhaps be answered by narrowing the scope
of shared intention to exclude such cases), Gilbert's approach requires that intentions display the
potency (to ground obligations) that Hume and Anscombe so powerfully argued they cannot have.
Theories that draw the connection between shared intention and obligation in terms of
freestanding moral values avoid this embarrassment.
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involves only nondefection as opposed to mutual support-such sharing as
contract does involve proceeds along a different axis from the (greater)
sharing in shared cooperative activity. This axis takes the form of intentions
running directly from participant to participant, rather than through the
activity. And in spite of the thinness of the sharing that it involves, contract
therefore establishes a moral relation among the persons who engage it that
joint intentional and even shared cooperative activity do not. 102
I have said from the start that the intentions to assume obligations that
lie at the heart of even self-interested, discrete contracts entail that contracts
underwrite some form of moral recognition among the parties to them. 03
But I have worried that the thin and formal character of such contractual
obligations might undermine efforts to base the morality of contract on the
relations of recognition that contracts involve. Casting the contractual form
as a species of joint intentional activity makes it possible, now, to overcome
this worry by identifying the precise character of the respect that contract
transcendentally evokes and therefore the precise form of community that
contract underwrites.
Notwithstanding the self-interest with which persons typically approach
their contracts, each party to a contract forms self-consciously interlocking
intentions, in which she adopts the success of certain intentions of the other
party as her own ends. Moreover, each party intends to give the other
authority over her intentions: She intends for the other party to exert a claim
102. One can say, therefore, that the intentions associated with joint intentional activity and
even shared cooperative activity are not sufficient to establish the respectful community upon
which the morality of promise and contract depends. The intention not to defect from the promise
or contract unless released is also necessary because without this intention the deference to the
person of the promise-without which the promisor does not treat the promisee as an end-is not
established. At the same time, adding the intention not to defect is sufficient for establishing the
required respectful community. This community is sustained by the fact of deference to the
promise, and there is no need (recall the discussion in Subsection I.C.3) to cast this deference in
terms of obligation or any of its cognates.
103. It is a transcendental condition of the possibility of contractual obligation that the parties
to contracts are full-fledged legal persons-as the law acknowledges when it declines to recognize
contracts with persons who lack contractual capacity. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 97,
§§ 12-16. Notice, moreover, that persons, for example minor children, may lack contractual
capacity but nevertheless sue and be sued in tort, so that having contractual capacity indicates a
higher legal status than merely enjoying the right not to be harmed. Compare W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 134 (5th ed. 1984) (stating the "general
rule" that "an infant has no tort immunity based solely on the fact of infancy" and describing
exceptions), with E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.4 (3d ed. 1999) (reporting that
"common law courts early announced the prevailing view that a minor's contract is 'voidable' at
the instance of the minor"). The two rules clash when a minor fraudulently induces a person to
enter into a contract, in which case he may be held liable in tort for fraud but not in contract. See
KEETON ET AL., supra, § 134 (reporting cases).
This pattern in the law should not be surprising, given what I have said so far: Tort law
grows out of a relatively primitive but broad-based objection to using other persons merely as
means; contract law reflects a more advanced but narrower ideal in favor of treating other persons
as ends, and in particular as ends in terms of their capacity to adopt an independent point of view,
at least insofar as they are capable of sustaining this treatment.
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against her in connection with these interlocking intentions, a claim not to
be the first to defect from the joint performance that the intentions
characterize. Some practices of promising (for example, marriage)
introduce the promissory relation-involving intentions to assume
obligations that run directly from person to person-among persons who
seek broadly to make common cause. They therefore present conceptions of
community that are impassioned and intimate in two ways: First, the ends
that the parties share encompass the general pursuit of their substantive
interests; and second, the parties understand the mode of their sharing to
include broad patterns of reciprocal concern and open-ended obligations of
mutual aid.
Contract, by contrast, introduces the promissory relation among persons
whose engagement is much narrower. It therefore presents a conception of
community that is in both ways impassive and detached: Both the ends that
the parties share and the mode of their sharing are circumscribed by the
particular terms of their agreement. Contract therefore presents a much
sparer and more formal conception of community than is common to many
personal promises, both in the narrowness of the ends that are shared in
contract and in the narrowness of the mode of sharing itself. One might say,
adopting a term of art, that whereas the community constituted by marriage,
for example, is fully cooperative, the community constituted by contract is
only collaborative.
Collaborative communities, in spite of their narrowly formal character,
involve genuine respect and remain true communities. They invoke the
shared ends and modes of sharing that this Section has described in
considerable detail. Indeed, collaboration exhibits forms of respect that
arise only unnaturally in connection with cooperation, if they arise at all.
The contrast between the circumscribed character of collaborative
communities and the open-ended character of cooperative communities
gives collaborators a measure of control over how they are treated in the
name of community that cooperators do not enjoy. The role that joint
intention plays in collaboration, and the specificity that collaborative
intentions therefore display, entail that a collaborator must constrain her
actions to respect her partner's point of view concerning the collaboration,
whereas the open-endedness of cooperation can allow a cooperator to
pursue her partner's interests as she sees them, even against his own,
differing, view of what his interests involve. Finally, this difference matters
in practice: Collaborative conceptions of community are less likely to
recommend paternalism than cooperative conceptions, and paternalism is
indeed both less practiced and less accepted in connection with contracts
than in connection with personal promises. Collaboration presents a moral
ideal of community and respect-indeed an ideal that is distinctive in its
own right and not just cooperation's poorer cousin. And contract therefore
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describes a distinctive moral relation between persons-and moral reasons
for both making and keeping contracts arise-in spite of the fact that
persons also approach contracts in pursuit of their narrow, and often
competing, self-interests.
This should not in the end come as any surprise, because the ideal of
moral community (rendered articulate through the Kantian Formula of the
End in Itself) from which my argumlent hegan pre-ents 9 capacious moral
ideal that encompasses, as I have said, the sharing of many substantive ends
under many modes of sharing. The existence of the intention to become
obligated transmutes the pattern of intentions that contract involves into a
relation not just of each party to the joint activity, but rather directly
between the parties, whose ends are not merely coincidental nor even
correlated, but are instead shared-even if the ends are more formal, and
the sharing more limited, than in other promissory relations. By sharing
ends in this fashion the parties to contracts come, as Kant would say, to
treat each other as ends, which is to say that they cease to be strangers and
enter into a moral community together.
Moreover, when one party breaches a contract, she pursues an end that
is inconsistent with the shared ends of the contract, an end in which the
other party to the contract cannot share. She thus forecloses treating the
other party as an end in himself, at least in respect of the contract's subject
matter. The morality of contract therefore displays the same structural
components as the morality of promise of which it represents a special case.
The reasons for making contracts include that persons who do so enter into
a moral relation in which they treat each other as ends in themselves. And
the reasons for keeping contracts include that breaches do not merely undo
whatever sharing of ends a contract relation involves, but rather render
sharing ends, at least in respect of the contemplated performance,
impossible. Contracts enable persons who are not intimates nevertheless to
cease to be strangers; and breaches do not just reinstate the persons' prior
status as strangers but instead leave them actively estranged.
0 4
104. Bratman's own account of the morality of shared intention proceeds along very different
lines. Instead of developing the possibility that joint intentional activity, coupled with the
appropriate form of intention to be obligated, can produce a morally significant relation among
the participants, Bratman approaches the morality of shared intention in light of the participants'
several separate interests. This leads him to a harm-based view that understands the morality of
shared intentions as arising out of each participant's reliance on the other's expressed intentions,
under an application of Scanlon's Principle of Fidelity. See BRATMAN, supra note 100. Such
harm-based views cannot, however, adequately explain the morality of promise and contract,
because they cannot account for the fundamental place of the will among the grounds of moral
obligation. I develop this point in greater detail elsewhere. See Daniel Markovits, Making and
Keeping Contracts (Mar. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
One general advantage of Bratman's approach over mine is worth noting, although it is not
relevant in the specific context of promise and contract. Bratman's view applies based on the
attributes of joint intentional activity simpliciter, without reference to the additional element of
intentions running directly between the participants that my characterization of contract invokes.
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B. Who Can Collaborate
Contracts, including contracts concerning discrete transactions among
self-interested parties, invoke the distinctive ideals of respect and
community that explain the morality of promising, albeit in a collaborative
rather than fuilly cooperative form. The argument has therefore answered
the challenge that I posed at its earliest beginnings: It has explained how the
scope of the morality of promise might encompass even the constrained,
instrumental, and therefore distinctly impersonal promises that contracts
typically involve. But contracts may be impersonal in another way also,
which I have not yet emphasized, and which refers to the character not of
the promises that contracts contain but rather of the parties who make these
promises. This second kind of contractual impersonality addresses only the
scope of the collaborative view's application and not the view's
persuasiveness tout court, and so presents a less fundamental challenge to
the collaborative account of contract than the first. Yet it is worth
addressing nevertheless, if only to help clarify the ambitions and structure
of the collaborative view.
The parties to contracts need not be individuals (that is, natural persons)
but may be, and indeed often are, organizations (that is, artificial persons)
including, typically, economic firms. Contracts may therefore be sorted, by
reference to the character of the parties who make them, into three classes:
contracts between individuals, contracts between organizations, and
contracts between individuals and organizations.10 5 I have developed the
collaborative theory of contract with the first class of contracts, between
individuals, in mind. This is a natural emphasis given the theory's origins
and ambitions: Both the Kantian ideals of respect out of which the theory
has grown and the liberal ideals of political legitimacy to which the theory
aspires focus attention on individuals and away from organizations.
But it is important also to say how the collaborative view stands with
respect to the other two classes of contracts, which involve organizations as
parties. In this Section, I observe that the collaborative view does not apply
in any straightforward way to contracts involving organizations. I also
argue, however, that contracts involving organizations present very
Bratman's account of the morality of shared intention therefore has a broader range of application
than mine and has been applied, for example, to explain the duties of legal officials to support a
legal practice characterized as a joint intentional activity. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRrNCIPLE 98 (2001); Kenneth Einar Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125, 134-35 (Jules Coleman
& Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); Scott Shapiro, Law, Plans, and Practical Reason, 8 LEGAL THEORY
387 (2002). 1 take no view of the scope of my alternative approach to the morality of shared
intention, which may or may not be confined to the special cases of promise and contract.
105. This typology follows the general approach taken in MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS,
PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 83 (1986), and, for the particular case of contract law, Schwartz
& Scott, supra note 3, at 544.
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different problems-morally and indeed conceptually-from contracts
among individuals. The fact that the collaborative view does not
straightforwardly reach contracts that involve organizations therefore does
not represent a theoretical failure so much as the natural intellectual
division of labor. These observations do not, of course, settle the questions
whether there should be one law of contract or two, and if there should be
only one, whether considerations relevant to individuals or to organizations
should dominate. Although I do not seek to settle this question, I argue that
contracts involving individuals properly occupy the center of our intuitive
conception of contract, and I identify costs of allowing contracts that
involve organizations to be governed by a legal regime that departs from
the collaborative ideals that I am developing. These arguments remain
inevitably incomplete, however, because they invest the collaborative ideal
with a weight that remains asserted only, and not yet earned, and whose
final justification must abide future work connecting collaboration to the
mainstays of liberal political authority.
Organizations clearly cannot participate directly in the moral ideals by
whose terms the collaborative view explains contractual obligations. The
collaborative view describes the distinctive forms of respect and
community that contracts engender, but these broader notions do not
directly apply to organizations at all. Individual persons have reasons to
respect and seek community with each other because individual persons'
moral status commands that they be treated never merely as means but
always as ends in themselves. Organizations, by contrast, have no
comparable moral status, even when there are treated, artificially, as
persons at law. Quite to the contrary, organizations should be treated
precisely as mere means, and someone who treats an organization as an end
in itself makes, at least presumptively, a moral error. Organizations are
simply not the kinds of creatures to which the broader moral framework
that supports the collaborative ideal directly applies, so that relations
involving organizations-that is, between organizations or between
organizations and individual persons-cannot directly participate in the
value of contractual collaboration.
This much is straightforward. But it remains possible that contracts
involving organizations might generate a morally valuable collaborative
relation indirectly, in one of two ways: First, contracts involving
organizations might engender collaboration among the individual persons
who, as stakeholders in the organizations, stand behind the organizations
and bear the consequences of their contractual activity; and second,
contracts involving organizations might engender collaboration among the
individual persons who, as the organizations' agents, front the organizations
and contract on their behalves. I remain open to these possibilities and
accept that my views here are preliminary only, so that contracts involving
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organizations may perhaps be brought within the collaborative framework
by some argument I have not anticipated. But I am inclined nevertheless to
reject both suggestions, and indeed for analogous reasons.
On the one hand, contractual promises made to organizations address
only the organizations and not their agents or stakeholders. Such promises
may be received by the organizations' agents and may inure to the benefits
of the organizations' stakeholders, but this is not sufficient to make them
promises in favor of the agents or stakeholders, who never become
promisees themselves. The intentions in such promises make no reference
to these individual persons but only to the organizations, so that a
contractual promise made to an organization does not address the individual
persons associated with the organization at all. A promisor in such a case
simply does not adopt, through her promise, any intentions toward these
associated persons, although the promise may of course affect these
persons, and the promisor may carry previously existing intentions toward
them (for example, intentions to benefit them) with her into the promise.
And, on the other hand, contractual promises that bind organizations
also regard only the organizations and not their agents or stakeholders. Such
promises may be triggered by the organizations' agents and may burden the
organizations' stakeholders, but this is not sufficient to make the promises
count against the agents or stakeholders, who never become promisors
themselves. The intentions in such promises again make no reference to
these individual persons (even if they are intentions of the individual
persons who, as agents, actually speak the promises), but refer only to the
organizations, so that a contractual promise made on behalf of an
organization does not bind the individual persons associated with the
organization at all. Nor do these persons adopt any intentions through the
promise, although the promise may, of course, influence their intentions,
not least because they may carry into the promise previously existing
intentions that their organizations should keep their contracts.
One might say, therefore, that organizations are, as a general matter,
freestanding with respect to the intentions and obligations in which the
collaborative account of contract traffics. 10 6 Promises that make reference to
106. Meir Dan-Cohen, writing in a related context, calls organizations impermeable and
emphasizes that actions taken against organizations, even if they affect individual persons
associated with.the organizations, are not yet taken against these individual persons. DAN-COHEN,
supra note 105, at 35, 64. Dan-Cohen imagines cases in which intentionally injuring a corporation
reduces its profits and harms its employees, and observes that while the harm to the employees
may be foreseeable, it need not be intentional. See id. at 68. This metaphor is vivid, to be sure, but
it is perhaps also a little misleading. It suggests that organizations act as shields--or, as
Dan-Cohen says, "buffers," id. at 69-that stand between those who act against organizations and
the individual persons connected to the organizations, whom these actions affect. That is the
wrong image, however, because the organizations do not so much stand in front of these
individuals as beside them. Evidence for this is that any "shielding" presented by an organization
may at once be overcome by a person who simply aims his intentions in another direction, namely
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1466 [Vol. 113: 1417
Contract and Collaboration
organizations do not generally implicate the agents and stakeholders, out of
whose actions they arise and to whose interests they inure, in any
promissory relations of their own. This is not a hard and fast rule, to be
sure, and some contractual promises that formally involve organizations
only may in substance address the organizations' stakeholders or agents:
When an organization is very small it may, within the relevant contractual
practice, be understood as indistinguishable from its stakeholders, and even
when an organization is larger, particular agents or stakeholders may
become personally engaged in the organization's contracts, perhaps because
of the intimacy or intensity of their involvement with the contractual
practice in question.'0 7 In such cases, an individual person becomes, in the
context of a contractual relation, identified with an organization, and may
therefore participate in the intentional relations that the contract involves.
But these are by their nature unusual cases, and in the more typical
circumstance organizational contracts will not draw individual persons
associated with the organizations into any collaborative relations.
The collaborative account of contract therefore seems not to apply,
either directly or indirectly, to contracts that involve organizations.,
°8
Organizations cannot engage the values of respect and community that
underwrite the collaborative ideal, and an organization's contracts draw
neither its agents nor its stakeholders into collaboration. The theory of
contractual obligation that I develop in these pages therefore does not, at
least in any straightforward way, encompass contracts that involve
organizations. This limitation does not, however, undermine the
collaborative view's claim to capture the essence of contract or indeed its
practical importance. To begin with, alternative approaches to contracts
involving organizations succeed only on terms that reveal such agreements
to be far removed from contract's conceptual core. And moreover, there
may be good reason to assimilate contracts including organizations to the
collaborative view in order to protect collaboration among individuals.
The collaborative view does not stand alone in failing to apply directly
to contracts involving organizations. Rather, a similarly restricted scope
applies quite generally to theories of contract that find the roots of
contractual obligation in practical properties of the individual wills of
contracting parties. Thus it is a familiar observation, for example, that
theories that ground contractual obligation in the autonomy of the
contracting parties-that understand contractual obligation as either
straight at the individual persons who are said to be shielded. A person who injures a corporation
in order to harm its employees does intentionally harm them.
107. In observing these possibilities I do not, of course, take myself to be presenting a
substantive account of when individual persons should be legally, or morally, bound by
organizations' contracts.
108. Note that organizations may themselves present instances of contractual collaboration. A
partnership, for example, certainly involves contractual collaboration among the partners.
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promoting or respecting this autonomy-cannot explain contract as it
applies to organizations, and fail to do so for reasons that closely resemble
the considerations that I have developed here. Meir Dan-Cohen, for
example, concludes that the autonomy paradigm applies to contracts
involving organizations only instrumentally and only in the narrow case in
which the organizations in question serve the autonomy of individuals 0 9
And Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, who develop a theory specifically of
contract among organizations (and, in particular, economic firms) take the
proposition that "the business firms that make commercial contracts are
artificial persons whose autonomy the state need not respect on moral
grounds" to be so straightforwardly obvious as to justify excluding the
value of autonomy from the theory of contracts among organizations
without further argument.110 As a result of these and related arguments,
theories that explain contract in terms of the practical properties of
individual persons' wills must quite generally leave space, in addressing
contracts involving organizations, for economic and broadly utilitarian
modes of analysis. Thus it seems natural for Schwartz and Scott to say, in
setting the scene for their theory of contracts among organizations, that
"[t]he contract law of commercial parties is about efficiency," so that
"contract law should facilitate the ability of firms to maximize welfare [by
which Schwartz and Scott mean contractual surplus] when making
commercial contracts.""'
But although this economic approach is surely more naturally suited
than the collaborative view to explaining business and exchange relations
among organizations, the economic view of these arrangements turns out,
on reflection, not to describe a practice of contract, properly speaking, at
all. Even as the economic approach succeeds at analyzing organizational
practices upon which the collaborative view has no immediate purchase, its
successes reveal that the collaborative view's failures do not undermine its
aspirations to present a theory of contract. The success of the economic
analysis of business arrangements among organizations serves, rather, to
reveal that the distinctive essence of contract lies where I have found it, in
contracts among individual persons.
Schwartz and Scott's discussion of the underpinnings of their economic
account of contracts among business organizations vividly illustrates these
observations. In defending their view that contract law for economic firms
should be designed single-mindedly to maximize contractual surplus,
Schwartz and Scott introduce a series of further ideas-besides the claim
that autonomy-based values do not apply to organizations-that emphasize
109. DAN-COHEN, supra note 105, at 77.
110. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 556.
111. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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the divergence between the business arrangements among economic firms
that they take for their subject and contract's distinctive conceptual core.
Specifically, although Schwartz and Scott do not deny that the law might, in
some circumstances, properly be concerned not only with efficiency but
also with justice, they reject the idea that this concern for justice, in either
its corrective or distributive forms, should influence the law governing
business arrangements among firms. Thus Schwartz and Scott observe, with
respect to corrective justice, that firms' broad-ranging contractual
engagements generally cause them to occupy both sides of contractual
relationships, so that corrective-justice-inspired preferences for one side or
the other (for buyers, say, or for licensees) will inevitably come out in the
wash and will therefore be rejected by the firms themselves, who will never
benefit from corrective principles that shift surplus around in particular
contracts at the cost of reducing the overall surplus that is available.112 And
Schwartz and Scott add, with respect to distributive justice, that because the
individual persons who own firms will (and should) diversify their
holdings, even legal rules that did prefer firms on one side of business
transactions would have no distributive effects across owners.1 3 Diversified
owners, as Schwartz and Scott point out, will own shares in both the firms
that are benefited and those that are burdened by any particular legal rule.
1 14
Such owners look to the total value of their portfolios and are indifferent to
increases in the values of some of their holdings that come at the expense of
decreases in the values of others. 1' 5 All these arguments come together to
support Schwartz and Scott's "principal normative claim," which is, once
again, that the law governing business transactions among firms should be
arranged so as to maximize the total gains that such transactions produce." 1
6
But even as these arguments make a case for Schwartz and Scott's
approach to business transactions among firms, they reveal the distance that
separates such transactions, as Schwartz and Scott conceive them, from
contract's conceptual core. Specifically, Schwartz and Scott undermine
every sense of the moral separateness or distinctness of the parties to the
transactions that they analyze. They deny that firms have practical
properties, such as autonomy, that might cast distinct firms as morally
valuable in themselves. They deny that firms should be understood, by
reference to principles of corrective justice, to have distinct moral
entitlements to certain shares of the surplus created by the transactions that
firms make. And they deny that the law governing transactions among firms
112. Id. at 555.
113. Id. at 555-56.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 556.
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should seek to serve any distinctive distributive entitlements of the firms'
owners.
These observations, taken together, paint a picture of commercial
transactions among business firms in which the only morally freestanding
principal is the representative owner of a fully diversified portfolio of
shares in all the firms that engage in the transactions Schwartz and Scott
take as their subject. The firms themselves are mere instrumentalities that
interact with each other on behalf of this common owner, who has a
perfectly balanced share in both sides of every transaction. Schwartz and
Scott's search for an efficient law of economic transactions among firms
may naturally be understood as an effort to say what legal rules governing
the conduct of such instrumentalities will maximize the total value of this
representative owner's diversified portfolio.
Schwartz and Scott are engaged, therefore, in an exercise in
transaction-cost economics, broadly viewed. Indeed, their arguments
resonate directly with the Coasean theory of the firm. Coase observed that
"a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction
[by command and control] within the firm become equal to the costs of
carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange [a contract] on
the open market."'1 17 The return to capital will therefore necessarily be
reduced in light of the need to bear at least the smaller of these transaction
costs, and Schwartz and Scott may be understood as asking what rules of
law will minimize the transaction costs on the market side of the firm's
boundary (with the consequence that the legal rules Schwartz and Scott
identify will minimize the optimal size of the firm118).
Putting the argument into this frame casts the instrumental character of
firms as Schwartz and Scott understand them into sharp relief: Firms should
exist only insofar as they are less transaction-costly means than markets of
putting capital to work, and they are therefore not just instruments, but
undifferentiated instruments, which may be created, manipulated, and
destroyed always in the service of a single, diversified owner. And this
reveals, finally, the gap between Schwartz and Scott's chosen subject and
contract's conceptual core: Contract, in its essence, involves two distinct,
independent parties, but the transactions that Schwartz and Scott describe
countenance just one.
Taken together, these arguments create the condition that I announced
at the start of the discussion of contracts involving organizations and
117. RONALD COASE, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33,
44 (1988) (reprinting R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)).
118. Coase himself observed that policies that increase the cost of market transactions but not
the cost of the same transactions within the firm will increase the optimal size of the firm. Id. at
41. Coase had in mind sales taxes and price controls, but inefficient legal rules governing market
transactions among firms have the same effect.
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toward which I have been steadily working ever since. The collaborative
view does not immediately apply to obligations generated by contracts
involving organizations, including in particular economic firms. But
alternative accounts of contracts between organizations, even as they
succeed at explaining the obligations involved, cast these obligations in a
light that reveals them to be enormously different from the obligations that
the collaborative view seeks to explain, and indeed, at least from the
perspective of the pretheoretical intuitions that motivated the collaborative
view, not to be contractual, properly speaking, at all.
None of this means that the obligations that organizations, including
economic firms, assume when they make agreements are illusory or involve
conceptual confusion. Nor does it deny that firms ought to be capable of
obligating themselves and that inquiry into the legal rules governing such
obligations-the inquiry Schwartz and Scott have taken on-presents an
important and challenging subject. I claim only that the two subjects-
agreements among individual persons on the one hand and agreements
among organizations on the other-are sufficiently different that the
collaborative view's failure to account for the second should not count
against its explanation of the first.
These observations present a theoretically satisfying division of
contract into structurally distinct and normatively distinctive species
(although they do not underwrite any account of contracts that involve both
individuals and organizations, which cannot be satisfactorily explained on
either the collaborative or the economic view). But they do not yet present a
practically satisfying account of contract law, which continues to operate, in
large measure, at a generic level, without expressly distinguishing between
individuals and organizations. This makes it natural to ask whether
considerations relevant to individual persons or to organizations-to
collaboration or to efficiency-should dominate contract law. Schwartz and
Scott propose that contract law should focus on firms. They claim that the
doctrines commonly identified with contract-in the common law of
contracts and in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)-take agreements
among firms as their principal subject, leaving contracts involving
individuals to be governed by outlying doctrinal regimes, for example
family law, consumer protection law, and employment law. 1 9 Schwartz and
Scott seek to encourage this approach by developing traditional contract
law into a "law merchant for our time.,
20
My view, however, is quite different. It seems to me that, as a
descriptive matter, contracts among individual persons-governed by the
doctrines of traditional contract law-play a fairly prominent role in many
119. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 544.
120. Id. at 550.
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individual persons' moral and legal lives. Individual persons, acting within
the doctrinal categories that Schwartz and Scott associate with contract
proper, commonly make contracts involving the purchase and sale of
personal property (including, increasingly, over the Internet 121) and of
services in many forms, including childcare and elder care, day labor, and
services associated with any number of trades and professions.122 Moreover,
and prescriptively, these contracts all engender valuable collaborative
relations among the individual persons who participate in them, and
contract law should foster these relations and resist doctrinal developments
that serve efficiency only at the cost of undermining contractual
collaboration. Collaboration, as I contend in concluding this Article, and as
I will expound more systematically in subsequent work, lies at the center of
the distinctively liberal approach to sustaining social and political order,
and it is therefore much too important a value to sacrifice in the service of
efficiency. Contract law as it stands is therefore less focused on firms than
Schwartz and Scott suggest, and contract law ought to be less dominated by
considerations involving firms than Schwartz and Scott propose.
Contract law's primary purpose-which infuses not only the outlying
doctrinal regimes to which Schwartz and Scott relegate contracts involving
individuals, but also the center of the common law of contract-is not to
encourage efficient agreements among firms but rather to sustain
collaborative agreements among individual persons. A specialized law
merchant of the sort Schwartz and Scott develop must be consistent with
this primary purpose if it is to be justified, so that the boundaries of their
project must shift in respect of an alternative conception of the core of
traditional contract law. Whether a specialized law merchant may be
rendered consistent with this conception of contract will depend upon a host
of considerations, including both the degree of substantive divergence
between collaboration- and efficiency-promoting legal rules and the
difficulties introduced by hybrid contracts, which involve both individuals
and organizations, and in which collaborative and other ideals may strain
121. For example, such contracts occur through eBay, which posted nearly fifteen billion
dollars in sales in 2002. See About eBay: Company Overview, at http://pages.ebay.com/
community/aboutebay/overview/index.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2003).
122. How commonly these contracts involve collaboration depends, of course, on how
readily the existence of an organizational form cuts off collaborative possibilities. I set this
question aside in my earlier discussion of collaboration and contracts involving organizations, see
supra note 107 and accompanying text, and I do not take it up fully here. I do insist, however, that
contracts involving, say, a nanny, or an electrician, or a lawyer can engage collaborative values
even though the nanny belongs to a small cooperative, the electrician has incorporated her
business, or the lawyer has a partner or two. Indeed, Schwartz and Scott themselves exclude
corporate entities with fewer than five employees from the class of firms to which they take their
views of contract to apply. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 545.
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against each other in any number of ways.123 Here it will also matter that
even though contracts involving organizations cannot, strictly speaking,
engender collaborative community, they will commonly share much of the
morphology of collaboration: Even though organizations that contract
through agents do not (strictly speaking) collaborate, their agents will
nevertheless form a web of interlocking intentions that is practically
identical to the intentions that true collaboration involves. This means that a
contract law for organizations that violates collaborative norms will risk
offending, or perhaps even undermining, collaborative ideals that individual
persons carry with them from their individual contracting. This
phenomenon, in which associated practices are regulated together, is
familiar from other settings: Computer-generated child pornography, for
example, offends our ideals of the sanctity of children even though no child
is actually harmed and these ideals are not straightforwardly violated.
Moreover, similar associations arise directly within contract law, as in the
familiar fact that businesspeople feel personally implicated in contracts that
they make as agents on behalf of organizational principals.
124
A great deal will therefore depend upon the capacities of individual
persons to resist any confusion that a distinctive law merchant introduces
into their own contractual relations and to sustain collaborative intentions in
the face of the offense that it evokes in them. But however these matters are
resolved-and I do not seek to resolve them here-it should be clear that
the importance of the collaborative approach to contract is not undermined
by the fact that it does not immediately encompass contracts among
organizations.
It has been the burden of this Part precisely to characterize contractual
collaboration, to reveal that (in spite of presenting a paler prospect than
full-blooded cooperation) contracts among individual persons participate in
the Kantian ideal of moral community, and to argue that such arrangements
among individual persons present the essence of contract. The thinness of
123. Collaboration- and efficiency-based doctrines may of course converge upon each other,
and any such convergence will dampen any tensions that arise between my approach and
Schwartz and Scott's.
124. This comes out, for example, in Stewart Macaulay's classic study of the behavior of
businesspeople in and around contracts. Macaulay reports that "[b]usinessmen often prefer to rely
on 'a man's word' in a brief letter, a handshake, or 'common honesty and decency' over fully
specified and formalized contractual forms. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 58 (1963). In spite of Macaulay's title, and
his own association of contract with careful planning and active enforcement, see id. at 56, these
informal relations are palpably contractual in my collaborative sense. Collaboration, far from
being undone by informality, in fact depends on some measure of informality and open-endedness
in order not to descend into prepackaged coordination. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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the collaborative ideal will no doubt influence the part that the morality of
contract plays in persons' all-things-considered practical deliberations. As I
have already explained,1 25 the nature of the community that a particular type
of promise establishes influences the character of the reasons that arise for
making and keeping such promises. The nature of this community also, of
course, influences the weight that such reasons carry when set against other
moral or more broadly practical considerations. I have been exclusively
concerned in these pages with demonstrating that, in spite of its pragmatic
and self-interested context, contract constitutes a moral relation. I have not
sought to say what role this relation plays in the broader scheme of moral
and political justification. I shall, on another occasion, take up this question
and argue that the thin, collaborative form of community that contract
establishes plays an essential part in the larger liberal scheme of political
and social legitimation. But I am content, for now, to elaborate upon the
collaborative conception of contract in greater practical detail, by
illustrating how it has been developed and expressed in the law.
III. ILLUSTRATIONS AND ELABORATIONS
I now attempt to connect the collaborative ideal that I developed in the
last Part to the concrete law of contract as it is articulated by courts and
legislatures, or at least to certain features of contract law. I do not seek to
develop a general or complete account of contract law, preferring instead to
proceed impressionistically, focusing on particular doctrines that have
received substantial theoretical attention from others. I claim that the
collaborative idea illuminates (and perhaps even resolves) several doctrinal
puzzles that have remained intractable in the face of alternative theoretical
approaches to contract. I present this discussion with two aims in mind:
First, the references to specific doctrinal categories will make it possible to
elaborate in greater detail what the collaborative view of contract involves;
and second, the resonances between the collaborative ideal and the law's
handling of specific doctrinal problems will render plausible the view that
the theory of contract I am proposing is no mere academic conceit but is
instead immanent in our actual legal practice.
The second of these claims leaves me deeply uncomfortable. I am
certainly not saying that individual legal actors (judges and legislators)
adopted the legal doctrines at issue in pursuit of the collaborative ideal that
I now see in them. Nor am I proposing some causal or functional
evolutionary account according to which collaborative rules are selected for
125. See supra Section I.C.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 113: 14171474
Contract and Collaboration
in the process through which doctrine is made.126 I disavow these causally
ambitious explanations because I have no evidence for believing them to be
true, although I also have no evidence for thinking them false. But this
disavowal leaves me in the awkward position of purporting to find a
fundamental ideal at the root of a body of legal doctrine while offering no
explanation as to how the ideal in question got there. I can offer no relief
from this awkwardness except to say that insofar as my position is rendered
more awkward still by the relative unfamiliarity of the collaborative ideal
that I am expounding-so that the interpretation of legal doctrine that I am
proposing appears to lack not only causal foundations but also a connection
to our broader practices and institutions-I hope in future work to relieve
some of the strain. I shall seek, in the future, to connect the collaborative
ideal to the most fundamental ambitions of liberal social institutions and
thereby to reassert the centrality of contract, understood in collaborative
terms, within the liberal legal order. Insofar as I succeed at this task, it will
not seem surprising that judges steeped in this legal order should adopt
contract doctrines that express its core commitments.
Finally, I add one last methodological observation before commencing
the first-order doctrinal analysis that fills out the remainder of this Part. In
conducting that analysis, I focus my attention on self-consciously articulate
statements of generally applicable legal rules, such as may be found in
appellate opinions, the Restatement of Contracts, and the Uniform
Commercial Code. In reviewing Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract,
Robert Gordon worried that such a doctrinal focus-raised, in Gilmore's
case, to the level of near monomania by a self-confessed "complete[]
uninterest[]" in sociological accounts of the practice of contract on the
groundT27 -might render legal analysis irrelevant to the actual workings of
the law.' 28 My argument shares in the high abstraction and narrowness of
focus that Gilmore's displayed (and insofar as I have replaced Gilmore's
history with philosophy, my argument may be more limited still in this
regard). And Gordon surely was right to worry that this line of approach
threatens to leave everything that is most important about the law
somewhere off the page.
There is, however, another side of the question. As Gordon himself
recognized, proponents of doctrinal legal scholarship may say that
126. I am not proposing any analogue to George Priest and Benjamin Klein's account of the
evolution and efficiency of common law rules. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
127. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974) (stating, in reply to those
who said that legal scholars "should engage in sociological analysis rather than in historical or
philosophical synthesis," that he found himself "not so much in disagreement with their aims as
completely uninterested in what they are doing").
128. See Robert Gordon, The Death of Contract, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1216 (reviewing
GILMORE, supra note 127).
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the process of contract case law adjudication is worth the closest
attention because it is a microcosm of fundamental social
principles. In this view appellate courts are given the heroic role of
expressing the inarticulate purposes of the community, and, by tiny
stages, developing the norms that will harmonize the combat of
social purposes to the end of the greatest good.'
29
When it is purged of implications of heroic or farseeing agency on the
part of judges, I become sympathetic to this view. I have this sympathy not
because I believe that I can reconstruct processes by which appellate courts
(and cognate institutions) discern and articulate the basic norms that I find
in their doctrinal pronouncements; indeed I have just admitted that I cannot.
But I do believe (although this itself may be an article of faith) that the
public expression of such basic norms, and their embodiment in the law, are
essential to sustaining any political and social order over time. Moreover, I
observe the public expression through legal doctrines-including through
the doctrines of the law of contracts-of basic norms that might sustain a
stable social order and, simultaneously, observe the existence of the social
order itself that might be so sustained. I am prepared to infer, from these
observations, that the norms contribute to the social order, 130 and I therefore
conclude that connecting these norms to their doctrinal expressions presents
an important task for legal scholarship.
With respect to the case of contract in particular, I believe that contract
doctrines elaborate or give expression to an ideal of collaboration that is at
once fragile and also fundamental to our social order. I shall explain the
fragility and importance of collaboration in future work. This Article is
devoted first to articulating the collaborative ideal and now, in this Part, to
tracing its expression in the law.
129. Id. at 1228.
130. Even accepting the background observations needed for making it respectable, this
inference remains far from secure. It is always possible that those who participate in the practice
of contract on the ground do not recognize the principles that I find in contract doctrine, not even
as aspirational ideals. Alternatively, it is possible that these principles mask rather than display the
true values at play in contract, perhaps even in the service of one class within the society as
against another. In each of these cases, my faith in doctrinal reconstruction would be misplaced:
In the former case, the principles that I find in contract doctrine would be reduced to an
anthropological curiosity; in the latter case, they would be unmasked as ideology.
I recognize these possibilities, of course, and do not purport to have settled any
methodological debate in favor of the approach that I adopt. But I do find the observations in the
main text sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion back onto those who reject the enterprise of
doctrinal reconstruction. If doctrine does not matter, it is not because there is in general no
connection between doctrine and what does matter, but rather because specific circumstances
break this connection in particular cases. And it is up to those who would slight doctrine to trace
the circumstances and identify the cases.
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A. Consideration
The modem doctrine of consideration is simply expressed by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which says:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise
must be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought
by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise.
131
The application of the doctrine is anything but straightforward,
however, and has generated a host of familiar controversies and puzzles.
The collaborative theory of contract generates new insights into these
difficulties, and in particular into the law's puzzling emphasis on the
bargain context.
1. The Conventional Wisdom
The root cause of the many difficulties presented by the doctrine of
consideration lies in the fact that the doctrine contains two basic
propositions that are in tension with each other. 32 First, the doctrine insists
that the law will not enforce every promise or voluntarily assumed
obligation, but only those that involve a bargained-for exchange-or, as
Holmes put it, "reciprocal conventional inducement.' ' 3 3 But second, the
law remains completely unconcerned about the terms of the bargain. The
doctrine of consideration, one might say, insists on the fact of a bargain but
takes no interest in the adequacy of the bargain.' 
34
The tension between these two elements of the doctrine is immediate
and indeed appears directly in the comments to the Restatement. Thus
comment c to section 79 explains that "[o]rdinarily... courts do not inquire
into the adequacy of consideration" and adds that "[g]ross inadequacy of
consideration may be relevant to issues of capacity, fraud, and the like, but
the requirement of consideration is not a safeguard against imprudent and
improvident contracts except in cases where it appears that there is no
bargain in fact." 135 Comment d, by contrast, at once presses in the opposite
131. RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 71.
132. This presentation follows FRIED, supra note 1, at 29.
133. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 293-94 (Dover Publications, Inc.
1991)(1881).
134. The law does not even require the bargained-for consideration to motivate the promise
in exchange for which it is received. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 81.
135. Id. § 79 cmt. c.
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direction, in order to prevent the liberality expressed by comment c from
rendering the requirement of consideration a nullity: "[D]isparity in value,
with or without other circumstances, sometimes indicates that the purported
consideration was not in fact bargained for but was a mere formality or
pretense. Such a sham or 'nominal' consideration does not satisfy the
requirement of [consideration]. 136 In other words, in spite of the earlier
comment's disavowal of inquiry into the adequacy of consideration, the
"cases where it appears that there is no bargain in fact"' 37 are not limited to
circumstances involving force or fraud but may instead be identified
directly by reference to the inadequacy of consideration.
The cases, predictably, apply these rules in both directions. On the one
hand, it is not hard to find venerable opinions that say, for example, "It is
the general rule that where there is no fraud, and a party gets all the
consideration he contracts for, the contract will be upheld,"' 38 and that "a
rose, a hawk, or a peppercorn will suffice [for consideration] provided it is
what is asked for by the promisor."' 139 And, on the other hand, it is equally
easy to find venerable opinions that say, for example, "The consideration
was not only unequal, but grossly so.... [and] at best, purely technical and
colorable, and obviously.., wanting in that degree of equitable equality
sufficient to support the promise declared upon," 140 or that "[t]he parties
may shout consideration to the housetops, yet, unless consideration is
actually present, there is not a legally enforc[ea]ble contract."' 41
Now it is perhaps possible, on a purely formal and doctrinal level, to
reconcile these rules and the cases that announce and apply them. One
might say that the law does not require enforceable bargains to be fair, or
even reasonable, but that it does require them at least to be real and to
serve, for the parties, some purpose other than the parasitic one of satisfying
the demands of the bargain requirement. As Corbin observed, "[W]hen the
consideration is only a 'peppercorn' or a 'tomtit' or a worthless piece of
paper, the requirement of consideration appear[s] ... to be as much of a
mere formality as is a seal."' 142 A seal standing alone is nowadays generally
disfavored as a means of securing the legal enforcement of promises. 43 It is
136. Id. cmt. d.
137. Id. cmt. c.
138. Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294, 296 (1882).
139. Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 117 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. 1955) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The opinion goes on to say that "[t]he law will not inquire as to the adequacy of
consideration when the thing to be done is asked to be done, be it ever so small." Id.
140. T.P. Shepard & Co. v. Rhodes, 7 R.I. 470, 475 (1863).
141. In re Greene, 45 F.2d 428, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
142. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 127 (1952).
143. See U.C.C. § 2-203 (1997); RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, ch. 4, topic 3 introductory
note & statutory note; 1 WALTER H.E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 219A (3d ed.
1957); Robert Braucher, The Status of the Seal Today, PRAC. LAW., May 1963, at 97. English law,
by contrast, continues to recognize the seal. See G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 120 (6th
ed. 1983).
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natural to read the cases concerning consideration-insofar as they at once
refuse to inquire into the adequacy of bargains and yet insist that bargains
be real rather than artificial-to develop the doctrine so as to prevent the
parties from reinserting the seal into the law, now in the form of a bare
assertion of consideration.
This approach may organize the cases, but it remains difficult to
construct a satisfying theoretical defense of the insistence on the fact of a
bargain, when coupled with unconcern for the bargain's character; and the
reference to the seal merely pushes the problem back one level, since it is
difficult to square the doctrine's indifference to the adequacy of
consideration with its conclusion that a seal cannot stand in for the very
consideration whose adequacy has been declared irrelevant. Fried, for one,
attacks the consideration doctrine on precisely this ground. He thinks that,
by refusing to police the adequacy of consideration, the law "affirms the
liberal principle that the free arrangements of rational persons should be
respected." 144 But he also thinks that when the law nevertheless insists that
enforceable promises involve some consideration, when it "limit[s] the class
of [enforceable] arrangements to bargains," then the law "holds that
individual self-determination is not a sufficient ground of legal
obligation."' 145 Fried concludes that the consideration doctrine is deeply
"internally inconsistent" and therefore indefensible.
146
Fried's diagnosis of the internal tensions in the consideration doctrine
represents the conventional wisdom, although not all those who discuss the
doctrine share in his conclusion that it should be abandoned. To some, less
concerned than Fried with purity of principle, the internal tensions in the
consideration doctrine represent less of a failure. Indeed, beginning with
Lon Fuller's classic article Consideration and Form,147 a large literature has
developed increasingly sophisticated, if expansively heterogeneous and
unabashedly pragmatic, arguments roughly in favor of the consideration
doctrine's formal approach to the bargain requirement-its broad
willingness to overlook inadequacies in the substance of bargains coupled
with its emphatic demand that the bargains in fact exist.
Fuller inaugurated the approach by proposing three broadly
instrumental purposes that the consideration doctrine's formal emphasis on
bargains serve: First, bargains provide evidence of a contract that aids the
legal process of enforcement; second, bargains caution those who make
them of the commitments that they accept and in this way discourage rash
and impulsive conduct; and third, the preference for bargains channels
144. FRIED, supra note 1, at 35.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
14792004]
The Yale Law Journal
persons into a legal framework within which they can reliably effectuate
their intentions. 148
Those who follow in Fuller's footsteps have added variations to his
basic themes. Some of these variations render the main argument in favor
of the law's preference for bargains less certain: Where Fuller characterized
gifts as economically "sterile,"'' 49 for example, later commentators observe
that enforcing unbargained-for promises might serve recognizably
economic ends related to the fact that a promised performance becomes
more valuable to the promisee as it becomes more certain. 150 But other
variations reinforce the argument: Melvin Eisenberg, for example,
emphasizes that gift promises often contain implicit excuses for
nonperformance (for example, a worsening of the promisor's economic
position or ingratitude by the promisee) that the law cannot easily
administer;151 Richard Posner observes that promisees often possess
informal social means of enforcing gift promises that render legal
enforcement superfluous and indeed undesirable; 152 and Charles Goetz and
Robert Scott add that legal enforcement of promises outside of the bargain
context (and especially in the context of gift promises) will tend
inefficiently to depress the supply of such promises. 1
53
These and related arguments may, taken together, make a persuasive
case for the proposition that not all promises should be enforced through
law. But it is plain, even without addressing the several arguments'
substantive merits, that such instrumental approaches to the doctrine of
consideration cannot possibly account for the law's monotonous, strangely
precise, and highly formal focus on reciprocal bargains as the touchstone of
enforceability. For if bargains play only an instrumental role in the
consideration doctrine, then it is natural to suppose that the doctrine's
effectiveness would be enhanced if at least some other instruments were
also admitted to the doctrine and allowed to serve alongside bargains in
promoting the doctrine's ends.
Most immediately, the consideration doctrine's formal emphasis on the
fact of a bargain cannot be defended on instrumental grounds: Any
instrumental function that can be performed by a bargain regardless of its
adequacy can surely also be performed by the parties' express insistence
148. See id. at 800-02. Fuller's ideas, and even his language, have achieved canonical status.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 75 cmt. a ("[T]he fact of bargain ... tends to satisfy the
cautionary and channelling functions of form.").
149. Fuller, supra note 147, at 815.
150. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1278 n.40.
151. See Melvin Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1979).
152. See Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
411, 417 (1977). Charles Goetz and Robert Scott make the same point. See Goetz & Scott, supra
note 3, at 1304.
153. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1304.
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(shouted to the housetops) that they have struck a bargain. If the adequacy
of a bargain has no role in its instrumental effectiveness, then there is no
reason to think that the mere fact of a bargain (however inadequate) is any
more instrumentally effective than the express (even if nominal) insistence
that this fact obtains. As Peter Benson remarks, "If the fundamental role of
consideration is that it fulfills the functions of form, the fact that parties
expressly treat something as a consideration for the shared reason of giving
legal effect to their intentions should be sufficient or at least relevant" to
enforceability at law. 154 Indeed, several of those who follow Fuller's
justification of the consideration doctrine nevertheless reject the doctrine's
refusal to enforce promises that involve expressly asserted but ultimately
nominal consideration, and lament the law's refusal to allow the parties to
manufacture enforceability by asserting a bargain's existence or resorting to
a seal. 155 The functional theories of consideration can perhaps explain why
not every promise should be enforceable at law and even why the bargain
context is relevant to the question of enforceability, but they simply cannot
(nor, finally, do they purport to) account for the consideration doctrine's
formal yet insistent focus on thefact of bargains.
Fried found a paradox in the law's concern for the fact but not the
adequacy of bargains, and on this basis rejected the doctrine of
consideration altogether. The doctrine's instrumental defenders never
address this paradox and instead argue that the doctrine, whatever its
internal structure, achieves worthwhile external ends. The paradox,
however, reasserts itself (as the argument of the previous paragraph
reveals), because the law seems to insist on the fact of a bargain even where
this fact has no possible instrumental or functional significance. The
instrumental mode appears ill-suited to explaining a legal regime that is so
narrowly yet insistently formal as the consideration doctrine.
2. The Collaborative View
A more direct explanation of the doctrine's narrow emphasis on the fact
of a bargain would therefore surely be preferable. And indeed, the logical
154. Benson, supra note 1, at 167.
155. As Goetz and Scott have observed,
At common law, the formal contract under seal provided a means for promisors to
assure enforcement of gratuitous promises. A sham bargain performs a similar function
in encouraging deliberation, preserving evidence, and identifying the promisor's
intention. Although devices such as seals and sham bargains entail significant
administrative costs, the voluntary use of these formal mechanisms suggests that the
benefits to both parties of the additional reassurance from legal enforcement outweigh[]
the transactions costs.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1303 (footnotes omitted); see also Posner, supra note 152, at 420
(calling the abolition of the seal a "mysterious development" and lamenting the tendency to reject
parties' efforts to manufacture nominal consideration).
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space for such an alternative account remains open. All mystery and
paradox surrounding the consideration doctrine would dissolve if the
bargain form (quite apart from the fairness or adequacy of its substance)
could be shown to be in itself valuable and, indeed, to display a distinctive
connection to the values that underlie the morality of contract more
generally. 156
I aim to make precisely this showing, and the intrinsic value of the
bargain form constitutes the centerpiece of the account of consideration that
I propose. I have argued that the morality of contract derives from the value
of the collaborative community that contracts engender. Through making
and keeping contracts with each other, persons may cease to be strangers:
Contracts establish relations in which persons do not just negatively refrain
from using each other merely as means but also, and affirmatively, treat
each other as ends in themselves. I now argue that the bargain form is
intimately connected to the conception of collaboration that lies at the root
of the morality of contract-indeed, that the bargain form is characteristic
of collaborative relations-and that contract law is therefore right to
emphasize this form. I present this defense of the consideration doctrine in
three stages, which emphasize the three central features of the doctrine's
administration. The first argues that the bargain form is sufficient to
underwrite collaboration regardless of a bargain's substantive fairness. The
second identifies a class of non-bargain-based voluntary obligations that do
not underwrite collaborative relations and that the consideration doctrine,
by insisting on bargains, therefore properly refuses to recognize. And the
argument's third stage observes that some voluntary obligations may
underwrite collaboration in spite of falling short of the technical
requirements of the bargain form, and it interprets exceptions to the
consideration doctrine's strict insistence on bargains, including courts'
efforts to find consideration where none technically exists, as identifying
these obligations.
The bargain form incorporates all the elements of collaboration upon
which the morality of contract depends. Bargains are, as J.E. Penner says,
"bilateral," which is to say that they involve "mutual decisions-that is,
156. It is worth noting here that although the express requirement of consideration is a
distinctive feature of the common law of contract, other legal cultures also emphasize bargains
and treat them specially, and may even display doctrinal counterparts to consideration. See, e.g.,
JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW COMPARED
199-207 (1980); Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in
Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1009 (1959). Moreover, the recognition of the
importance of bargains is no mere surface phenomenon, but is instead connected to the idea, at
least as old as Aquinas, that promises establish an order of one person to another. See
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE: EXCERPTS FROM SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1566-67
(Legal Classics Library spec. ed. 1988). Aquinas applied this idea in a broader context than the
present one; rather than distinguish among subclasses of promises, he argued that all promises
must be communicated to be binding.
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decisions made by more than one person-and they concern 'joint' projects
or concerns of some kind where the parties each participate to some extent
in whatever the agreement contemplates."'' 57 Moreover, my earlier
arguments make it possible to give this observation a more precise
expression and to capture its moral importance. Bargains involve precisely
the scheme of interlocking intentions-in which each party takes the other's
intentions as authoritative for her own-on which the collaborative ideal at
the heart of contract depends. Bargains are in their nature wanted by, and
invoke the intentions of, all participants. Each party to a bargain expressly
intends to give the other authority to require performance, and each party
expressly intends to exercise the authority that she enjoys in this
connection.
Indeed, the law adopts almost precisely this account of bargains, right
down to the language of intention, saying, in the official comments to the
Restatement, that the bargain requirement "means that the promisor must
manifest an intention to induce the performance or return promise and to be
induced by it, and that the promisee must manifest an intention to induce
the making of the promise and to be induced by it. '' 158 Bargains therefore
generate relations in which the bargainers engage each other, and subject
themselves to each other's authority, in precisely the pattern that
collaboration requires. Bargains also underwrite such collaborative relations
simply by virtue of their formal structure, and regardless of their
substantive fairness. Collaboration, as I have repeatedly emphasized, is a
thinner notion than cooperation and allows persons to cease to be strangers
without becoming allies or even intimates. Even competitors can
collaborate, and even as they each seek to extract as much of the surplus
generated by the collaboration as they can. The fact that one competitor is
more successful in this effort than another, and that the resulting bargain
might be thought substantively unfair, therefore does not undermine the
bargain's collaborative character. The bargain form is sufficient for
collaboration, and the consideration doctrine, attending to the intrinsic
value of this form, properly places bargains at the core of contract.' 
59
157. J.E. Penner, Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract, 2 LEGAL
THEORY 325, 329 (1996). Penner, I should add, fleshes this idea out in a manner very different
from mine.
158. RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 81 cmt. a. The Restatement adopts this collaborative
account of bargains in express preference over alternative accounts that would require
consideration to motivate a promisor or to be "the object of the promisor's desire." Id.
159. Carol Rose has also observed that bargains--or, as she says, exchanges-have an
intrinsic value beyond their capacity to promote the self-interests of the persons who are party to
them: "[T]he just-plain, unsentimental rhetoric of exchange conceals something about how
exchanges really work-their reliance on goodwill, and their potential to get the actors to think
from other people's points of view." Carol M. Rose, Giving Some Back-A Reprise, 44 FLA. L.
REV. 365, 377 (1992). Rose initially developed this view in Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading,
Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice
Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295 (1992). For Rose, bargains are valuable because there is, as she says,
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The consideration doctrine's emphasis on bargains also serves to
exclude certain noncollaborative classes of voluntary obligations from the
realm of contract. That such voluntary obligations exist should not be
surprising. Corbin, for example, observed that a "mutual, present and fully
effective" exchange "creates no special right in one party by which to
compel a subsequent performance by the other," and this led him to place
such exchanges outside of contract.160 This exclusion appears natural, on
my view, because such exchanges do not involve any forward-looking
intentions in those who make them and certainly do not involve intentions
to give others authority over future intentions.' 6 ' They therefore do not
present examples of persons engaging one another or participating in the
collaborative ideal that gives contract its moral value.
62
Other forms of voluntary obligation also fail to underwrite collaborative
relations, and the consideration doctrine, through its emphasis on bargains,
takes aim at these also and properly excludes them from the class of legally
enforceable contracts. 163 Most straightforwardly, vows and resolutions-
"an element of giving at the center of quite normal kinds of exchanges." Id. at 311. This is
because, Rose observes, the person who first performs her half of a bargain does so in the face of
some uncertainty about whether her opposite number will reciprocate. Id. at 311-12. The first
performance therefore takes on something of the quality of a gift, and the first performer displays
a confidence, or trust, in her partner in the bargain. Id. at 313.
Although Rose and I agree that bargains are valuable, we give very different accounts of
what values bargains involve. And although the two accounts do not contradict each other-
bargains might display both forms of value-I am not sure that I find Rose's view persuasive. To
begin with, it is possible (as I suspect Rose would acknowledge) to disrespect a person in spite of
trusting her and indeed to disrespect a person through trusting her. This is, I take it, a plausible
account of P.T. Barnum's attitude toward his exchange partners when he said that "there's a
sucker born every minute." Rose's trust therefore does not signal a valuable relationship even
when it is present. (By contrast, it is not possible to disrespect a person through collaborating with
her, through treating her intentions as end-producing for oneself. Insofar as P.T. Barnum sought to
please his customers, even he respected them.) Furthermore, as Rose straightforwardly admits,
external enforcement mechanisms render bargains possible even without the trust that Rose
describes. Id. at 314-15. And although Rose is surely right to point out that these mechanisms
themselves require trust to get going, it is not clear how to relate this fact to the claim that
exchanges within these mechanisms continue to incorporate trust. The genealogy of a practice
may involve (and may even depend upon) a value that the practice itself no longer displays.
160. CORBIN, supra note 142, § 4.
161. Present and fully effective exchanges resemble Bratman's "prepackaged" coordination.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
162. Such presently effective exchanges are not, of course, devoid of all moral content, and
the parties to them remain under a duty not to use each other merely as means. But this duty
arises, as I have said, even among strangers. And the form of the presently effective exchange,
because it is not forward-looking, involves no further engagement between the parties to treat
each other as ends in themselves.
163. The modem doctrine, moreover, represents an improvement, in this respect, over an
older version of the doctrine, which did not require a bargain or exchange but rather found
consideration "either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." Hamer
v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891) (internal quotation marks omitted). Grant Gilmore
observes that the bargain theory of consideration is more restrictive than the older
benefits/detriment view and that it became a "tool for narrowing the range of contractual
liability." GILMORE, supra note 127, at 21. Gilmore also claims that the bargain theory originated,
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that is, obligations undertaken in the name of some ideal or in the obligor's
own name, respectively--do not underwrite collaborative relations among
persons. They may, to be sure, benefit persons, including perhaps by the
obligations that they generate, as when one person makes a binding vow or
resolution to perform some action that profits another. But even in these
cases, vows and resolutions do not underwrite collaboration, because .those
who make them do not engage their beneficiaries and certainly do not
subject themselves to the beneficiaries' authority. Whatever moral
obligations vows and resolutions underwrite (and I express no opinion
about whether vows and resolutions are morally effective in this way) arise
in light of the obligors' relations to the ideals or to their own integrity,
rather than in light of the obligors' relations to their beneficiaries. 64 And
because the moral foundations of contract law rest upon a collaborative
relation in which vows and resolutions do not participate, the consideration
doctrine correctly denies these practices legal recognition in contract.' 
65
Moreover, nonbargain promises may similarly fail to underwrite
collaborative relations and are also properly denied legal enforcement by
the consideration doctrine, although these cases involve some additional
complexities. Promises, to be sure, are different from vows and resolutions
in that the obligations that they create are not just in favor of promisees but
are also owed to promisees: Whereas a person who breaks a vow offends
against the ideal in whose name the vow was made and a person who
breaks a resolution offends against her own integrity, a person who breaks a
promise wrongs her promisee. But promises are distinctive in a second way
also. Promissory obligations are not only owed to promisees but are also,
one might say, owned by them: Promisors subject themselves to their
promisees' authority. Both elements of promise were necessary, in Parts I
and II, for explaining the sense in which promisors come to treat their
without precedent, in Holmes's lecture, The Elements of Contract, and that Holmes was, "quite
consciously, proposing revolutionary doctrine." Id. at 20. Gilmore's historical characterization of
Holmes's engagement with the consideration doctrine has come under criticism. See, e.g.,
DAWSON, supra note 156, at 199-204; Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and
Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1168-71 (1975).
164. Vows and resolutions might of course also generate harm-based obligations, insofar as
persons reasonably rely on them. I do not comment on this tort-like approach except to observe its
obvious distance from the collaborative account of contract that I am proposing.
165. The contrast between vows and resolutions on the one hand, and bargains on the other,
invites characterization in terms of the theory of speech acts. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, How To
Do THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975). One may distinguish among three types of speech acts:
locutionary acts, which involve simply the utterance of a sentence; illocutionary acts, in which a
speaker does something by uttering a sentence; and perlocutionary acts, in which a speaker, by
uttering a sentence, does something that involves bringing about appropriate effects in the hearer.
The account in the main text illustrates that gratuitous vows and resolutions are illocutionary but
not perlocutionary speech acts. See David H. Jones, Making and Keeping Promises, 76 ETHICS
287, 289-90 (1966). The argument in the main text also reveals what is less commonly
understood-namely that bargain promises involve perlocutionary speech acts and that important
elements of the morality of bargain promises turn on this fact.
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promisees as ends in themselves, the sense in which promises establish a
form of respectful community.
These observations raise the problem of the passive promisee-the
promisee who does not exercise her ownership of the promissory
obligation, who remains disengaged from the promise and does not
interfere in the promised performance, either to command or to release it.
And because passive promisees do not participate in the promises owed
them, it becomes uncertain how such promises might engender community
between them and their promisors-how such promisees might exercise the
authority over their promisors upon which the promise relation depends.
When promisees remain passive, it becomes unclear how promisors can
come to engage them and treat them as ends in themselves.
In personal promises, at least insofar as personal promisors are
motivated to promote their promisees' interests, this benevolence may
perhaps help underwrite the respectful relation upon which promissory
morality depends. A promisee's interests may assert themselves even
without the promisee's active participation-a personal promisor's
benevolence may, as it were, stand in for the promisee's management of the
promise. And a personal promisor's special efforts to serve these
interests-for example, by adjusting her performance as her promisee's
interests change-may support a distinctive engagement with her promisee,
whose value justifies insulating promises from the overall balance of
reasons as the role of obligation in promissory morality requires. 
166
But this approach to the problem of the passive promisee, whatever its
appeal in the case of personal promises, is not available in connection with
contract. Contractual promisors, as I have repeatedly observed, are
characteristically concerned exclusively for their own, and not for their
promisees', interests. Contractual promises therefore include no motives
166. I have not of course developed this idea in any detail, but I take the suggestion that
committed benevolence may underwrite morally valuable relations, and so support obligations, to
be uncontroversial as a generic matter. It is at play, for example, in friendship or romantic love,
both of which generate relations whose moral value is closely connected to the unusual
benevolence that they involve. Thus it is common, in both high theory and low practice, to
develop the morality of these relations by reference to the forms of benevolence that arise within
them. Aristotle, for example, proposed that a perfect friendship can arise only among "men who
are good, and alike in virtue," so that a person engages his friends almost by analogy to his own
self-love. ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics (W.D. Ross trans.), in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1094a, 1156b (Richard McKeon ed., Random House 1941). And the customary
understanding of modem romantic love emphasizes the willingness of lovers to accept great
self-sacrifice almost as the measure of their love's value. Moreover, it is common to conclude that
friendships or loves that involve less benevolent motives do not constitute morally valuable
relations, as in the Aristotelian accusation that a friendship is merely one of pleasure or utility, see
id. at I 156b- 1157b, or the contemporary accusation that a person is "using" her lover.
An effort to develop the morality of personal promises by reference to the benevolence that
they involve would proceed along parallel lines, articulating the precise forms of benevolence at
issue in such promises and identifying the false or depraved variations from which true personal
promises must be distinguished.
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that might stand in for the promisees' active participation in the promises,
because a contractual promisor's only engagement with the promisee is
through the promisee's actual, active participation in the promise. The
special relation whose value underlies the morality of contract therefore
cannot possibly be constructed out of a contractual promisor's participation
standing alone, but must instead look to the promisee's activities as well.
The collaborative ideal that I developed in Section II.A reflects these
features of contract-it entirely ignores questions of motive or benevolence
and focuses exclusively on the collaborators' intentions. And because
passive promisees contribute no intentions to the promise relation, they
therefore render the collaborative engagement upon which the morality of
contract depends impossible. 167 Bargains, of course, are never passive: Each
party to a bargain intends actively to insist on the performance it is due. The
consideration doctrine, through its bargain requirement, therefore properly
denies enforcement to contractual promises that involve passive promisees.
Taken together, these arguments reveal the considerable appeal of
contract law's focus, through the consideration doctrine, on the bargain
form. On the one hand, the bargain form can underwrite a collaborative
relation without regard to a bargain's substantive fairness or adequacy, so
that every obligation that the consideration doctrine renders enforceable
may be brought within the collaborative view. On the other hand, the
bargain form excludes from legal enforcement a range of obligations-
including vows, resolutions, and promises to passive promisees-that do
not underwrite collaborative relations and cannot be brought within the
collaborative view. The consideration doctrine, and in particular the
doctrine's formal emphasis on bargains, therefore serves as a useful
167. It might be thought that the doctrines requiring contractual promises to be accepted
before they become legally binding are sufficient to ensure that contracts involve truly
collaborative relations and to exclude cases involving passive promisees from legal enforcement.
Fried, for example, observes that "[a] promise is relational" and connects this observation to the
doctrinal requirement of acceptance. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 40-43. But although a promisee's
acceptance may establish some relationship with her promisor, it is insufficient to establish the
collaborative relation upon whose value contractual obligation depends. Collaboration requires
that promisees contribute to the interlocking web of intentions that I described in Section ILA, and
therefore that promisees adopt a forward-looking and responsive engagement with the
collaborative activity. Acceptance standing alone involves no such engagement-a person may
accept a promise as she would a donation-and it is therefore insufficient for collaboration or for
contract.
Moreover, even as acceptance is not sufficient for generating the special relation whose
value underwrites contractual obligation, it may not be necessary for generating the special
relation whose value underwrites the obligations involved in benevolent personal promises. The
brief and, of course, preliminary account of the personal promise relation that I have sketched
interstitially in these pages makes no mention of acceptance. And the view that personal promises
may obligate without being accepted (which must of course be distinguished from the very
different view that they may obligate even if rejected) is far from unprecedented. It is entailed, for
example, by David H. Jones's view that promises are illocutionary but not perlocutionary speech
acts. See Jones, supra note 165, at 289-90.
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touchstone for identifying obligations to which the collaborative view of
contract applies.
The bargain form is not, however, a perfect proxy for the collaborative
relations that justify enforcing promises at law. In particular, some promises
give rise to collaborative relations, and therefore merit legal enforcement,
even though they do not quite satisfy the technical requirements of the
bargain form. The consideration doctrine, read literally, is therefore
somewhat too restrictive from the collaborative point of view. And indeed,
exceptions to the doctrine and familiar efforts, undertaken in connection
with administering the doctrine, to manufacture consideration may
profitably be understood to remedy this defect by granting legal recognition
to promises that, while technically lacking consideration, nevertheless
manifestly underwrite collaborative relations.
These efforts to correct for the consideration doctrine's inadequacies as
a test of collaboration appear in a range of factual settings, and I shall
briefly identify three in particular.' 68 First, they arise in circumstances in
which the reality of contractual collaboration is apparent from the conduct
of the parties but the technical requirements of bargain-based consideration
are not quite satisfied. Courts might, for example, read a best-efforts term
into an exclusive dealings contract between a fashion designer and a sales
agent when the designer seeks to invalidate the contract for lack of
consideration by claiming that the agent, even though he has been actively
representing her, never undertook an express obligation to expend any
efforts on her behalf. 169 And courts might read a reasonable quantity term
168. A fourth possible line of argument involves the reliance claims countenanced under
section 90 of the Restatement. Section 90 ("Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or
Forbearance") is commonly viewed as hostile to the consideration doctrine. Grant Gilmore,
analogizing to antimatter in physics, even went to far as to call it "anti-contract." GILMORE, supra
note 127, at 68. But section 90 may perhaps be brought within the approach to consideration that I
am proposing, which treats the bargain requirement as a proxy for collaboration and then
interprets the doctrines that have arisen around the requirement as correctives for the
imperfectness of the proxy. Section 90 reliance may be understood, along these lines, as an effort
to identify and enforce noncontractual collaborative arrangements.
I do not try to develop this speculative suggestion here. To do so would require elaborating a
theoretical account of noncontractual collaboration and reconstructing the cases to reveal that
courts apply section 90 reliance to select for legal enforcement of precisely those noncontractual
arrangements that are collaborative in this way. I do not, as I say, try to execute these tasks here,
except to observe two points. First, a watershed in the argument will be whether collaborative
activity is possible without the intentions not to be the first to defect that lie at the center of
promises. Second, this question receives a doctrinal expression in the debate over whether only a
complete promise may underwrite a section 90 claim, or whether a simple offer may, in the right
circumstances, do so as well-a debate that resonates with the cases, including most notably with
the dispute between Learned Hand and Roger Traynor. Compare James Baird Co. v. Gimbel
Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (Hand, J.), with Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757
(Cal. 1958) (Traynor, J.).
169. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). As then-Judge
Cardozo observed, although the formal requirements of consideration were not satisfied, the
whole arrangement was "instinct with an obligation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (1997) ("A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for
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into a requirements contract that the seller seeks to avoid for lack of
consideration by claiming that her buyer, even though he has been placing
and paying for orders, never undertook an express obligation to purchase
any quantity at all. 170 Courts in these cases observe collaboration among the
parties to agreements whose express terms do not quite satisfy the bargain
requirement, and they supplement the terms to manufacture consideration
and enforce the agreements, just as the collaborative view recommends.
Second, and relatedly, the law no longer attends to technical defects in
consideration in connection with modifications of already collaborative
contractual arrangements. Thus, the UCC abandons and the Restatement
retreats from the preexisting duty rule, and the law no longer insists upon
independent consideration to support contractual modifications. 71 This is
also as the collaborative view recommends. It should be sufficient
for enforceabililty that postmodification contracts retain their bargain
form-that is, that these contracts would involve good consideration had
they been the initial arrangement between the parties-because this ensures
that the parties continue to collaborate. There is no reason to insist that the
process of contract modification be itself independently collaborative.
And third, an approach to consideration that supplements the basic
doctrinal emphasis on bargains with additional corrective rules, tailored to
circumstances in which the connection between the bargain form and
collaboration breaks down, supports an appealing reconstruction of the
legal treatment of gratuitous, or donative, promises. 172 The law of contract,
applying the consideration doctrine, is famously suspicious of donative
promises. This suspicion is justified, on the collaborative view, because
donative promises are unusually likely to involve passive promisees and so
to fail to engender collaborative relations: The paradigm case of the
donative promise, after all, involves a promisee who simply waits for the
exclusive dealing in the kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation
by the seller to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote
their sale.").
170. See E. Air Lines v. Gulf Oil, 415 F. Supp. 429, 435 (S.D. Fla. 1975); see also U.C.C.
§ 2-306(1) ("A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements of
the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no
quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated
estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or
demanded.").
171. See U.C.C. § 2-209; RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 89. For a canonical statement of
the old rule, see, for example, Alaska Packers'Ass 'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902).
The court there held that "[c]onsent to [the contract modification] ... was, in our opinion, without
consideration, for the reason that it was based solely upon the libelants' agreement to render the
exact services, and none other, that they were already under contract to render." Id.
172. The argument is admittedly more tenuous in this instance, and the decisions are perhaps
more uncertain.
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promisor unilaterally to make her gift, and therefore presents no target for
the promisor to engage as collaboration requires.
73
At the same time, not all gratuitous promises involve promisees who
are passive in this way. A promise is gratuitous insofar as it is not
motivated by the return performance that a promisor expects to receive
from her promisee. But as the Restatement's own indifference to motive
reveals, a return performance need not motivate a promise in order for a
promisor to intend to induce it and be induced by it.174 Donative promises,
in other words, do not conceptually require passive promisees. Moreover,
donative promisees may be active in this way even though the reciprocal
inducement does not appear on the face of the donative promise, which
does not expressly take on the bargain form. The collaborative view
counsels respecting such promises in spite of their literal lack of a bargain,
and courts have in fact intervened to recognize the claims of such active
donative promisees, by recasting the active engagement with their
promisors in a form that satisfies the consideration requirement. For
example, where a benefactor and a college had been collaborating to
improve the college's financial health and educational status, a court read a
practice of commemorating large donors by attaching their names to college
buildings or projects into the terms of a gift, in order to find consideration
for the gift promise and render it enforceable.1 75 Once again, where
173. Donative promises made with benevolent motives may, as the earlier discussion of
benevolent personal promises revealed, possibly underwrite collaboration even when promisees
remain passive. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. Because the law declines to inquire
into a promisor's motives, this possibility will not generally support the enforcement of donative
promises. The two exceptions to this rule involve donative promises made to charitable
organizations and those made as part of marriage settlements, which are, at least under the
Restatement, held enforceable even without consideration. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 97,
§ 90(2) ("A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under Subsection (1)
without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance."). This exceptional doctrine-
rendered more exceptional still by the fact that although it appears under the heading of section 90
reliance it expressly requires no reliance itself-may, under the collaborative view, be brought
within the law's broader structure by reading into the rule a presumption (ideological and absurd,
perhaps, but not surprising) that promises to charities and promises in marriage settlements are
benevolently motivated, so that they can sustain collaborative relations even apart from the
bargain form.
174. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
175. See Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). The
subtlety of the distinction between active and passive donative promises is illustrated by the
famous case of Williston's tramp, who is told by a benevolent passerby that if he walks to the
clothing shop around the comer he may select an overcoat on his benefactor's credit. See
I JAEGER, supra note 143, § 112.
Is the tramp an active or a passive promisee? The answer depends upon the parties'
intentional stances toward the tramp's walk to the clothing store. If the promisor intends the
promise to induce the walk and intends for the walk to induce him to provide the coat, and if the
tramp intends the walk to induce the provision of the coat and intends the promise of the coat to
induce his walking to the store, then the arrangement is collaborative even though, because the
tramp has not expressly promised to walk to the store, it does not display the bargain form. If, on
the other hand, the promisor is merely offering to buy the tramp a coat but not to get it for him,
and the tramp is merely deciding whether or not to collect on the offer, then the tramp is a passive
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collaboration arises apart from the bargain form, the consideration doctrine
may be flexibly applied to vindicate the collaborative relation.
The collaborative theory of contract therefore explains both the
consideration doctrine's central bargain-based rule and the law's several
tendencies to manipulate and depart from this rule. Bargains-simply in
virtue of their form and quite apart from their substantive fairness or
adequacy-present an excellent proxy for collaboration, and the law of
contract, which finds its roots in the moral value of the collaborative
relation, is therefore justified in adopting the consideration doctrine and
emphasizing the bargain form. But bargains are not a perfect proxy for
collaboration, and the law therefore justifiably departs from the letter of
consideration doctrine in order to support collaborative arrangements that,
for one reason or another, do not quite fit the bargain form.
B. Expectation Damages
When a promisor breaches a contract, expectation damages present the
principal remedy that the law offers to the disappointed promisee. 176 He is
to be put in a position just as good as the one he would have occupied had
the promisor performed as the contract required-no worse, but also no
better. 177 Explaining this legal regime has been one of the preoccupations of
contract theory for nearly a century. 178 The collaborative view of contract
provides a new defense of the expectation remedy, which improves upon
existing arguments in several important ways.
179
promisee and the arrangement involves no collaboration. Both possibilities are, incidentally, quite
realistic. In the first, the passerby and the tramp intend to clothe the tramp together; in the second,
the passerby intends to enable the tramp to clothe himself. A court adjudicating the tramp's
contractual claim to the coat may find consideration or not, depending on its view of the facts.
Williston himself did not of course think or write in terms of collaboration, and his own view
of the case was simply that it involved no consideration because "the walk was not requested as
the price of the promise, but was merely a condition of a gratuitous promise." Id. This approach
seems to me to elide the central distinction in the case, namely whether the tramp's walk to the
store was a condition of the promisor's intent to provide the coat or a condition of possessing a
coat that the promisor unconditionally intended to make available-whether, as it were, the walk
functioned as a condition outside or inside the promisor's donative intention. This subtle
difference is critical to contract law, because it is the difference between an intention to
collaborate with the tramp and an intention merely to benefit him.
176. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, §§ 344, 347.
177. See generally id. § 344 (defining the expectation interest of a promisee as "having the
benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract
been performed").
178. This question was first raised to prominence by Lon Fuller and William Perdue in their
classic multipart article The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages. Fuller & Perdue, supra
note 56.
179. It is worth observing at the outset, if only to forestall misunderstanding, that the legal
enforcement of contracts does not undermine the collaborative value of the contract relation. The
thinness of the collaborative conception of respect-the fact that collaboration may arise among
persons motivated exclusively by their own interests-renders collaboration consistent with
enforcing contractual agreements at law. Collaboration is perhaps different, in this respect, from
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1. The Conventional Wisdom
One common approach to these matters defends the law's conspicuous
attachment to expectation damages in economic terms. Although working
out the details of the economic analysis of contract damages has proved
both intricate and challenging, the essential idea behind this analysis is
straightforward enough. Expectation damages induce both promisors and
promisees to make a wide range of choices more efficiently than they
would under alternative damage rules.180 Accordingly, expectation damages
tend to increase the joint value that the bargain offers to the promisor and
the promisee combined. This is thought to be a strong argument in favor of
expectation damages, both because of the intrinsic attraction of maximizing
total value and, relatedly, because the promisor and promisee, approaching
their bargain from the ex ante point of view, have reason to want regulatory
rules that maximize the total surplus available for them to divide.
The connection between expectation damages and efficiency is not,
however, quite perfect. For example, expectation damages, even in
conjunction with a mitigation principle, can induce inefficient
overreliance. 181 In addition, in markets in which a promisee's expectation
and her reliance costs (including the costs of her foregone opportunities)
come apart, expectation damages may induce promisors to take inefficient
levels of care in deciding whether or not to contract.' 82 These examples may
be multiplied, 183 and this should come as no surprise. Contract remedies
richer, more cooperative forms of community-for example, the forms of community that arise in
connection with personal promises among benevolently motivated intimates-which may be
destroyed when their terms are enforced.
180. The first systematic statement of the efficiency of expectation damages to appear in the
legal literature was Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and
Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273 (1970). Two excellent and quite broad economic
analyses of the expectation remedy appear in Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies,
Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988); and Lewis A.
Komhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L.
REv. 683 (1986).
181. See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466,
472 (1980). Aaron Edlin and Alan Schwartz observe that efficient investment can be secured by a
price structure that combines the investment and breach decisions in the same party, and that such
pricing can lead to overcompensatory remedies. See Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and
Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98,
104-11 (1996); Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 33, 44-52 (2003).
182. See Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem,
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988).
183. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies,
12 J. LEGAL STuD. 427 (1983) (arguing that when both parties to contracts are risk-averse,
efficiency requires a remedy somewhat below expectation damages); A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869, 936-38
(1998) (claiming that when meritorious plaintiffs are less than certain to recover, the efficient
remedy may exceed expectation damages). This expanded list remains, needless to say, far from
exhaustive.
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influence contractual behavior in so many intricate and often countervailing
ways that no perfect connection between efficiency and expectation
damages may reasonably be expected. Moreover, the functional character
of the economic approach to law denies the formal category expectation
damages any independent role in the analysis of contract remedies. This
means, as Richard Craswell has observed, that even if, on some particular
set of facts, efficiency analysis happens to recommend the expectation
remedy, this will be a coincidence only, and the formal category "will not
have played any role in the analysis leading up to that conclusion."'
184
Economic argument therefore does not present a complete defense of the
expectation remedy.
Furthermore, economic efficiency is not the only consideration relevant
to evaluating the expectation remedy, so that even a more perfect
connection between efficiency and expectation damages would not
conclusively justify the remedy. The reason, simply, is that in addition to
influencing the total value of a bargain, damage measures determine the
distribution of this value as between the parties in the event of a breach. It
is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which the distribution imposed
by the expectation remedy appears, at least at first blush, unduly to favor
either promisors or promisees.
To illustrate the first, promisor-favoring circumstance, imagine that a
promisor-seller and promisee-buyer contract for the sale of some good and
that, a moment later, an alternative buyer who values the good more highly
than the initial buyer appears and presents the possibility of a further gain.
Under the expectation damages regime, this gain goes to the seller, who
may satisfy the first buyer's original expectations and resell the good to the
second buyer at a price that includes as much of the second buyer's
additional valuation as the seller's bargaining power allows her to capture.
The seller may proceed in this way, moreover, in spite of the fact that she
has contracted to deliver the good to the first buyer. This reveals, as is
commonly observed, 185 that the expectation remedy renders contract law
less solicitous of promisees than tort law is of owners-there is no general
tort doctrine of efficient conversion analogous to the contract doctrine of
efficient breach. 186 Together, these observations suggest that, at least in
184. Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 107 (2000).
185. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 245-64
(1991); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989).
186. This broad statement masks significant doctrinal complexities in the law of restitution as
it arises in connection with torts. The usual cases involve defendants who interfere with plaintiffs'
property rights under circumstances in which the benefit to the defendant exceeds the cost to the
plaintiff. The general rule is that if a defendant's interference is justified or merely negligent, the
plaintiffs recovery is capped by her loss, but that if the defendant's conduct is consciously or
intentionally tortious, the plaintiff may recover the defendant's larger gain. Compare, e.g.,
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (holding that where the defendant
damaged the plaintiff's dock while trespassing to save his boat in a storm, the plaintiff should
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some cases, expectation damages are inadequate to the demands of fairness
in the contract setting: Fairness, it may seem, requires the promisor to
restore to her promisee the benefit that she has extracted from a
performance to which the promisee was entitled. Fairness requires
restitution. 
187
To illustrate the second, promisee-friendly circumstance, imagine that a
promisor-seller and promisee-buyer agree on terms-say, a below-market
purchase price-that are exceptionally favorable to the buyer, and that the
seller breaches almost at once, or at least before the buyer has incurred any
costs in reliance on the contract. 88 Expectation damages give buyers in
recover the cost of repairs to the dock and not the larger value of the defendant's saved boat), with
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946) (holding that where the defendant
knowingly used the plaintiff's egg-washing machine without permission, the plaintiff should
recover the labor costs the defendant saved by using the machine). The efficient breaches whose
benefits the expectation remedy allows defendants to retain are, of course, typically intentional.
187. This reference to "restitution" involves something of a nonstandard usage-or, more
precisely, picks out a nonstandard case of restitution. Restitution is most commonly claimed in
cases in which a promisee seeks to recover something he has transferred to a promisor in
connection with a contract that the promisor then breached. In a typical example, a promisee who
has rendered part payment for a performance that is never provided seeks to recover his payment
in restitution.
In such typical cases, the promisee's restitution damages will be smaller than his expectation
and indeed even than his reliance damages-as the Restatement observes, "Although it may be
equal to the expectation or reliance interest, [the restitution interest] is ordinarily smaller because
it includes neither the injured party's lost profit nor that part of his expenditures in reliance that
resulted in no benefit to the other party." RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 344 cmt. a. A promisee
will typically seek restitution, therefore, only when there is some special reason to do so, for
example in order to recover some unique good that the promisee has transferred to the breaching
promisor or in the unusual case in which a promisor breaches a contract that has a negative
expectation for the promisee. Restitution displays this humble character in ordinary cases because
the restitution remedy does not focus directly on the injured promisee but rather seeks "to put the
party in breach back in the position that party would have been in if the contract had not been
made." FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 12.19.
But the humility of restitution (and the survival of the expectation regime and its doctrine of
efficient breach) depends critically on the assumption that the promisor who commits an efficient
breach cannot be said to have taken something-the promised performance-from the promisee
and benefited from it in a manner that makes disgorgement necessary. As Farnsworth observes,
courts have refused to allow recovery in restitution in such cases, that is,
when the injured party seeks to require the party in breach to disgorge gain that has
resulted not from the injured party's performance but rather from the other party's
breach.... as where a seller breaks a contract and sells the goods to a third person for
more than the contract price.
Id. § 12.20 (emphasis omitted).
The intuition in the main text asks how this limit on restitution, which Farnsworth identifies
as an "exception" to the general structure of restitution, id., can be justified. A defense of the
expectation remedy must address this intuition. The defense that I offer does so by explaining that
the cases in which restitution for the gains produced by an efficient breach should be allowed are
precisely those in which these gains can also be recharacterized as falling within the promisee's
expectation.
188. Here it is crucial that the buyer has not incurred even opportunity costs, most likely in
the form of passing over offers by other sellers. This condition, which is reflected in the main
text's reference to a below-market price, will rarely be satisfied in commercial settings, especially
where there are competitive markets (because buyers in such markets face many sellers, the
second-best of which will be only marginally less attractive than the best). Such thoughts led
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such cases the full benefits of their bargains, and it may seem that such
purely executory promises, unconnected to any detrimental reliance, are
simply too insubstantial to support this result' 89 -that buyers in such cases
are getting more than they deserve.' 90 Whereas the first set of cases casts
expectation damages as allowing promisors to profit unfairly from
something that is no longer theirs, the second set casts expectation damages
as unreasonably giving promisees something for nothing.' 9' Each of these
two observations connects intuitively to arguments for abandoning
Fuller and Perdue, who thought expectation damages too solicitous of promisees, to be least
skeptical of expectation damages in commercial contexts, roughly because the pervasiveness of
opportunity costs in such contexts allows expectation to be recharacterized as reliance. Fuller &
Perdue, supra note 56, at 62. Anthony Kronman presents a similar argument. See Anthony T.
Kronman, A New Champion for the Will Theory, 91 YALE L.J. 404, 409 (1981).
Nevertheless, commercial instances of the case imagined in the main text do arise. A
particularly dramatic example supplied the backdrop to the famous lawsuit between Texaco and
Pennzoil. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The stylized
facts were these: Getty Oil sold itself to Pennzoil for $3.5 billion in spite of holding net assets (in
the form of proven oil reserves) worth $11 billion. Forty-eight hours later, it breached the contract
and resold itself to Texaco for a much higher price. Pennzoil sued claiming its expectation under
the contract (technically, Pennzoil sued Texaco on a theory of tortious interference with the
contract). A jury found for Pennzoil and, in spite of the fact that Pennzoil had suffered no losses
whatsoever as a result of the breach, awarded $7.53 billion in expectation damages.
Plaintiffs who sue on exaggerated warranties present more commonplace examples of efforts
to enforce contractual relations unbacked by reliance. These cases typically arise when sellers
make commercially unrealistic claims for their products and disappointed buyers sue to enforce
promissory expectations based on these claims. Such expectations are unbacked by any reliance
(including by any lost opportunities) because the exaggerated character of the sellers' promises
render them much more valuable to the buyers than any alternatives that were available. Buyers
sometimes win such cases, as in Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d
1304 (3d Cir. 1982), in which a seller incorrectly warranted that a S50,000 computer system
would perform tasks that no commercially available system priced below $250,000 could
perform, and the disappointed buyer recovered $200,000 in expectation damages unbacked by
reliance. Buyers also sometimes lose such cases, as in Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc.,
669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982), in which a seller incorrectly warranted that a vaccine would protect
horses from a disease and the disappointed buyer was (over vigorous dissent) denied recovery for
horses lost to the disease on the ground that because no other vaccine existed, the buyer's horses
were not lost in reliance on the warranty.
The argument to come proposes that Texaco and Chatlos were rightly decided and that
Overstreet was not.
189. As Fuller and Perdue put it, in enforcing the expectation remedy apart from reliance
losses, "[t]he law no longer seeks merely to heal a disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a
new situation. It ceases to act defensively or restoratively, and assumes a more active role. With
the transition, the justification for legal relief loses its self-evident quality." Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 56, at 56-57.
190. This last formulation reveals that the point does not necessarily depend on the buyer's
having incurred absolutely no reliance costs, but may perhaps extend naturally to every case in
which expectation damages exceed reliance-in which the expectation remedy places a buyer in a
better position than she occupied in the status quo ante. One might say that, in all such cases,
expectation damages give buyers more than they deserve, precisely to the extent that they exceed
reliance damages.
191. The second set of cases, incidentally, also presents facts on which the expectation
remedy induces inefficient promisor care in contracting. See supra text accompanying note 182.
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expectation damages in favor of some greater or smaller remedy-
restitution damages in the first case, reliance damages in the second.' 92
The economic argument for expectation damages is therefore
inadequate twice over, and the overall case for the expectation doctrine
would be stronger if the economic argument stood in the company of a
moral argument that displayed a more perfect connection to the formal
category expectation damages and also defeated or at least defused these
noneconomic intuitions. I seek to provide such an argument-to forge a
definite connection between the collaborative ideal that I have articulated
and the expectation remedy. This effort proceeds in two stages, which
address the two intuitions against the expectation remedy that I have just
identified. In the first stage, I argue that, in the narrow circumstances at
issue, 193 expectation and restitution do not establish morally distinct
remedial regimes and that there is therefore nothing morally interesting
about restitution as a remedy for breach of contract. The fundamental moral
choice in contract remedies is the choice between the expectation remedy
(with restitution assimilated into it) and the reliance remedy, and my
principal purpose is to take aim at this choice. In the second stage of the
argument, I argue in favor of the expectation remedy by connecting the
formal category expectation damages to the value of collaboration.
192. I have consciously left specific performance out of the discussion in the main text in
order to avoid a confusion between the amount or size of a contract remedy and its form. On the
one hand, with respect to amount, specific performance has many of the same features of the
restitution remedy, in that it allows promisees to force breaching promisors to disgorge the gains
made possible by their breaches. Indeed, it may be that in some cases the most effective way to
enable promisees to secure these gains in cash form is to allow them to claim specific
performance. On the other hand, specific performance adopts a very different form from the
restitution remedy, in that it involves an injunction and hence creates a property rule rather than a
liability rule. This is of course critical to some of the classic doctrinal justifications for specific
performance, which turn on the idea that, in cases involving unique or irreplaceable performance,
compensation for breach is impossible and only specific performance can secure a promisee's
expectation. Specific performance is relevant to my argument here only in connection with the
first, instrumental account of its purpose. Questions of the commensurability of in-cash remedies
and in-kind performance, and more practically of the difficulties of measuring the cash value even
of performance that can in principle be priced, present interesting and important problems but do
not impinge on my main argument. See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance,
45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (1978).
The mention of specific performance here raises one further point, which is worth noticing
expressly. Neither the restitution remedy nor the specific performance remedy will provide
promisees with the entire gains to be had from efficient breaches in all cases. Instead, when the
transaction that an efficient breach involves is available to the promisor but not the promisee, then
both restitution and specific performance will result in bargaining. Under restitution, the promisor
will agree to enter into the transaction only if the promisee waives some portion of her
restitutionary claim; under specific performance, the promisor will agree to reveal the transaction
(or engage in the transaction on the promisee's behalf) only if the promisee offers to pay the
promisor some portion of the gains that it involves.
193. That is, when restitution is understood in the narrow sense I am giving it. See supra
note 187.
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2. The Collaborative View
The collaborative argument for expectation damages begins by
clarifying the conceptual relation between restitution and expectation. I
claim that the intuition in favor of restitution rests on a conceptual mistake
involving the conflation of two different levels of abstraction. Once this
conflation is eliminated, the restitutionary remedy appears as simply a
special case of the expectation remedy, as necessary for securing
promisees' expectations in connection with contracts that have certain
content.
The remedies that I have been calling "expectation" and "restitution"
can of course yield different results when they are applied in particular
cases. This, after all, is what drives the intuition that the expectation remedy
is too friendly to breaching promisors, whom it allows to retain gains from
breach that restitution would require them to disgorge. But even though it is
entirely reasonable to ask whether a promisor or her promisee ought to
possess the gains made possible by an efficient breach, one must be careful,
in addressing this issue, to distinguish the question who should possess
these gains from the very different question how the gains should be
characterized. To say that the gains from efficient breaches should go to
promisees because restitution rather than expectation is the right remedy for
breach of contract conflates these two questions. The claim that gains from
an efficient breach should be returned to promisees as "restitution" is not an
independent argument for this remedy but just a way of expressing a
conclusion about the content of the promisees' expectations.
The expectation remedy, as it is commonly said, provides a promisee
with the "benefit of the bargain."'194 This is a formal principle only; any
substantive conclusion concerning the actual remedial entitlements of a
disappointed promisee of course depends on a separate understanding of the
content of the bargain whose benefit he is to receive. One of the benefits
that the bargain encompasses involves the possibility that, between the time
of contracting and the time of performance, the value of the promised
performance in the hands of the promisor might grow and indeed come to
exceed the value that the specific performance in question confers on the
promisee. In a simple contract for the sale of a widget, say, a third party
offering an above-market price for the widget, or (more likely) proposing a
more profitable use of the productive resources needed to manufacture the
widget, may appear to the promisor but remain unavailable to the promisee.
Efficient breaches occur precisely in such circumstances.
The prospect that an opportunity for efficient breach might arise, and
the value associated with this prospect, therefore count among the benefits
194. RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 344 cmt. a.
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generated by the contract. And the parties may allocate this benefit, by
means of the contract, just as they allocate any other. For example, the
contract may cap the promisee's entitlements at the value she herself can
extract from the promised performance, in which case promisors would be
permitted to profit from efficient breaches. Alternatively, the contract might
specify that the promisee's entitlements include even value that the
promisor could extract from the performance through dealings with third
parties who remain unavailable to the promisee, in which case promisors
who breached efficiently could not keep any gains for themselves. In this
latter case, one might say, adopting a shorthand manner of speech, that the
promisor must disgorge the gains from efficient breach to the promisee,
who is entitled to "restitution" of these gains. But that conclusion depends
on the earlier conclusion that the parties, by means of the contract, allocated
these gains to the promisee. And in this case, the gains in question belong to
the promisee's benefit of the bargain; they belong to the promisee's
expectation, properly understood. 195 Restitution is not a competitor to the
expectation remedy but rather a component of the expectations that
accompany certain contractual arrangements, and claims that restitution
should be paid following a particular breach merely state conclusions about
the expectations established by the breached contract.
This treatment of the relationship between restitution and expectation
damages in contract-the claim that restitution for the gains from efficient
breach just presents a special case of expectation--does not represent any
substantial insight or doctrinal innovation. It merely gives a clear
expression to an idea that is commonly, if inarticulately, understood in
practice. 196 The law's generally encouraging stance toward efficient
195. This is perhaps obscured somewhat by a common way of speaking, adopted for example
in the Restatement, that characterizes a promisee's expectations in terms of "attempting to put him
in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, that is, had there
been no breach." Id. This formulation encourages the thought that the restitution remedy must be
conceptually distinct from expectation because it seems to leave the promisee better off than he
would have been "had the contract been performed."
But this characterization of restitution-as leaving promisees better off than performance-
reflects a confusion, and, indeed, the same confusion that lies behind the view that restitution and
expectation are distinct. When a contract allocates the gains from efficient breach to a promisee,
then a breaching promisor's failure to transfer these gains to the promisee itself represents a
breach. And the promisee will receive the benefit of his bargain only if he is put in as good
a position as if this breach had not occurred-as if the contract had been performed in this
respect-which requires, once again, that the promisor disgorge her gains from the efficient
breach.
196. The relationship that I have asserted between restitution and expectation is not, however,
universally acknowledged. It is rejected, for example, in the familiar moral argument that
principles of fidelity or faithfulness require promisors to do what they say they will do and
therefore support making specific performance (a cognate of restitution) the remedy for breach of
contract. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 185, at 255-60; Friedmann, supra note 185, at 2. It is
also rejected, at least implicitly, in a small but perhaps growing number of judicial opinions
suggesting that breaching promisors should be required to disgorge their gains from efficient
breaches under the "'principle of the law of restitution that one should not gain by one's
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breaches should be read, therefore, not as enshrining expectation damages
in preference over restitution on a conceptual level, but rather as
establishing a principle of contract interpretation under which contracts that
are silent are interpreted to exclude from a promisee's expectation the gains
from possible efficient breaches (and in this way also rendering restitution
for such gains unjustified on its own terms).
197
own wrong.' Earthinfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 117-21
(Colo. 1995) (quoting E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the
Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341 (1985)).
The trouble with these arguments is that the idea that promisors should be true to their words
(and do wrong to break them) does not yet say what the content of their promises consists of-
principles of fidelity are plainly not principles of interpretation. Moreover, it is possible to
understand promisors as committing themselves not to perform in every event but rather to give
their promisees the performance or its equivalent value-as Holmes would say, to perform or to
pay damages. On this interpretation, promisors who breached efficiently and kept the gains
involved would not thereby betray their promises. Instead, at least in a formal sense, such
promisors would do precisely as they had promised-under the promise to perform or pay
damages. These arguments simply reprise the discussion in the main text. There, I observe that a
claim for restitution is nothing more than an application of the expectation remedy to contracts
with a particular content; here, I apply this insight to the question of what fidelity to such
contractual promises demands. The observation that the principle of fidelity does not select for the
resitutionary remedy has, of course, been made before. See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 288-93, on file with author)
[hereinafter DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION]; Craswell, supra note 3, at 490;
Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law
Theory, I THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 115, 121 (2000) [hereinafter Dagan, Restitutionary
Damages]. The doctrinal point that restitution can be recast as a special case of expectation
perhaps represents a modest advance in clarity.
The real doctrinal advance made possible by the collaborative view of contract-and the
place at which my view departs from Richard Craswell's and Hanoch Dagan's-involves the
reliance remedy. Craswell and Dagan both believe that the principle of fidelity is consistent with
any remedy rule, including, presumably, the reliance rule. Craswell says that the fidelity principle
"merely fill[s] out the details of what it is a person has to remain faithful to," Craswell, supra note
3, at 490, and Dagan adds that, in light of this, fidelity is "content neutral[]," Dagan,
Restitutionary Damages, supra, at 121. I deny this, and use the collaborative account of contract
that I have developed to reject reliance damages for breach of contract. That argument is
presented fully in a moment, but the intuition behind it can be recast in terms of the principle of
fidelity and articulated in a rough manner here. The reliance remedy reduces a promisor's duties
under her promises to the tort-like duties not to harm that she would incur in making any
representations. It thereby deprives her promise of its distinctive character and leaves her with
nothing to display fidelity to.
Finally, one other difference between my view and Dagan's is worth noting. Although
Dagan accepts that the principle of fidelity does not require promisors to disgorge the gains
that they make from efficient breaches, he also proposes that the "cooperative" element of
contract-its creation of a "zone of mutual cooperation and confidence, dependence and
vulnerability"--supports a rule under which promisors and promisees share the gains from
efficient breach. DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra (manuscript at 299-300).
My collaborative view, by contrast, develops an account of contractual solidarity that does not
require any such sharing.
197. Alan Schwartz has shown that, under fairly general conditions, promisees will be better
off under a remedy regime that allows promisors to retain the gains created by efficient breaches.
See Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis
of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369 (1990). Accordingly, the principle of
contract interpretation that reads silent contracts as establishing this regime will match the actual
preferences of sophisticated promisees.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2004] 1499
The Yale Law Journal
Finally, this account of the conceptual relationship between expectation
and restitution (the idea that expectation is the fundamental idea and
restitution is just a special case) is reconfirmed in connection with
exceptions to the principle that contracts are read to allow promisors to
retain the gains from efficient breach. When the law, for some independent
reason, establishes a regime under which promisees may expect specific
performance-and therefore includes the gains from efficient breach within
promisees' expectations-then it also grants restitutionary damages (now
understood as a component of expectation damages) in connection with
breaches that render actual performance somehow impossible. This
circumstance arises, for example, in connection with breaches of contracts
for the sale of real property in which the seller conveys the land not to her
buyer but rather to a third party who has made a higher offer. If the rights of
the third party rule out ordering specific performance, courts treat the seller
as a trustee for the initial buyer and award the proceeds from the second
sale to this buyer as restitution. 98 Just as restitutionary damages are not
Unsophisticated promisees present a morally more complex problem. Unsophisticated
promisees will either take no view of their remedies or, worse yet, carry their own personal views
about promising with them into legal contracts, including, plausibly, views connected to intuitive
arguments that reject expectation damages in favor of the restitutionary regime discussed earlier.
Of course, the fact that unsophisticated parties do not actually choose to allow promisors to retain
the gains from efficient breaches does not prevent them from enjoying the benefits of this rule.
The consumer in a competitive market, for example, who mistakenly believes herself to be
entitled to specific performance of her purchase agreements, and mistakenly prefers this remedy,
may nevertheless face prices that her sellers can afford to offer only because (as they know but
she does not) the expected gains from efficient breaches will accrue to them. Moreover, if the
transaction costs of correcting the consumer's mistakes-both positive and normative-about
remedies are high enough (as they likely are in many cases), she will never be disabused of her
erroneous preferences and views of her legal rights. In such cases, the rule imposing the
expectation remedy remains in some rough sense substantively fair to the consumer, even though
it also overrides her choices. Finally, consumers who were made to understand the content of their
legal rights and the reasons for them might well come to approve of the expectation remedy but
also to resent those who had imposed on them the costs of understanding it. These facts present an
interesting case of paternalism, in which the victims of paternalism have an interest not only in the
paternalistic policy but also-because of the high costs of enabling them to choose for
themselves-in the paternalism itself.
198. Gassner v. Lockett, which was pointed out to me by-Alan Rau, presents a typical fact
pattern. 101 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1958). The defendant conveyed a parcel of real property to the
plaintiff (who did not record the sale) and later reconveyed the same parcel to a third party (who
did record the sale) for a higher price, the land having appreciated in the interim. The plaintiff
sued, seeking specific performance of the original conveyance, which was unavailable in light of
the third party's good title to the land. Nevertheless, the court treated the defendant as a trustee for
the plaintiff with respect to the land and awarded the plaintiff damages that included any profit
that might have accrued to the defendant by virtue of the resale. See id. at 34.
The court reached this conclusion in spite of an express recognition that the defendant (an
old man) had displayed no bad faith in making the second sale but was merely forgetful of the
first, which introduces an interesting asymmetry into the law. Restitution is generally available to
tort victims in analogous cases only when the torts are intentional, see supra note 186, but the
plaintiff in Gassner received restitution in spite of the court's recognition that the breach was not
intentional. It seems, counterintuitively, that the law is in this respect friendlier to contract-based
than to tort-based restitutionary claims. This result is, however, the right one. It is right doctrinally
because of the conceptual point made in the main text, namely that the Gassner plaintiff's
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awarded when they are excluded from a promisee's expectation, so they are
awarded when they are included. Once again, expectation is the
conceptually fundamental remedy. Restitution is awarded only as a
particular case of expectation.
The intuition that expectation damages unfairly favor efficiently
breaching promisors, and that fairness requires restitution, thus does not
present a moral challenge to the expectation remedy: Once certain
conceptual confusions are cleared away, all plausible claims to restitution,
understood in this narrow sense,199 are revealed merely to present special
cases of the expectation remedy. By contrast, the second challenge to
expectation damages that I reported earlier, based on the intuition that
promisees who receive their full expectations in the absence of any reliance
are getting something for nothing, raises a fundamental moral question
about the expectation damages regime that cannot be dismissed by such
purely conceptual argument. Instead, a defense of expectation damages
must address this question by means of a substantive moral argument that
connects the basic ideals that underlie contractual obligation specifically
and precisely to the expectation remedy. Developing such an argument
turns out to be a tricky business indeed.
For example, Fried's well-known effort to defend the expectation
remedy by reference to the value of autonomy (which he says lies at the
root of his account of contract as promise200) fails to render the connection
between autonomy and expectation damages sufficiently precise. Fried tries
to connect autonomy to the expectation remedy in two ways. First, he
observes that a person can exercise the full power of her autonomy only if
she can, when she chooses, commit herself so as "to make nonoptional a
course of conduct that would otherwise be optional" for her.2°1 Moreover,
Fried adds, just as the making of such commitments is necessary to the
exercise of a person's autonomy, so the enforcement of such commitments
is necessary to the recognition, by others, of the person's autonomy: He
claims that "respect for others as free and rational requires taking seriously
their capacity to determine their own values" and that this requires "holding
people to their obligations," which themselves reflect these values.20 2 To
treat a person otherwise, Fried says, is to "infantilize him, as we do quite
restitutionary claim wins because it is also, and more fundamentally, a claim for expectation
damages, and this claim proceeds under a theory of strict liability. The result is morally right for a
structurally related reason. I argue in a moment that strict liability for expectation damages is
required to vindicate the value of the collaborative relation that contract (distinctively) involves.
Expectation damages in Gassner required restitution.
199. Once again, see supra note 187.
200. Fried's view is ultimately as much concerned with harm as with autonomy, although I
do not take up this interpretive complexity here. I prefer, in the present context, to focus on
Fried's views as advertised rather than to develop my own reconstruction of them.
201. FRIED, supra note l, at 13.
202. Id. at 20.
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properly when we release the very young from the consequences of their
choices. ' 20 3 For Fried, the value of autonomy requires the expectation
remedy because a failure to enforce promissory expectations against a
promisor at once diminishes and disrespects his autonomy.
The trouble with Fried's account is that although it constitutes a
plausible argument in favor of imposing some measure of damages for
breach of contract, it does not display sufficient precision to support a
preference for enforcement by means of the expectation remedy in
particular. As Richard Craswell observes, "[A]lmost any remedy-reliance
damages, punitive damages, specific performance, etc.-makes the
promised course of conduct non-optional to some degree, depending on the
severity of the threatened penalty. 2 °4 Accordingly, "[t]here is surely
nothing in the idea of individual autonomy that requires the exact degree of
non-optionality provided by the expectation measure." 205 Moreover, the
relationship between the expectation remedy and respect is similarly
tenuous. Although it is natural to say that we disrespect a person if we treat
his promises as incapable of generating any obligations at all, it is far from
clear what affirmative treatment of promises respecting a person requires.
Perhaps it is enough, for respect, to treat promises as giving rise to moral
but not to legal obligations; and perhaps it is enough to limit enforcement to
the reliance remedy. There is therefore no immediate reason to believe (and
Fried has proposed none) that respect requires the precise extent of
enforcement imposed by the expectation remedy. Fried's argument fails in
each case to establish a sufficiently precise connection between the moral
ideals from which it begins and the expectation remedy that it purports to
203. Id. at21.
204. Craswell, supra note 3, at 518.
205. Id. Although my treatment of Fried here closely follows Craswell's, a slight difference
in emphasis is worth noting. Craswell's larger aim is to argue that Fried's philosophical view of
promising cannot account for contract law's default rules quite generally. He thus adds:
The idea of individual autonomy does suggest that individuals should be allowed to
make their conduct nonoptional to any extent they choose, by specifying one of these
remedies in their contract. But the law must still select one of these remedies as the
default rule, and nothing in the notion of individual autonomy gives any reason for
favoring the expectation measure over any of the others.
Id. I am less concerned than Craswell with default rules in general, and the law's preference for
the expectation remedy establishes more than simply a default rule-recall the restrictions that the
law imposes on specific performance and penalty clauses. Moreover, whereas the ideal of
autonomy is orthogonal to contract law's preference for expectation damages cast as a default
rule, it is, at least if Craswell is right to suppose that autonomy requires leaving the extent of
enforcement up to the parties, opposed to the mandatory elements in the law's preference for
expectation damages. I include the conditional remark because it is not clear to me that Craswell
is right to suppose that the ideal of autonomy requires the remedial rules that the law adopts to be
default rules only. Perhaps autonomy is in fact best promoted by a particular remedial regime (or,
more likely, undermined by certain regimes), so that certain remedies conflict with autonomy
even if they are chosen by the parties. My only point is that Fried has not presented any reason to
believe that the law's preference for expectation damages constitutes an ideal remedial regime
with respect to autonomy.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1502 [Vol. 113: 1417
Contract and Collaboration
defend. It certainly provides no grounds specifically for preferring
expectation over reliance as the measure of contract damages.
Craswell presents his argument against Fried as part of an important
broader attack on philosophical efforts to connect contract law to the
morality of promising, in which Craswell claims that, in contrast to
economic theory, moral philosophy cannot account for many of the familiar
doctrines of contract law, including in particular the expectation remedy.2 °6
But although I agree with Craswell's view of Fried, I reject his broader
claims about philosophical argument more generally. The collaborative
ideal that I developed in the previous Part determinately favors a remedial
regime that protects promisees' expectations. Indeed, the connection
between the collaborative ideal and the expectation remedy extends even
into some of the details of that remedy's administration. The account of
contractual obligation that I have developed consequently makes it possible
for me not just to argue for the expectation remedy in general but also to
take sides in certain doctrinal disputes that arise within the expectation-
based regime of contract damages. I take up each of these claims in turn,
moving from the more general to the more particular. At the general level,
the fundamental moral choice concerning contract remedies is, as I have
said, the choice between the expectation remedy (with restitution
assimilated into it) and the reliance remedy.0 7 I therefore begin by taking
up this choice and arguing that reliance damages fail to vindicate the
collaborative ideal, which demands the greater measure of damages
contemplated by the expectation remedy.
A promisor has a duty to protect her promisee's reasonable reliance, to
be sure. I do not deny that a person who relies on the words or actions of
another and is harmed when her trust is betrayed may, in appropriate
circumstances, recover her losses; nor do I deny that such claims can arise
in and around contracts. Persons have a general duty not to treat others
merely as means, and a promisor who encourages her promisee to rely
when this serves her own purposes and then abandons him to bear the costs
of his reliance violates this duty. But the contractual setting is in such cases
not the ground but merely the background of the promisor's duty. And the
reliance remedy casts the promisor's wrong in such cases as of a piece with
the wrongs she might commit by harming and using another person in any
number of ways, for example by simple, nonpromissory deception or
coercion.
Just as persons must refrain from treating even strangers merely as
means, so they must of course refrain from treating their contract partners
206. See Craswell, supra note 3.
207. As I explained earlier, expectation and restitution (as I am understanding it) do not
establish morally distinct remedial regimes, and there is therefore nothing morally interesting
about restitution as a remedy for breach of contract.
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merely as means. But persons may satisfy the requirement that they not
treat each other merely as means and yet remain strangers or indeed become
estranged. And contract is not just an application of the morality of
interactions among strangers. Contract involves patterns of interlocking
intentions, in which each party's intentions are end-providing for the other
and in which each party intends to give the other authority over her future
actions. These patterns of intentions cause contract to generate a morally
valuable relation-a relation of collaboration-among the parties. And the
parties are able, through this relation, to move beyond refraining
(negatively) from using each other merely as means, and instead
(affirmatively) to recognize each other as ends in themselves. Contract is a
mechanism through which persons may cease to be strangers and enter into
a community.
The reliance remedy fails to recognize this central feature of contract.
When it measures the parties' remedial claims by comparing their
postbreach positions to the positions that they occupied, as strangers, in the
status quo ante, the reliance remedy, looking backwards, treats the parties
as if they had remained strangers. The reliance remedy cannot, therefore,
underwrite the central moral innovation that contract represents-the
collaborative relation of mutual respect that contract involves. To support
this communal relation, a contract remedy must not just reflect the parties'
duties (carried over from their prior relation as strangers) to refrain from
using each other merely as means but must, additionally, reflect the parties'
further forward-looking commitment affirmatively to treat each other as
ends in themselves, which lies at the core of the collaborative relation
established through the contract.
This commitment is expressed through the interlocking pattern of
intentions and ends that constitutes contract's substance. Promisors treat
their promisees as ends in themselves by sharing the ends of contracts with
their promisees. These ends are, in the first instance, that the contracts be
performed-that the promisees be put in the position that they would have
occupied save for a breach. But even where there is a breach, the relation
between promisor and promisee can be salvaged as long as the promisor
presents her promisee with a replacement that has the same value to the
promisee as the promised performance, which is to say that it satisfies the
promisee's expectations in the contract. A promisor who pays expectation
damages continues to collaborate with her promisee, in spite of her breach.
Indeed, the payment of expectation damages may be understood as
presenting an extension of the meshing subplans and interlocking intentions
that characterized the collaborative community of contract in the first place.
A promisor and promisee share ends (and the promisor treats the promisee
as an end) by intending to adjust their actions to bring about the shared ends
of the promise, and by giving each other authority to require such
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adjustments. The payment of expectation damages is just the consummation
of these intentions-the final adjustment (by the breaching promisor) of her
actions to make a substitute for the promised performance come about and
the final recognition of the promisee's authority to demand this
performance. Expectation damages encompass the exact ends whose
sharing enables the parties to contracts to treat each other as ends in
themselves. And, in this way, expectation damages precisely track the
contracting parties' transformation from strangers to collaborators and
vindicate the distinctive value of the collaborative community that this
transformation engenders.
This argument explains why promisors' contractual duties extend
beyond protecting their promisees' reliance and, moreover, forges a precise
connection between the morality of contract and the expectation remedy.
The connection arises, however, at a formal level only. The collaborative
theory of contract supports the expectation remedy but offers no insight into
determining the content of promisees' expectations in particular cases. As I
argued earlier, remedies that allow promisors to retain the gains from
efficient breaches, remedies that require promisors to disgorge these gains
to their promisees, and even remedies that require promisors specifically to
perform contracts may all be cast, formally, as protecting promisees'
expectations interpreted in the relevant ways. The collaborative view of
contract does not join the debate among these substantive alternatives,
which it leaves to familiar arguments concerning efficiency,
administrability, and individual liberty. The collaborative view will
sanction all three outcomes in the right circumstances, provided of course
that they can be cast in the form of the expectation remedy.
The collaborative view does not leave the expectation remedy
completely devoid of content, however, because not every substantive
remedy can be cast, formally, as the expected outcome of a collaborative
relationship. Some substantive remedies are ruled out because casting
contractual expectations in terms of these remedies would undermine any
collaboration that a contract might involve. Moreover, these limiting cases
of collaboration are no mere theoretical constructions, but instead place
practically important lower and upper bounds on the remedies to which
disappointed promisees are entitled. And finally, these limits turn out to be
reflected in the positive law.
First, the collaborative ideal imposes a substantive lower bound on
remedies for breach of contract. The practical effect of this lower bound is
to restrict contracting parties' freedom to limit the damages that promisees
may recover in case of breach. Many limitations on damages can, of course,
straightforwardly be recast as altering promisee expectations and are
therefore perfectly consistent with the collaborative ideal and with the
morality of contract. Efforts to exclude consequential damages from a
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promisee's remedies present a typical and prominent example. Just as a
contract clause that requires a promisor to transfer the gains from efficient
breaches to her promisee can be understood as increasing the promisee's
expectations under the contract, so a clause that protects a promisor from
liability for consequential damages can be understood as decreasing the
promisee's expectations. But not every limitation of damages can be
understood as consistent with the expectation remedy and the collaborative
ideal in this way. In particular, the morality of contract is inconsistent with
the parties' agreeing that a disappointed promisee's damages shall be
limited to his reliance.
The reliance remedy that my earlier argument excluded from contract
cannot reenter the arena by being recast in the form of the parties'
expectations. The collaborative ideal upon which the earlier argument
depended is more robust than this suggestion allows. A contract term that
limits a promisee's remedy to reliance damages specifically undermines
any contractual expectations that the promisee might otherwise entertain.
Such a term expressly rejects any forward-looking commitments that the
contract containing it might otherwise encompass and expressly denies the
promisee authority to require the promisor to provide the promised
performance, and it therefore nullifies whatever sharing of ends the rest of
the contract proposes and undoes whatever collaboration the contract might
otherwise involve. Simply put, a term limiting a promisee's remedies to
reliance damages returns the parties to their original state as strangers. This
observation just repeats and enforces the conclusion of the earlier argument
that rejected reliance damages as the general remedy for breach of contract:
Reliance damages are characteristic of relations among strangers who may
not treat each other merely as means and yet do not treat each other as ends
in themselves. But contractual obligation, and the expectation remedy that it
involves, are distinctive precisely for enabling persons to cease to be
strangers and to come to treat each other as ends.
This is not to say that persons who exchange assurances but limit their
liability to reliance enter into no relation at all. They may have joint
intentions of the forms that Bratman describes, and they may owe
obligations to each other that they do not owe persons generally. In
particular, such persons have given notice that their representations may be
relied upon, so that if one of them abandons her intentions without making
good the other's reliance, she will have bypassed his will and treated him,
impermissibly, as a mere means. But although such persons may owe each
other obligations that they do not owe persons generally (because they
have, in effect, expanded the tort of misrepresentation beyond its usual
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20bounds), they remain strangers.208 The reason is that the intentions and
obligations associated with such representations do not come together: The
obligations do not secure the intentions, as the collaborative relation, and
the form of respect that this relation involves, require.2 °9 Critically, the
obligations are not obligations to secure the success of the intentions, so
that even if the assurances allow persons to share ends, they do not allow
persons to treat each other as ends. 1°
Moreover, the legal regime that governs efforts to limit promisees'
remedies resonates with these ideas. The most articulate treatment of the
issue appears in section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC
specifies, in subsection 1, that the parties to a contract may limit damages
for breach as they choose (subject, of course, to general considerations
concerning unconscionability 21 ) and establishes some basic interpretive
presumptions to govern such efforts.21 2 This matches my theoretical
observation that most limitations of remedies may be recast as special cases
of the expectation remedy and should be enforced under this heading. But
then the UCC adds, in subsection two, that "[w]here circumstances cause an
exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be
had as provided in this Act., 213 Moreover, as the comments to the UCC
make plain, subsection 2 applies even apart from general concerns about
substantive fairness and unconscionability: "[W]here an apparently fair and
reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates
to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give
way to the general remedy provisions of this Article., 214 Section 2-719(2)
requires, in other words, that promisees retain some distinctively
promissory remedy, some remnant of the value of the bargain, something
that may be cast as a contractual expectation. 21 5 The law thus supports the
208. There is no contradiction in this. Someone may owe one person an obligation that she
does not owe another and yet be, in my sense, equally a stranger to both, which is to say that she
may be in community with neither. Just think of a person who has rendered another vulnerable to
her and owes that person a special duty of care.
209. When persons exchange assurances backed only by a reliance remedy, their intentions in
favor of each other are limited to intentions not to harm each other-intentions that may exist
even among strangers-and do not compass whatever shared ends they adopt.
210. I would like to thank Richard Craswell for persuading me of the need to emphasize this
point.
211. See U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1997).
212. See id. § 2-719(1).
213. Id. § 2-719(2).
214. Id. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
215. Courts have not always applied section 2-719(2) in a manner that is entirely consistent
with my interpretation of the Code or with the official comment. The clause most commonly
arises in connection with cases in which a contract expressly limits a buyer's remedies to repair or
replacement of the goods, and "[t]here is now broad consensus among the courts that a seller's
failure to effect a timely and satisfactory cure indicates that an exclusive repair or replacement
limitation has failed of its essential purpose." John A. Sebert, Jr., Rejection, Revocation, and Cure
Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Modest Proposals, 84 Nw. U. L. REV.
375, 396 (1990). This is as my view of the matter recommends, but even where courts in such
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collaborative ideal by ensuring that when the parties to a contract have been
collaborating, but their initial arrangement comes, as events develop, to lose
its distinctively contractual, collaborative character, then the terms of the
arrangement will be reformed to reinstate a contractual remedy and restore
the collaborative relation.
216
Furthermore, the collaborative ideal also imposes a substantive upper
bound on contract remedies. The practical effect of this upper bound is to
reject punitive damages as a general remedy for breach of contract. Punitive
damages require breaching promisors to make additional payments to
promisees, over and above any compensation for the lost benefits of
performance and even over and above restitutionary disgorgement. They do
not serve to secure or complete the collaboration or to protect the
promisee's interest or expectation in the collaborative venture, but instead
look to burden the breaching promisor with a punishment or reprimand. The
collaborative ideal rejects punitive damages for breach of contract because
cases strike down limitations of remedy clauses under section 2-719(2), they remain reluctant to
allow buyers to take advantage of the full range of remedies "as provided in this Act" to which the
Code refers. See, e.g., Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 527 A.2d 429, 438
(N.J. 1987) (limiting the application of section 2-719(2) to allow buyers to recover full
consequential damages only in cases in which "circumstances of the transaction, including the
seller's breach, cause the consequential damage exclusion to be inconsistent with the intent and
reasonable commercial expectations of the parties"). Moreover, courts sometimes limit a buyer's
remedy in such cases to some form of returning the goods and receiving a refund of his purchase
price. See Sebert, supra, at 396 (noting that when exclusive remedies fail to fulfill their essential
purposes, a "buyer at least would be entitled to reject or to revoke her acceptance"); see also
U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(a) (expressly authorizing limitations of damages to a repayment of the price of
defective goods purchased). This is in effect the reliance remedy that my philosophical argument
finds insufficient to underwrite a contractual relationship. I am tempted to say that courts in such
cases do not proceed in contract at all but instead treat the parties as strangers and approach the
plaintiff's claim as sounding in the tort of misrepresentation. Insofar as the law sanctions this
approach, it weakens contractual collaboration.
216. It is worth observing that section 2-719(2) precisely replicates the formal structure of the
consideration doctrine: The Code allows the parties to limit remedies and displays no special
concern (beyond the general application of the unconscionability doctrine) for the substantive
adequacy or fairness of such remedies as remain. But at the same time, the Code insists on the fact
of some remedy that does not fail of its essential purpose, and that thus remains distinctively
contractual. Moreover, the subject matter of section 2-719(2) is of a piece with the subject matter
of the consideration doctrine: A promise in which the promisee relinquishes every remedy is in
effect a gratuitous promise rather than a bargain. It certainly does not participate in the
collaborative ideal, because the promisee in such a case disavows, through the limitation-of-
remedy clause, the authority to demand performance upon which that ideal depends. This makes it
natural to ask why the law enforces such promises at all-why it does not just find contracts
whose exclusive remedies fail of their essential purposes void for lack of consideration. I suspect
that the best answer to this question is that the cases in which section 2-719(2) is invoked present
parties who have, in spite of the limitation-of-remedy clause, clearly been collaborating but fall
afoul of the technical requirements of the consideration doctrine. The law imposes a default
remedy to complete the collaboration that has so obviously been ongoing. This approach,
moreover, closely tracks the law's treatment of consideration in exclusive dealings or
requirements contracts which, as I observed previously, see supra text accompanying notes
169-170, also creates consideration when none otherwise exists in order to support ongoing,
evidently collaborative relations. In both cases, the law steps in to repair technical inadequacies in
relations, the main lines of which are clearly collaborative.
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it rejects the suggestion that a promisor who breaches a contract-but
does nothing more-acts wrongfully in any sense that might justify
punishing her.
To understand why the collaborative view rejects punitive damages as a
general remedy for breach of contract, it is helpful to return to the Kantian
ideas from which this approach to the morality of contract set out, and in
particular to the Formula of Humanity. This principle, as I have repeatedly
observed, identifies two ways in which one person may wrong another and
therefore identifies two classes of conduct for which punishment might be
appropriate: First, one person might use another merely as a means; and
second, she might fail to treat him as an end. A simple breach of contract
involves neither wrong. First, it has been clear since early in the argument
that a promisor who breaches a contract does not generally manipulate her
promisee or use him merely as a means. As long as she approached the
contract honestly-that is, with the intention of performing-her
subsequent breach does not manipulate her promisee at all.217 And second,
the recent discussion of expectation damages reveals that a breaching
promisor need not even estrange herself from her promisee, but may, in
spite of the breach, continue to treat her promisee as an end in himself. She
does so by paying compensatory damages that secure her promisee's
expectations in the shared ends that the contractual collaboration involved.
A simple breach of contract, without more, therefore does not constitute
a wrong that the collaborative theory of contract recognizes. Moreover,
insofar as punitive damages cause a promisee to prefer his promisor's
breach over her performance, they give him an incentive to induce her to
breach and in this way encourage him to adopt ends in which she cannot
possibly share. Accordingly, quite apart from being unnecessary for
vindicating collaboration, punitive damages in fact actively corrode
collaboration. This cements the collaborative view's opposition to punitive
damages in connection with simple breaches of contract, because such
damages are now cast as affirmatively hostile to collaboration. In reaching
this conclusion, the collaborative view once again matches the positive law,
which also denies punitive damages in ordinary cases of breach of
contract.
218
Of course, the fact that punitive damages should not generally be
awarded for simple breach of contract does not entail that punitive damages
should never be awarded for any breach of contract, and both the
collaborative view and legal doctrine contemplate punitive damages in
certain special cases. Two special cases in particular deserve mention, both
because they return (once again) to the two components of the Formula of
217. But recall, once again, the cautionary note struck above. See supra note 26.
218. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-106(1).
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Humanity and because they resonate with the positive law. First, and
uncontroversially, a breaching promisor, even though she does not treat her
promisee merely as a means simply by breaching, may yet treat him as a
means by some other actions that accompany her breach. Her breach may
involve fraud (perhaps in connection with a lying promise) or force
(perhaps in connection with duress). In each of these cases, the promisor's
actions would, quite apart from the contract, wrong even a stranger, and this
wrong may deserve punishment, including punishment imposed through
punitive damages. The law recognizes this possibility by allowing punitive
damages in cases in which a breach of contract also constitutes an
independent tort.219
Second, and more controversially, a breaching promisor may fail to
treat her promisee as an end insofar as she does not just breach her promise
but also refuses to pay the compensatory expectation damages that
vindicating contractual collaboration requires. In this case, even though the
breaching promisor does not use her promisee as a means, she does render
sharing ends with him impossible and in this sense, as I have said before,
estranges herself from him. Such estrangement constitutes a wrong,
although whether this wrong justifies punishment seems to me uncertain
(after all, it does not inflict harm in any straightforward sense). The law
quite possibly also recognizes both this wrong and its uncertain status, in
the form of the controversial doctrine of bad faith breach of contract,
20
although the uncertain and uneven development of this doctrine makes it
difficult to say whether the doctrinal category of bad faith in fact tracks the
idea of estrangement that the collaborative view proposes.221
219. See, e.g., Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison Bros. Stores Inc., 630 F.2d 379, 384 (5th Cir.
1980).
220. See, e.g., Chung v. Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Haw. 1980); Dold v. Outrigger
Hotel, 501 P.2d 368 (Haw. 1972). Both cases were abrogated by Francis v. Lee Enterprises Inc.,
971 P.2d 707 (Haw. 1999).
221. The collaborative theory of contract and the positive law of remedies perhaps converge
on another point also. The collaborative view's conclusion that punitive damages corrode
collaboration is perhaps matched in the law's reluctance to enforce liquidated damages clauses
that impose penalties on breaching parties. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 356; U.C.C.
§ 2-718(1). Note that civil law seems less hostile to penalty clauses. For example, Article 1152 of
the French Civil Code enforces liquidated damages provisions quite generally, including penalty
clauses, although a 1985 amendment allows judges to reduce penalties that are plainly too large or
too small. See MEGA CODE CIVIL 1302 (Xavier Henry et al. eds., 5th ed. 2003).
My uncertainty here reflects the fact that although some penalty clauses likely would
constitute party-chosen punitive remedy regimes, it is far from clear that all would do so, and it is
not at all clear how to distinguish punitive penalty clauses from those that serve some other
purpose. Part of the difficulty involved in understanding the relationship between penalty clauses
and punitive damages arises out of the fact that the economics of penalty clauses is itself a
difficult subject. For many years, lawyer-economists believed penalty clauses quite generally to
be inefficient. This led some to abandon the standard inference from a term's appearance in a
contract to the fact that it was chosen by the parties, and to replace this with an inference that
penalty clauses involved mistake or fraud, thereby justifying the law's refusal to enforce them.
See, e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages,
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The collaborative theory of contract confines the expectation remedy
between reliance damages as a lower bound and punitive damages as an
upper bound. In doing so, it forges a precise connection, of a kind that has
eluded alternative approaches to contract, between the morality of contract
and expectation damages (including some details of the law's
administration of expectation damages). The first-order analysis of the
connection between collaboration and contract remedies is therefore
complete, but a second-order question still deserves attention. This
concerns the character of the collaborative ideal upon which the first-order
argument in favor of the expectation remedy depends and, in particular, the
question whether a liberal state may properly deploy its coercive power to
impose contract remedies on the basis of this ideal.
This question arises because it is one of the basic tenets of liberalism
that a society's laws may not enforce controversial moral ideals,222 and one
of the consequences of this basic principle is to impose limits on the
reasons for which the law may enforce contracts. Even an argument that
manages to establish a precise connection between a moral principle and a
remedial regime will nevertheless fail to justify providing this remedy at
law if the principle is itself inappropriately controversial, and this entails
that the law may not enforce contracts simply for the reason that, according
to some substantive moral view, it is wrong to breach them. "[E]nforcing
voluntary obligations," observes Raz (referring to promissory and
contractual obligations), "is not itself a proper goal for contract law." 223 The
reason for this, Raz continues, is that "[t]o enforce voluntary obligations
[for their own sakes] is to enforce morality through the legal imposition of
duties on individuals. 224 Indeed, as Raz says, "[i]n this respect, it does not
differ from the legal proscription of pornography." 225 At the same time,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (1984). Others took the inefficiency of penalty clauses to entail that
sophisticated parties, at least, would never adopt them and therefore disapproved of the law's
refusal to enforce penalty clauses on the ground that it invited courts incorrectly to identify valid
liquidated damages clauses as unenforceable penalties. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 197, at
383-87. Both approaches make most sense against the backdrop of the clear inefficiency of
penalty remedies; they disagree only about evidence and inference. Aaron Edlin and Alan
Schwartz, however, now challenge this conventional wisdom and argue that certain liquidated
damages clauses imposing supracompensatory remedies are efficient because they are necessary
to induce efficient investment. See Edlin, supra note 181; Edlin & Schwartz, supra note 181.
The moral analysis of penalty clauses (at least, the moral analysis proposed by the
collaborative theory of contract) is sensitive to the outcome of these economic investigations.
Although I am not prepared to say that inefficient penalty clauses are necessarily punitive, I am
tempted by the view that efficient penalties are not punitive. Such efficient penalties do not
corrode the parties' collaboration but rather increase its value.
222. The precise content of this principle is, of course, itself the subject of a vigorous debate,
which I discuss briefly below. See infra note 228.
223. Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 916, 937 (1982)
(reviewing ATIYAH, supra note 56).
224. Id.
225. Id.
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contracts may be enforced in the service of ends that do not involve
controversial moral ideals. Raz identifies the prevention of harm to
promisees as the principal example of an acceptable end, 6 and the
promotion of economic efficiency perhaps represents another such end.
Moreover, familiar moral interventions in the law of contracts-for
example, efforts to bring moral ideals of fidelity or faithfulness to bear on
the choice of contract remedies-violate these principles of liberal restraint.
Even if a moral argument connecting ideals of fidelity and faithfulness to
some contract remedy or other could be established,227 this argument could
not possibly support imposing the remedy at law. The principle of fidelity
to one's word, understood in this way, is without question a controversial
moral ideal. It is connected to controversial moral conceptions of integrity
and honor and perhaps even to religious principles concerning oaths. (The
principle of fidelity is in this respect perhaps not much different from the
moral principles of sexual purity that underlie a certain form of the
condemnation of pornography.) It is at odds with more prosaic, more
secular conceptions of morality, according to which placing a special
emphasis on promissory obligations, as distinct from more general
sentiments of kindness and regard for others, involves at best rule-worship
and at worst self-indulgent conceit. Even if the principle of fidelity favored
a particular remedy for breach of contract, a liberal state whose contract law
established this remedy on this ground would impermissibly legislate
morality.
228
226. "Compensating individuals for harm resulting from reliance on voluntary obligation
is ... a proper goal for the law." Id. Raz concludes that, as an initial matter, reliance damages are
more easily defensible than expectation damages. He adds, however, that expectation damages
may nevertheless be defensible by an indirect root that connects expectation damages to the
prevention of harm under the theory that the expectation remedy is necessary to protect the
practice of contract and the demise of this practice would cause harm. See id.
227. The principal efforts in this direction attempt to argue that fidelity requires promisors
specifically to perform their promises or at least to deliver any proceeds from efficient breaches to
their promisees. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 185, at 245-64; Friedmann, supra note 185. 1
have argued that these efforts fall into a conceptual confusion concerning restitution and
expectation. See supra note 196. Now it appears that even if this judgment is mistaken, moral
arguments from fidelity cannot support legal doctrines concerning remedies.
228. Fried's proposal that the value of autonomy can underwrite expectation damages stands
in a significantly more complex relation to liberal principles of restraint. And although I doubt
that autonomy is in fact connected to expectation damages as Fried proposes, see supra notes 200-
205 and accompanying text, it remains instructive to ask whether this connection, if real, would
justify expectation damages on terms that the liberal state could accept. Fried clearly recognizes
that liberalism rejects using state power in the service of controversial moral ideals: He asks
whether enforcing promises (in the service of autonomy) is consistent with, as he puts it, the basic
liberal distinction between the good and the right, see FRIED, supra note 1, at 7-8, by which he
means to refer to the liberal principle that the state may not engage its power in the service of
controversial conceptions of the good. But Fried's question about his view is not easy to answer,
because it engages in the dispute about the fundamental character of liberal restraint.
Some liberals, including most famously Mill, see JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David
Spitz ed., Norton & Co. 1975) (1859), and Raz, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
(1986), conceive of autonomy as a special kind of value and hold that the liberal refusal to enforce
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The collaborative ideal, by contrast, may underwrite a liberal state's
exercise of coercive power. Collaboration does not present a substantive
moral value in any ordinary sense but rather articulates a highly flexible
form of relation among persons. The pattern of interlocking intentions upon
which collaboration depends can arise (and can underwrite a community in
which persons cease to be strangers and come to treat each other as ends in
themselves) no matter what substantive content the patterned intentions
take on. Moreover, this feature of collaboration is carried forward into the
more particular legal doctrines that the collaborative ideal supports, as is
illustrated by each of the doctrinal discussions presented a moment ago:
The consideration doctrine insists on the form but remains indifferent to the
substance of collaboration, and the expectation remedy similarly focuses
the law on the forward-looking form of contractual expectations but allows
the parties to adopt any substantive expectations that may be expressed in
this form. Collaboration is, therefore, a mode of interaction that remains
equally available to persons regardless of the sectarian content with which
they seek to fill it. And finally, the moral underpinnings of the collaborative
relation reinforce collaboration's nonsectarian character. The collaborative
ideal of community does not impose any requirements of mutual support or
intimacy on those who engage it (recall the distinction between
morality does not extend to autonomy. Rather, such "comprehensive liberals" insist, autonomy
represents the condition under which liberal restraint is justified, because it presents the condition
under which individuals may choose freely among the several more ordinary moral values that
liberal restraint requires the state to refrain from enforcing. Fried's autonomy-based view of
enforcing contract clearly falls into this camp; indeed, Fried presents the connection between
autonomy and the expectation remedy in precisely this light, by casting expectation damages as
necessary for according appropriate respect to persons' powers autonomously to choose their
values. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 20-21. If comprehensive liberalism provides the right account
of liberal restraint, then a liberal state might enforce the expectation remedy on Fried's grounds
(provided, of course, that the connection Fried draws between autonomy and expectation damages
were correct).
Other liberals, however, including most notably Rawls, take a different view of liberal
restraint, according to which even autonomy (at least in the rich version that Mill, Raz, and Fried
champion) itself represents a controversial moral ideal that liberal states may not enforce. See
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); RAWLS, supra note 56. Such "neutralist liberals"
emphasize that the ideal of autonomy is at odds with the host of moral views that reject the
comprehensive liberal's focus on individual choice among ends, and instead see the good life as
involving a connection between a person's ends and her broader culture, including perhaps even
structures of authority. Thus, in the present context, neutralist liberals observe that many perfectly
respectable moral views-many religiously based conceptions of charity and forgiveness, for
example-reject Fried's idea that we respect persons by enforcing their autonomously chosen
commitments against them. On the neutralist view, then, liberal states may not enforce
expectation damages on the basis of the value of autonomy, and Fried's argument for the
expectation remedy ultimately fails (even if it could succeed at connecting autonomy to
expectation damages in the first place).
I do not argue in favor of one or the other conception of liberalism here. I have introduced
the distinction only to show that Fried's autonomy-based defense of expectation damages depends
on resolving it in a particular way. The collaboration-based argument for expectation damages
that I introduce in the main text, by contrast, does not present these difficulties. It is compatible
with both comprehensive and neutralist principles of liberal restraint.
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collaboration and cooperation), and collaboration may arise among persons
whose association is motivated purely by self-interest on all sides.
Collaboration is not, of course, devoid of all normative content-no guide
to action possibly could be-but its normative commitments are all thin and
formal in precisely the ways that the liberal vision of politics requires.
CONCLUSION
These pages have presented a new philosophical account of promise
and contract that attempts to reclaim these practices as independent,
distinctive, and central elements of our moral and political experience. The
account does not focus on promisors or promisees considered severally, as
traditional views have done, but instead focuses on the relation that
promises and contracts establish among those who engage them. When
persons make promises and contracts, they cease to be strangers and come
to treat each other, affirmatively, as ends in themselves. When persons
break promises and contracts, by contrast, they render the sharing of ends
impossible, at least in respect of the promised performance, and in this way
become not merely strangers, but actively estranged. The morality of
promise and contract therefore engages one of the most basic values in our
practical lives, and this value underwrites every element of promissory and
contractual obligation.
The approach that I have developed produces insights at several,
increasingly concrete, levels of analysis. Most abstractly, it explains the
relationship between the moral experience of making promises and
contracts on the one hand, and of keeping them on the other; it explains the
formal role that the obligation to keep promises and contracts plays in our
all-things-considered practical reasoning, the way in which this obligation
appears to us as a constraint upon our actions; and it resolves an old and
familiar puzzle about the distinctive place of the will among the grounds of
promissory and contractual obligation. Intermediately, the theory explains
how the legal practice of contract, in which parties may be motivated by
their narrow self-interests and may interact in discrete transactions only,
might nevertheless participate in the broader ideal of treating persons as
ends in themselves and in the broader relation of respectful community that
this ideal invokes. To this end, the theory articulates an ideal of
collaboration that, even as it falls short of full-blooded cooperation,
nevertheless invokes the forms of respectful recognition upon which the
morality of promising quite generally depends. And most concretely, the
structure of contractual collaboration suggests resolutions to familiar
puzzles of legal doctrine, involving consideration and expectation damages,
that have eluded alternative views.
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My argument has therefore worked its way steadily inward, which is
natural and proper in an effort to explain particular legal practices in terms
of general moral principles. The task of the theory going forward, by
contrast, will be to work its way back outward-to connect the specific
collaborative ideal that I have identified as the foundation of contract in
particular to broader ideals of respect and community that figure
prominently in the overall scheme of liberal moral and political
justification, within which the legal practice of contract appears. This is, as
I have repeatedly suggested, properly a task for the next stage in a larger
movement of thought to which the argument of these pages contributes, but
which it does not exhaust. Nevertheless, it is possible, in concluding the
present phase of the argument, to look ahead a little and to see, in rough
outline, how the next phase will go. This will have the effect of shoring up
the approach to contract developed here by revealing that the collaborative
ideal that I have found at the center of contract is not just attractive in itself,
but also plays an essential part in the broader ambitions of liberal political
thought.229
The next phase of the argument will begin from the familiar
observation that public order and social stability are fragile achievements.
Persons face constant incentives to defect from the coordinated schemes on
which these goods depend and to pursue their own ends more vigorously
than coordination allows. Too frequent defections undermine coordination
entirely, render public order and social stability unsustainable, and
introduce a state of affairs that is worse, for every person, than the
coordinated state that it replaces. The first end of politics, including liberal
politics, is therefore to sustain coordination in the face of the incentives to
defect.
These incentives to defect fall into two categories. To begin with,
defection may serve persons' narrow self-interest more effectively than
coordination: Coordinated schemes allocate property rights, for example,
and one person may appropriate another's holdings to serve her own
interests. The stability of coordination depends, therefore, on overcoming
egoism, that is, persons' tendency to care only about their own interests.
229. In this way, looking ahead will help allay concerns that the collaborative approach to
contract that I have developed in these pages presents nothing more than a moral curiosity, or
alternatively, that it presents only the minimum moral content of the contract relation-a sort of
baseline below which contract becomes impossible (or at least morally empty). The first concern
is that the collaborative account of contract represents a mere sideshow to more important
arguments that seek to justify contract on alternative grounds (including, perhaps, the more
traditional grounds of serving autonomy, preventing harm, and promoting well-being). The
second concern is that the collaborative account of contract represents a mere beginning to an
argument that asks what more intensive forms of sharing contract should incorporate, as under
Anthony Kronman's well-known argument. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and
Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
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But even where egoism has been overcome, coordination remains
insecure. Even persons who display an impartial concern for the interests of
others, and who never pursue their own interests more vigorously than this
impartial concern for the general interest allows, will nevertheless disagree
about what the general interest is. And defection may, once again, enable
persons to promote their impartial but nevertheless sectarian conceptions of
the general interest more effectively than coordination allows: Coordinated
schemes also allocate influence over collective decisionmaking, and one
person may seek to usurp another's influence in order to serve not her own
private interest but her sectarian view of the general interest. The stability
of coordination therefore depends on overcoming not only egoism but also
egocentrism, that is, persons' tendency, even if they display an impartial
concern for the general interest, to care only about their own points of view
of what the general interest is.
230
Political theories may be separated into three classes, according to their
attitudes toward social coordination and the problems of overcoming
egoism and egocentrism. The political theories in the first class conclude
that not even egoism can be overcome and, therefore, that sustaining social
stability and public order depends upon establishing a government so
powerful that each person's narrow self-interest is always best served by
cooperating with its commands. These absolutist theories insist, with
Hobbes, that the minimal solution to the problem of sustaining public order
is also the maximal solution. The political theories in the second class
conclude that egoism can be overcome but that egocentrism cannot be and,
therefore, that sustaining social stability and public order depends upon
establishing a government that imposes a universally accepted conception
of the general interest. These totalitarian theories insist that public order
depends upon uniform, all-encompassing devotion to one vision of the
general good. Finally, the political theories in the third class conclude that
both egoism and egocentrism may be overcome and, therefore, that social
stability and public order may be sustained even in an open, pluralist
society. These liberal theories insist that public order may be sustained by
political justifications that address each person, separately, from her own
point of view.
Liberal political theories therefore adopt the most ambitious approach
to the problem of sustaining public order that is conceptually available and,
consequently, bear the heavy persuasive burdens of explaining how the
principles and institutions that they propose can overcome both egoism and
egocentrism. In future work, I will argue that contract contributes to
liberalism's efforts to meet the second of these burdens. More specifically, I
230. An impartial concern for the interests of all will not, of course, help to overcome
egocentrism because it is itself a source of egocentrism.
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will seek to display the practice of contract, understood along the
collaborative lines that I have developed here, as a proving ground for
overcoming egocentrism. In light of the intimate connection that exists
between contract as a legal institution and the market as an economic
institution, this argument will contribute to the venerable, if episodic,
tradition of scholarly debate about whether the market exercises a civilizing
or destructive influence on the individual persons who come under it and on
political and social relations among these persons.23' The argument's
distinctive contribution will be to address this question in a philosophical
and normative mode rather than (as is more common) in a sociological and
positive mode. I will argue that contract-and through contract the
market-has an effect on the reasons persons have, and not just the
characters that they display, that supports a particularly ambitious, liberal
solution to the problem of social unity.
The basic associations in which this argument will traffic are
straightforward enough. The parties to contracts, in forming a collaborative
community, commit themselves to a mutually responsive, interlocking
pattern of intentions in which each takes certain of the other's intentions as
end-producing for herself and each gives the other authority over her
intentions. A party to a contract engages, therefore, not with the other
party's interests as she understands them, but directly with the other party's
point of view, as expressed through his contractual intentions, to which she
must accommodate herself. Contractual collaboration therefore depends
precisely upon a commitment to overcoming egocentrism, at least in the
context of the contract. Moreover, insofar as the practice of forming
interlocking contractual intentions efficiently serves the (often conflicting)
ends that the several parties bring to their contractual relations,232 contract
enlists persons' narrow self-interest in the service of overcoming
egocentrism. And finally, in light of my earlier argument that promises and
contracts enable persons to cease to be strangers and to attend to their basic
needs for community-as expressed in Arendt's idea of "the will to live
together with others in the mode of acting and speaking" 233-- contract also
enlists persons' broader ethical interests in the service of overcoming
egocentrism.
Going forward, I will seek to develop these ideas and to display the
characteristically liberal forms of social solidarity that contract
encourages-forms of solidarity that do without intimacy and so avoid the
231. The most prominent recent contribution to this literature is Albert 0. Hirschmann, Rival
Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 1463
(1982).
232. The economic theory of contract is, after all, right as far as it goes: Contracts are often
efficient mechanisms for generating beneficial reliance.
233. ARENDT, supra note 34, at 246.
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taint of the clan. I shall try, in effect, to trace the progress of sentiments that
defuse egocentrism by analogy to the way in which Hume traced the
progress of sentiments that defuse egoism. I shall claim that the practice of
contract-through the collaborative ideals that it involves-plays an
essential role in this progress. I shall therefore seek to reject the common
view that, regardless of their efficiency or other instrumental attractions,
contract and other market-based practices present an intrinsically debased
form of human interaction, in which persons are motivated by the uglier
forms of self-interest, including most notably fear and greed.234 This view
underestimates, to my mind, the deeply and intrinsically communal
character of contractual and market relations, and ignores these relations'
contributions to addressing the threats to social solidarity that egoism and
egocentrism pose. In an earlier article, I observed that market relations,
whatever their other connections to self-interest, also provide the measure
of what overcoming egoism requires.235 In the future, I shall argue that the
market-in connection with the practice of contract-presents the vehicle
'through which egocentrism may be overcome as well.
234. A typical example of this view appears in G.A. Cohen, Back to Socialist Basics,
1/207 NEW LEFT REV. 3, 9 (1994).
235. See Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291
(2003). In taking this approach, I followed Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of
Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
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